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Abstract 
The Turkish government commenced banking deregulation reforms with the objective of 
fostering competition in the early 1980s. Yet several financial crises emerged in the 
aftermath of the reforms, indicating structural weaknesses. The financial crisis in 2001 has 
been a cornerstone of the regulatory framework, changing the policy focus from 
deregulation to stability. This study aims to investigate the evolution of the regulatory 
reforms on cost structure characteristics and on ownership. It also evaluates the impact of 
reforms on the dynamic of competition in the loan market. Changes in accounting rules 
and introduction of re-regulation policies took place as of 2002, resulting in previous 
literature focus on either side of the change. This thesis builds a homogenous data set to 
allow for accounting changes and to look at the whole reform process, enabling it to draw 
more robust comparisons and policy implications. It accordingly uses a comprehensive and 
unique panel dataset of 51 banks for the period 1988-2016, capturing the pre- and post-
reform periods. 
 
To examine the impact of reforms on cost efficiency and ownership, a stochastic cost 
frontier with inefficiency determinants is estimated. The results suggest that pure cost 
technology trend worsens over time, confirming that banks have yet to adjust to the new 
regulatory environment. The trend in cost efficiency shows a non-monotonic pattern over 
time, implying that efficiency gains have been unsustainable. The results also suggest that 
reforms influence the ownership-cost efficiency relationship. Specifically, domestic private 
and foreign banks appear to benefit from an environment with operational freedom and 
functional autonomy during the pre-reform period. The implementation of tighter 
prudential norms in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis seems to have had adverse impacts for 
all ownerships at the early stages. Yet state banks and domestic private banks in particular 
are initially better equipped to adapt to the new regulatory environment compared to 
foreign banks. The results of the persistence of profits (POP) model indicate that the 
reforms had no discernible effect on the competitive conditions of the lending market. 
Furthermore, the foreign bank entry also did not improve competition. The complementary 
analysis undertaken using the Boone indicator (BI) suggests that competitive conditions 
are stronger in the early stages of prudential reforms yet it significantly worsens after 2008, 
implying that once again the reform package does not seem to have had the desired 
competition-inducing effects. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
Several emerging market economies have carried out financial reforms over the past half 
century. The main objective of these reforms was to end repressive financial policies by 
deregulating 1  their banking sectors. The deregulation reforms included easing or 
eliminating bank interest rate ceilings, lifting entry barriers, and reducing government 
intervention into credit allocation decisions. These countries have also opened their 
banking sectors to foreign financial intermediaries and allowed domestic banks to be 
foreign-owned. These reforms were, ceteris paribus, in turn expected to foster competition 
in the local banking markets and hence increase efficiency and result in a better allocation 
of capital. 
 
This positive view of the banking deregulation, nevertheless, is somewhat clouded by the 
remarkable increase in subsequent financial fragilities. It is argued that these reforms were 
undertaken without establishing a sound regulatory framework and supervisory 
institutions. This in turn induced banks to take on excessive risks,2 which later contributed 
heavily to the fragilities (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hellmann et al., 2000; 
Noy, 2004; Rossi, 1999). As a result, many emerging market economies having weak 
regulatory and supervisory structures, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and the Republic of 
Korea in Asia, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina in Latin America, and Turkey in the 
periphery of Europe, were all hit by severe financial crises after deregulating their banking 
systems, highlighting the dangers of pell-mell deregulation of banks. 
                                                 
1 Deregulation in banking refers to the reforms undertaken by governments to remove, diminish, or simplify 
restrictions on banks with the intent of promoting their efficient operation. The rationale behind this, 
arguably, is that fewer and simpler regulations foster competition, thereby leading to higher productivity, 
higher efficiency, and lower prices. Deregulation and liberalisation are often used interchangeably to indicate 
the reduction in government regulations and restrictions to the financial sectors in exchange for a greater 
participation of private players. In addition, with respect to developing economies, liberalisation also stands 
for opening up their economies to foreign capital and investments, arguably to remain competitive in 
attracting and sustaining both their domestic and foreign investments. Therefore, although deregulation is 
different from liberalisation because a liberal economy can have regulations to increase efficiency and protect 
consumer rights, these terms are often used interchangeably within deregulated/liberalised economies. 
2 Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that banking deregulation raises competition, which then erodes profits. Lower 
profits indicate lower franchise value, namely the capitalised value of expected future profits. Lower 
franchise value in turn reduces incentives for high quality loans, increasing the moral hazard issue.  
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These crises in turn rendered re-examination of the risk assessment practice of banks and 
the regulatory and supervisory structure. The regulatory authorities have taken active steps 
to improve prudential regulation of banks by introducing tighter prudential norms on 
capital requirements, by strengthening official supervision and by enhancing market 
discipline. These were expected to result in sound and resilient banking systems. As such, 
instead of focusing solely deregulation of banking sector to promote competition, the 
policy makers have started to also focus on strengthening financial stability, which in turn 
has generated an environment characterised by a coexistence of bank deregulation and 
prudential re-regulation.  
 
The changing regulatory environment was therefore expected to have profound effects on 
the operations, competition, efficiency, and profitability of banks (Goddard et al., 2011; 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007, 2004). Research on the impact of these reforms 
on bank performance and competitive conduct has very crucial policy implications. 
Establishing empirical evidence would enable regulators to test the effectiveness of 
reforms and a treatment plan can be tailored to improve efficiency and stability of the 
banking sectors accordingly. Moreover, although interrupted by the recent global financial 
crisis, the past few decades have seen a dramatic increase in cross-border banks flows 
encouraged by the reforms (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014). Therefore, there is a 
necessity for empirical evidence investigating the influence of foreign banks on domestic 
banking industries. It is against this background that this thesis is undertaken within the 
context of the Turkish banking sector, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2 Aims of the study 
There is a large body of empirical literature focusing on the association between financial 
reforms and the performance and competition of banks. The evidence derived from the 
literature nevertheless seems to be inconclusive on whether financial reforms improve 
competition and efficiency of banks. Moreover, most of these studies do not take into 
account the fact that regulatory reforms are often a mixed process of deregulation and 
prudential re-regulation. However, deregulation and prudential re-regulation might exert 
opposite impacts on the efficiency and competition of banks. Therefore, an investigation of 
the effects of the parallel use of prudential re-regulation along with deregulation processes 
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on the banking industry would enhance the capacity to design better bank regulation and 
supervision. In addition, the regulatory reforms3 aimed to generate a level playing field 
among different ownerships by applying regulatory policies uniformly across banking 
groups. Yet it appears from the literature that different degrees of pressure were received 
by different ownerships, calling for more empirical evidence. Furthermore, the increasing 
globalisation of financial systems has resulted in a drastic increase in foreign bank entry, 
yet the number of empirical studies explicitly taking into account the effect of foreign bank 
entry on the competition and efficiency of hosting countries’ banking sectors are still 
inconclusive, particularly in emerging and developing countries. Thus, this research aims 
to contribute to the literature on these issues. 
 
More specifically, this thesis aims to answer the following three main research questions: 
1) What is the impact of a deregulation and prudential re-regulation policy framework on 
Turkish banks’ cost efficiency and on the relation between cost efficiency and ownership? 
2) What are the effects on the dynamics of competition in the loan market? 3) Has the 
recent wave of foreign bank penetration improved the competition and efficiency of the 
Turkish banking sector?  
 
To answer these research questions, we carry out our empirical studies on the Turkish 
commercial banking sector. The Turkish banking sector has experienced a similar reform 
process observed in many emerging market economies’ banking sectors. Initially Turkish 
banking sector authorities started to introduce banking deregulation policies in the early 
1980s with the objective of lowering regulatory costs and stimulating competition in the 
banking sector. Accordingly, they lifted bank interest rate ceilings, lowered compulsory 
reserve requirements and entry barriers, and encouraged penetration of foreign financial 
intermediaries. The introduction of these policies was expected to improve the 
performance of banks, since deregulation-induced competitive pressures were going to 
eliminate monopoly rents enjoyed in the form of inefficiency or slack. Yet these 
expectations were not fully realised because the frequency of systemic banking problems, 
due partly to excessive risk taking, increased markedly soon after the implementation of 
deregulation policies. 
 
                                                 
3 Regulatory reform is a mixed process of deregulation and prudential re-regulation (Kay et al., 1988) 
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Although many other factors contributed to these fragilities, it is widely accepted that the 
weak institutional environment, the politicisation of banking affairs, and macroeconomic 
instability were the main factors, and they contributed to home-grown financial crises in 
1994, 2000 and 2001 (see, Alper and Öniş, 2004, 2003; Bakır and Öniş, 2010). The twin 
crises of 2000-2001 opened a window of opportunity, facilitating the successful 
implementation of major regulatory reforms. In the aftermath of the twin crises, the 
Turkish banking authorities implemented banking restructuring programmes to resolve the 
bad debts of problematic banks and introduced prudential norms to foster stability and 
minimise excessive risk taking. More specifically, they introduced regulation practices 
such as capital regulations accounting for market risk, external governance, official 
supervision, and private sector monitoring, all of which have been uniformly applied 
among different bank ownerships.  
 
1.3 Research methodology 
Turkey’s reform process can be divided into two periods. In the first period, spanning from 
1988 to 2001, banking deregulation was at the core of the reform process and it aimed at 
stimulating competition. In the second period, from 2002 to 2016, prudential re-regulations 
have been at the centre of the reform process with the objective of fostering stability in the 
banking sector (Bakır and Öniş, 2010). In addition, the regulatory reforms aimed at 
creating a level playing field among different ownerships operating in the Turkish banking 
sector. More specifically, regulatory policies associated with deregulation and prudential 
re-regulation have been applied uniformly across banking groups. Although these tools 
have been expected to stimulate stability, they may impose higher cost and impact on the 
competition and performance of banks. Therefore, this offers us an excellent laboratory to 
investigate the impacts of deregulation and the concomitant prudential re-regulation 
framework implemented by the Turkish banking authorities on cost structure, ownership, 
and competition in the commercial banking industry. Moreover, despite some early foreign 
banks’ entry in the aftermath of deregulation, they only controlled a minimal 3% of the 
total banking sector assets throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (Altunbaş et al., 2009). 
This trend significantly changed as of 2005. New foreign banks, mainly via the acquisition 
of mid-sized domestic private banks, started to enter the Turkish banking market after this 
year. As of today, almost one third of total banking sector assets are controlled by these 
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new banks. This process therefore allows us to explore the effects of foreign bank 
penetration on competition and efficiency of domestic banking sector.    
 
To address the first and third research questions, we employ a stochastic cost frontier 
analysis approach by following Battese and Coelli (1995). This allows us to estimate the 
efficient cost structure and the determinants of cost inefficiency through a one-step 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. Using the cost inefficiency model, we determine the 
effect of the change of regulatory framework on cost structure and also the cost efficiency-
ownership relationship. In addition, we will explicitly account for the recent wave of 
foreign penetration in the stochastic cost frontier analysis to examine whether their entry 
has exerted any influence on the cost efficiency of Turkey’s banking sector.  
 
This study investigates the overall influence of regulatory reforms on the competition of 
the credit market by using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate the 
persistence of profits (POP) model. We use the marginal cost of loans derived from the 
stochastic cost frontier to obtain the overcharge on loans (calculated as implicit loan price 
to marginal cost ratio). Then, we estimate the persistence of loan overcharge by employing 
a partial adjustment model which is in line with the POP literature’s idea following Zhao et 
al. (2010). An increased persistence in the loan overcharge would imply that competition in 
the lending market did not reduce over the sample period and vice versa. In addition to this 
analysis, we also employ a relatively new competition measurement approach, the Boone 
indicator (BI). This approach not only enables us to examine the evolution of competition 
over time to infer the effects of regulatory reforms, but also crosscheck the results derived 
from the POP model.  
 
1.4 Contributions to the literature 
This study contributes in several respects to the literature, in particular on Turkish banking. 
It furthers the understanding of the effect of regulatory reforms on bank conduct, 
efficiency, and ownership in general. In addition, the impact of foreign penetration on the 
efficiency and competition of the banking sector is also investigated to contribute to the 
literature. More specifically: 
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 Financial reforms are often a mixed process of deregulation and prudential re-
regulation and therefore this process may have opposite impacts on efficiency, 
ownership, and competition. Previous studies on the effect of regulatory reforms on 
Turkish banking sector efficiency and competition overlooked this issue. Moreover, 
they either used pre-reform data or focused on a short time period immediately 
following the post-reform period. Our unique dataset4 spanning from 1988 to 2016 
covers both the first stage (1988-2001) and the second stage (2002-2016) of 
reforms. This therefore allows us not only to explore the overall effect of regulatory 
reforms in general, but also the shift in policy focus (post-2001) characterised by 
the tightening of prudential re-regulations in particular. To our knowledge, only one 
empirical study 5  merges these two periods (1990-2007), yet it adopts a non-
parametric approach to measure performance. Given Turkish banks suffered from 
financial crises and were exposed to regulatory changes during this period, using a 
non-parametric approach might lead to biased estimations. This is because this 
method assumes away statistical noise in data and fails to successfully account for 
environmental impacts on estimated inefficiency (Liu and Tone, 2008). This study 
attempts to handle this issue by employing a parametric approach. Moreover, their 
sample dataset includes only the banks that consistently operated during their 
sample period. This in turn is likely to cover only best-performing banks, 
concealing the true nature of the banking sector, and is likely to suffer from 
survivorship bias (Carhart et al., 2002). Instead, this study not only includes 
survivor banks but also the failed ones. Furthermore, hardly any study investigates 
to what extent the changes in regulatory environment affect the performance of 
various ownerships differently. 
 
 Previous literature on the competitiveness of Turkey’s banking sector largely used 
static approaches. Considering that competition is a continuous selection and 
discovery process, this might lead to inconsistent results. Therefore, this study 
relies on two alternative competition measurement approaches, the POP model and 
the relatively new BI model, and enable us to capture the competitive dynamics in 
                                                 
4 A great deal of care had to be taken as the same headings had often a different meaning before and after the 
change in accounting rules as of 2002, along with the re-regulation process. The challenges we faced in the 
construction of our database are presented in Section 5.3.1. 
5 Fukuyama and Matousek (2011). 
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the lending market. Moreover, this study is the first attempt in the Turkish banking 
literature that explicitly investigates the effects of deregulation-prudential 
reregulation framework on competition. Furthermore, no other study used the POP 
model to investigate the intensity of competition in the lending market.  
 
 The heavy foreign bank penetration, largely realised in the form of the acquisition 
of domestic private banks, allows us to explore the effects of this penetration on 
efficiency and competition. This study is one of the first attempts to explicitly 
account for this penetration in both efficiency and competition models to explore 
the possible influence generated by the entry of these banks. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Besides this general introduction, this thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 2 
provides a historical overview of the Turkish banking sector with particular reference to 
the regulatory reforms. It details politico-economic developments that have shaped 
financial sector reforms and the evolution of the banking sector reforms since 1960s. It 
then elaborates on the structural changes of the banking sector due to the changing 
regulatory framework. Chapter 3 provides a literature review on the impact of bank 
deregulation on bank efficiency, the impact of prudential re-regulation on bank 
performance, and the ownership and bank performance relationship. It also reviews the 
existing literature on the relationship between regulatory reforms, ownership, and bank 
competition. In particular, each sub-section discusses the major drawbacks in the existing 
literature, which serve to establish motivation for our empirical study. Chapter 4 presents 
theoretical concepts of frontier efficiency, and largely elaborates on the parametric and 
non-parametric approaches used to measure frontier efficiency. It discusses the pros and 
cons of both approaches and hence explains the underlying factors, leading us to choose 
our preferred methodology for our empirical analysis. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
empirical analysis investigating the impact of banking reforms on cost efficiency and 
ownership using the stochastic cost frontier approach. Chapter 6 presents the approaches 
used to measure competition. It then discusses why this study adopts two complementary 
approaches, the POP and the BI, to measure the competition dynamic. Chapter 7 presents 
the empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory reforms on competition in the lending 
market using the aforementioned competition measuring approaches. It also investigates if 
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the recent wave of foreign bank entry improved the competitive dynamics in the lending 
market. Chapter 8 summarizes the major findings of the thesis and draws some general 
conclusions and policy implications. It also highlights limitations of the study and offers 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
The Evolution of Regulatory Reforms and Recent Developments in 
Turkish Commercial Banking 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the evolution of regulatory reforms undertaken by Turkish 
banking authorities since the early 1960s. It details the underlying factors leading to the 
introduction of the reforms and sheds lights on their effects on the structure and behaviour 
of banks. Particular attention will be paid on the politicisation of reforms and the 
government’s intervention into credit allocation, and their ramifications for the effective 
implementation and structure of the banking sector during the 1980s and 1990s. This 
chapter will therefore facilitate the interpretation of the empirical analysis carried out in 
this thesis. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 examines the gradual evolution 
of the regulatory framework from financial repression towards financial deregulation 
between 1960-1988, with particular attention devoted to the initial phase of the banking 
deregulation implemented in 1980. Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 review the legislation 
introduced in the post-deregulation period and discuss why these regulations could not 
prevent the financial and banking crises from breaking out in 1994 and 2000/2001. Section 
2.5 examines the reforms, including the restructuring programme and the concomitant 
prudential regulation and supervision activities, undertaken in the aftermath of the twin 
crises experienced in 2000 and 2001. Section 2.6 presents some descriptive statistics of the 
banking sector from 1988 to 2016, with particular interest devoted to the effects of the 
regulatory reforms and Section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2 The transition from financial repression to deregulation 
Turkey adopted a state-led economic development strategy by following import 
substitution policies in the period between 1960 and 1980. During this protectionist period, 
the alternative financing sources such as money and capital markets were underdeveloped 
and the country was facing a lack of real resources (Yeldan, 1997). The Turkish banking 
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sector therefore essentially served as the agent of successive governments and the success 
of the economic development strategy largely relied on banking funds. 
 
Parallel to this strategy, Turkish banking authorities adopted repressive financial 
regulations. Although these regulations were primarily used as a means to facilitate the 
channelling of financial funds into investments undertaken in line with state-led 
industrialisation policy, they also had ramifications on the structure of the banking industry 
(Isik and Hassan, 2003a). More specifically, the primary financial repression regulations 
implemented in the banking industry were the controls over entry-exit into the sector and 
the barriers on loan and deposit interest rates. On the one hand, the strict controls imposed 
on entry and exit were designed to protect incumbent banks from competitive pressures. 
The regulators arguably sought to increase the profitability of banks by imposing barriers 
to bank entry to ensure their safety and soundness (Isik and Hassan, 2003a). As a result, 
these regulations eventually led to the entry of only two new banks into the sector, while 
twenty banks exited through either liquidation or mergers within these two decades. On the 
other hand, the interest rate ceiling on loans provided cheaper funds for investment 
undertaken through the state-led development strategy. Yet it kept the nominal deposit rates 
below their market rates, resulting in negative real interest rates for deposits due to 
inflationary monetary policy. This phenomenon provided rents to the banks, but it reduced 
the amount of funds held in saving accounts, adversely affecting the accumulation of real 
resources in economy adversely.  
 
In addition, in an environment where there were no price competition and interest rate 
risks, many banks expanded their branch network to collect more deposits on negative real 
interest rates. Thus, the number of branches increased almost threefold from 1963 to 1980, 
despite the significant reduction in the number of banks, which in turn arguably gave rise 
to over-branching and over-staffing (Altunbaş et al., 2009; Zaim, 1995). Furthermore, this 
uncompetitive environment, coupled with excessive government involvement, arguably led 
to the erosion of effective credit evaluation and risk management policies (Denizer, 1997). 
Overall, the financial repression policies arguably generated a banking system that was 
highly concentrated, over-branched, inefficient, and protected from competitive pressures, 
raising concerns over these repressive policies. 
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In January 1980, a package of economic stability measures known as the ‘January 24 
Decisions’ were introduced to resolve the problems that emerged in the late-1970s 
stemmed from the aforementioned repressive policies. Therefore, the beginning of the 
1980s was a period of liberalisation transforming the Turkish economic structure from a 
state-led economy into a market-based economy where the banking reforms were at the 
centre of this process. The banking authorities accordingly initiated a deregulation process 
under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They 
introduced strong legal, structural, and institutional changes to reform the repressive 
regulations imposed on the banking sector before the 1980s.  
 
A series of deregulation reforms targeting the banking sector were introduced in 1980. 
Some of these reforms (i) removed the interest ceilings from deposits and loans, (ii) 
eliminated barriers to bank entry, (iii) permitted the establishment of new financial 
institutions, and (iv) allowed the introduction of new financial instruments by banks. In 
addition, Turkish banks were encouraged to operate in international markets and joint 
ventures and partnerships between domestic and foreign banks were also welcomed (Isik 
and Hassan, 2002a). This new regulatory framework sought to increase the efficiency and 
productivity of banks by reducing the intervention of the state and  subsequently enhancing 
competition and the role of market forces (Isik and Hassan, 2003a; Zaim, 1995). In 
addition, it also aimed to facilitate the integration of the domestic banking sector into the 
rest of the world and provide a more competitive and dynamic business environment for 
Turkish commercial banks (Ertugrul and Selcuk, 2001). 
 
Other complementary financial liberalisation reforms expected to contribute to the 
development of the financial and banking sectors were also introduced in the 1980s. For 
instance, in the early 1980s, capital account controls were partially removed and a flexible 
exchange rate policy was adopted, enabling banks to carry out foreign exchange 
transactions and offer new related services. The Istanbul Stock Exchange and Interbank 
Money Market were founded in 1986 to provide extra liquidity and promote the 
development of the financial system. In addition, new institutional and legal arrangements 
were introduced to stimulate the development of capital markets. Government securities 
started to be auctioned in 1985 and quickly accounted for a sizeable portion of the stock of 
the  financial assets of banks (Denizer et al., 2000). Therefore, it can be inferred that many 
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of the restrictions imposed on the financial and banking sector were eliminated, or at least 
minimised by the end of the 1980s. 
 
This reform process inevitably led to significant changes in the structure and conduct of 
the Turkish banking sector. It is argued that Turkish banks initially responded to 
deregulation and financial liberalisation by growing and improving their technological and 
human capital to improve their competitiveness (Yildirim, 2015). Increased competitive 
pressures and operational freedom forced banks to enrich their service portfolios and 
increase the range of their banking activities (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011). As a result, 
they offered new financial products and services such as interest and currency rate 
forwards, options, asset-backed securities, credit cards, foreign exchange deposits 
accounts, leasing, factoring, underwriting, fund management, and ATMs. Moreover, 
besides diversifying their services, they also invested heavily in computer systems to 
improve their technological infrastructure as well as beginning to employ higher quality 
human resources (Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas, 2006). These changes were expected to 
improve speed, quality, and efficiency in the provision of services (Altunbaş et al., 2009). 
The removal of bank entry barriers also led to a rapid increase in the number of banks, 
branches, and employees, indicating a rapid structural change of the banking sector in the 
1980s. The total number of banks increased from 43 in 1980 to 66 in 1990, while the 
number of foreign banks6 rose from 4 to 19 during the same period.  
 
Yet this reform process has also attracted widespread criticism in the banking literature. 
This is arguably because the regulatory authorities implemented the liberalisation reforms 
without establishing strong regulatory institutions and a sound legal framework (Ganioglu, 
2008; Yildirim, 2015). That is, the liberalisation of interest rates and the reduction of 
government intervention into the Turkish banking sector, coupled with inadequate 
prudential regulation and supervision framework, led to increased risk taking by banks and 
brokers. Financial institutions started offering high interest rates for deposits that they 
                                                 
6 Many of these new foreign banks only established branches in the three largest cities in Turkey and opted 
not to engage in retail banking. Instead, they tended to focus on trade financing and wholesale corporate 
banking although there were no restrictions on the scope of their operations (Denizer, 1997). In addition, 
although the number of foreign banks increased significantly, they only controlled 3-4% of total banking 
sector assets until the early 2000s (Altunbaş et al., 2009; Yildirim, 2015). The possible reasons for this low 
participation of foreign banks will be discussed in the next section. 
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could not afford (Odekon, 2002). All these contributed to the outbreak of a small crisis in 
the financial sector in 1982, resulting in the collapse of six banks between 1983 and 1984. 
The banking authorities were obliged to suspend the deregulation of deposit and lending 
rates due to the crisis and this re-regulation of the interest rates carried on until 1988.7 The 
crisis of 1982 revealed that without having a proper regulatory and supervisory legal and 
institutional framework, liberal reforms could lead to problems in the financial and 
banking sector (Boratav and Yeldan, 2006).  
 
The banking authorities sought to fill this legislative gap by establishing the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (SDIF)8 in 1983 to insure the saving of deposits and by 
introducing a new banking law9 in 1985, which were the first substantial attempts to re-
regulate the Turkish banking sector. The Banks Act of 1985, the first comprehensive 
regulation of the Turkish banking sector, aimed at dealing with structural problems of the 
banking sector by providing a stronger legal basis for the regulation and supervision of 
banks. The Treasury was assigned as the primary regulatory and supervisory board, which 
undertook both on-site and off-site regulation of banks. Moreover, a division at the Central 
Bank of Turkey (CBT) was established to support the Treasury in the regulation process. 
Banks were required to disclose information about their balance sheets to the CBT on a 
regular basis. The authorities had the right to change the management of troubled banks. In 
addition, new attempts to update the Bank Acts in line with international best practices 
were also introduced. Accordingly, banks were compelled to report their non-performing 
loans (NPLs) separately and to allocate provisions to cover defaulted loans. External 
auditing became mandatory for banks, with a view to increase market discipline as of 
1987. In 1989, in line with the Bank for International Settlements guidelines, a new capital 
                                                 
7 In the late-1988, deposit rates were freed again and this policy has been sustained since. Due to this fact, in 
our empirical analysis we focus on the post-1988 period when interest rates have been determined in the 
financial market. 
8 This regulatory institution aimed to ensure the saving of deposits were established under the administration 
and representation of the Central Bank of Turkey. Following the 1994 crisis, this institution was also assigned 
other responsibilities apart from the administration of the deposit insurance scheme. It performed activities 
for the resolution of the four bankrupt banks that were transferred to the SDIF in the aftermath of the crisis 
and the banks with a revoked operating license. It also played a crucial role in the domestic twin crises of 
2000 and 2001, given the fact that the number of bankrupt banks was 25 in the aftermath of the domestic 
twin crises. Although the administration and representation of it was given to the BRSA in 1999, it has 
gained an autonomous status as of 2003 and has obtained the authority to make regulations as of 2005.  
9 Banks Act No: 3182. 
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adequacy ratio (CAR) was introduced to ensure that banks had enough capital for their 
risky assets.  
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the Turkish banking sector quickly responded to 
financial liberalisation and deregulation reforms. New banks entered the sector following 
these reforms, although most of the foreign banks entered into the sector were in the form 
of branches. Incumbent banks sought to adjust to the liberalised and more competitive 
business environment by introducing new financial instruments and by adopting state-of-
the-art technologies. Yet the crisis in 1982 revealed the deficiencies of the regulatory 
institutions and the legal framework, for the first time highlighting their relevance. 
Therefore, the banking regulatory authorities attempted to introduce and implement 
prudential regulations with the introduction of the Banks Act in 1985 along with the 
adoption of further liberal policies. In the following section, we will investigate the 
repercussions of financial liberalisation as well as the politicisation of the regulation and 
supervision of banks. 
 
2.3 The post-deregulation period  
Following the completion of the banking sector deregulation in the late-1980s, the 
regulatory authorities adopted further financial liberalisation policies to become a truly 
“open economy”. Capital accounts, which were partially deregulated in the early 1980s, 
were fully liberalised in 1989 10  and the full convertibility of the Turkish Lira was 
recognized in 1989,11 which in turn fully exposed Turkish banks to the forces of financial 
globalisation. Successive governments used the capital account liberalisation as a 
                                                 
10 Neoclassical economic theory posits that easing restrictions would lead capital to flow from the capital-rich 
developed countries, where return for the capital is low, to the capital-scarce developing countries where 
return to the capital is high (Henry, 2007). This flow in turn would reduce the cost of capital in developing 
countries and thereby foster temporary increases in investments (Fischer, 1998). 
11  This decision indicated that the Turkish Lira exchange rate was left to market factors without any 
regulatory intervention and allowed local currency to be exchanged for foreign currency without any 
restriction on the amount. Yet it is argued that the opening of the capital account in Turkey was premature, 
since the Turkish financial market was not sound and deep enough to insulate itself from shocks from 
international capital flows. Instead, political authorities politicised the legislation process to capitalise on 
short-term gains based on short-term capital inflows without paying adequate attention to the disastrous 
medium- and long-term consequences. Therefore, this decision was one of the primary factors contributed to 
the financial crises in 1994, and 2000-2001 in Turkey (Onis and Bakır, 2007). 
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fundamental policy initiative to sustain and finance the fiscal deficits 12  of the 1990s 
(Balkan and Yeldan, 1998; Demir, 2004). During this period, a “hot money” policy of high 
real interest rates for government securities was implemented, along with domestic 
currency appreciation. This is because after the removal of interest ceilings as of 1988, real 
interest rates rose to unprecedented levels. This policy in turn attracted a significant 
amount of short-term foreign capital 13  (Biçer & Yeldan 2003). While borrowers had 
difficulties to adapt to excessive real rates on loans, banks adapted swiftly to the new 
conditions by investing into government securities instead of extending loans to the private 
sector. Successive governments therefore found it easier to finance its borrowing 
requirements from domestic banks by means of government securities. As a result, the high 
real interest rates, coupled with financial arbitrage opportunities, prompted banks to focus 
on government deficit funding as the annual real interest rates for the government 
securities averaged 32% in the 1990s (Bakır and Öniş, 2010).  These securities were also 
granted tax exemptions and could be used as collateral to attract banks. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic instability experienced in the Turkish economy in the 1990s14  induced 
banks to adopt a more risk-averse approach with their lending decisions, preferring to 
undertake a limited maturity transformation by investing in government securities. This 
business practice under macroeconomic instability enabled banks to avoid the potential 
NPLs that would have resulted from extending loans to the private sector (Atiyas and 
Ersel, 1994; Yildirim, 2002). These factors caused both state and private banks in 
particular to invest most of their funds, obtained through short-term foreign capital 
inflows, in government securities15 rather than channelling them to private and corporate 
lending.  
 
The Treasury and the CBT were the sole authorities of banking regulation and supervision, 
yet it arguably contributed to the politicisation of regulatory and supervisory institutions. It 
                                                 
12 A comprehensive deterioration of fiscal balances occurred in the post-1988 era in Turkey. While the public 
sector borrowing requirement as a ratio of GDP averaged 4.5% during 1981-1988, it increased to 8.6% for 
the 1989-1997 period.  
13 Turkey failed to attract substantial long-term foreign direct investment until the early 2000s, partly due to 
the unstable macroeconomic environment and lack of strong regulatory infrastructure for the financial sector 
(Alper and Öniş, 2003). 
14 Between 1990 and 2000 GDP ranged from -5.5% to 9.3% with an average of 4.7%. Inflation rates had lain 
in the range of 65–90% throughout the 1990s. 
15 The proportion of government securities in total assets soared from 10% to 23% from 1990 to 1999 (Bakır 
and Öniş, 2010). 
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is posited that the primary focus of the Treasury was to finance the budget deficit instead 
of ensuring the prudent behaviour of banks and politicians were therefore able to 
manipulate the decisions of the leading officials of the CBT  (Alper and Öniş, 2002; 
Ganioglu, 2008). For example, Turkish banks had large open foreign exchange positions16 
in the first half the 1990s since they were borrowing foreign currency at very high interest 
rates to benefit from the opportunities provided by holding domestic currency denominated 
government securities (Alper and Öniş, 2002). This exposed them to significant foreign 
exchange risk since they were vulnerable to sudden changes in foreign exchange rates and 
speculative attacks. However, the Treasury and the CBT completely overlooked the 
problem, laying the ground for future issues in the banking sector. Altınkemer (2005) 
argues that the government postponed the necessary fiscal adjustments by preventing the 
CBT and the Treasury from taking necessary measures since it was able to finance the 
deficit via domestic borrowing from banks. This in turn increased both the budget deficit 
and domestic external debt stock,17 raising doubts on the sustainability of the budget and 
external deficits.  
 
The concerns in the banking sector due to increasing foreign exchange risk, coupled with 
unsustainably high real interest rates on government securities, triggered a foreign 
exchange crisis in 1994 (Yildirim, 2015). The crisis had serious repercussions on both the 
economy and the banking sector. The Turkish Lira depreciated in real terms by a 
staggering 24% while inflation and interest rates soared to 132% (Altınkemer, 2005). 
Three banks were closed down and the total assets of the banking sector reduced by 28%. 
Significant bank runs compelled the government to introduce deposit insurance to all 
savings deposits to restore confidence in the banking sector.18 Moreover, the authorities did 
not close down some insolvent banks to prevent the financial sector from losing its 
reputation and confidence.  
                                                 
16 The total open foreign currency positions of the banking sector increased to USD 5 billion in 1993 from 
USD 1.8 billion in 1991 (Altunbaş et al., 2009). Specifically, the majority of the open positions were given 
by private banks that were investing heavily in the government securities financed by the short-term foreign 
capital inflows. 
17 The stock of domestic debt was only about 6% of GNP in 1989, just when the liberalisation of the capital 
account was completed, yet it skyrocketed to 20% by 1997. 
18
 This has led to a moral hazard problem since some of the banks predicted correctly that the government 
would not allow banks to fail, thereby they reported asset deterioration to be able to get capital injections and 
be bailed out by the government (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, the crisis was short-lived and the Turkish economy experienced a rapid 
recovery between 1995 and 1998. Yet this fast recovery raised many questions. 
Specifically, it is argued whether this expeditious recovery was achieved in exchange for 
further politicisation of the regulatory framework and supervisory institutions (Öniş and 
Bakır, 2007).  For example, the Treasury and CBT introduced a new ratio (the ‘Foreign 
Exchange Net Position/Capital Base’) to control foreign exchange assets and liabilities 
consistent with the capital base to monitor and control the foreign exchange risk of banks.19 
However, although this ratio showed that many Turkish banks needed to close down their 
foreign exchange open positions in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis, this action did not stop 
excessive foreign exchange exposure of banks, indicating that they were not properly 
regulated and supervised (Ganioglu, 2008). Moreover, these banks reopened their foreign 
exchange positions in spite of the high cost of funding (Altunbaş et al., 2009). As a result, 
they resumed borrowing from abroad and foreign currency deposit demand was kept high 
in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis.  
 
In addition to the foreign exchange risk, Turkish banks had other fragilities due to the weak 
regulation and supervision. For example, due to high interest rates and inflation, investors 
turned towards very short-term financial instruments such as repurchase agreements. They 
directed their funds into the overnight repo market with the return of high interest rates. 
Turkish banks funded their security portfolios using mostly funds from the repo market, 
leading them to give open positions on contingencies and commitments (Altunbaş et al., 
2009). They also exploited new financial instruments to hide their foreign exchange 
positions. Consequently, Turkish banks were exposed to a large maturity mismatch 
between their assets and liabilities along with foreign exchange risks since they were 
funding longer-term loans and government debt.  
 
State banks in particular began to bring serious distortions to the financial system after the 
crisis. It is posited that they were heavily used as an apparatus for rent distribution by 
political authorities (Alper & Onis 2002; Bakır & Öniş 2010). They extended loans at 
subsidised rates (below market interest) to the government and favoured sectors, which in 
                                                 
19 The rule imposed that the net foreign exchange position (domestic currency equivalent of foreign exchange 
assets and liabilities) to capital base could not exceed 50%, which by 1999 was reduced to 20%. 
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turn undermined their capitalisation, liquidity, and profitability (Altunbaş et al., 2009). The 
losses that occurred due to the exploitation of the state banks were called “duty losses” and 
they reached significant levels after 1994.20 The IMF put pressure on the government to 
halt the rent distribution, to keep fiscal expenditure under control, and implement tighter 
regulations. Yet it is argued that political concerns dominated and hampered external 
actors’ pressure (Alper and Öniş, 2004; Ganioglu, 2008). For example, the establishment 
of an independent regulatory and supervisory agency was inhibited since the political 
authorities were able to control and affect the decisions of the leading officials of the 
Treasury and the CBT, which enabled the politicians to control banks and thereby resource 
allocation. Therefore, the rent distribution through the state banks mechanism was actively 
used21 till the end of 1990s (Altunbaş et al., 2009).  
 
The entry of new banks was arguably based mainly on political criteria due to politicisation 
of the regulatory institutions (Alper and Öniş, 2002). For example, the number of banks 
increased from 66 in 1990 to 81 in 1999, most of which were domestic private banks. 
Although these new entries would not be expected to create negative outcomes, lax 
regulations, together with political interventions, not only allowed easy entry but also 
made the subsequent monitoring difficult (Yildirim, 2015). Therefore, six private banks 
which were granted licences following the 1991 elections failed within a decade of their 
inception, giving more support to the argument that entry by new banks was determined 
primarily by political criteria.  
 
Finally, an important point to note is that the participation of foreign banks into the Turkish 
banking sector was minuscule and rent-oriented throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Altunbas et al., 2009). Yet the country embarked on a deregulation and liberalisation 
                                                 
20 The duty losses of the largest two state banks soared from 3% of Gross National Product (GNP) in 1993 to 
12% of GNP in 2000, while the NPLs ratio reached about 37% of their total loans as of 2001 (Bakır and 
Öniş, 2010). These losses reached almost 50% of their balance sheets at the end of 2000 (BRSA, 2009). 
21 There were potential reasons explaining the government’s exploitation of the state banks’ resources to 
reinforce the domestic economy in the second half of the 1990s. They were arguably: (i) the economic 
downturns and financial crises which occurred in emerging markets (Brazil, South East Asia, Russia) in the 
late 90s; and (ii) conflicts such as the Russian economic crisis, which lead to exports from Turkey to Russia 
to dropping by 35%, and Gulf War, which had serious negative impacts on the domestic economy, led to 
sharp capital outflows and a slowdown in international trade. In addition, domestic political instability, 
terrorism, and the Marmara earthquakes of 1999 afflicted densely populated, industrialised regions all 
contributed to the economic slowdown in the second half of the 1990s (Altunbaş et al., 2009).  
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process as of 1980 with the aim of attracting foreign investment. In addition, foreign banks 
have shifted their strategy from pursuing internationally active corporate clients towards 
the exploration of business opportunities in emerging and developing economies (Moreno 
and Villar, 2005). Despite these favourable developments, foreign-owned banks accounted 
for only 3-4% of total banking assets until 2002 (Altunbas et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
foreign banks entered into the Turkish banking sector focused mainly on corporate finance, 
where one representative office or single branch basis would be all that was required to 
manage their business. It is argued that the persistent macroeconomic imbalances, the 
shortcomings, and implementation problems of banking regulation and supervision, and 
the lack of internationally accepted banking principles, contributed to the failure of 
attracting foreign investment and the mode of entry of foreign banks (Alper and Onis, 
2002). 
 
One standard proxy of foreign bank presence is the share of total assets of foreign owned 
banks in a banking industry. As discussed above, foreign banks have started to penetrate 
into developing and emerging market economies to seize business opportunities, leading to 
radical increases in their shares of total assets in these economies. Moreno and Villar 
(2005) provides descriptive data regarding the degree of foreign ownership of banks across 
countries including Turkey. This allows us to compare the foreign bank presence in Turkish 
banking sector with other emerging and developing countries with liberalised banking 
systems. Table 2.1 shows that foreign bank penetration has differed significantly across 
countries. Turkish banking sector appears to have the lowest foreign bank ownership of 
banks as of 2002. This might lend support to the discussions above that Turkish banking 
sector failed to attract foreign investment. Specifically, there has been a significant 
transformation in Latin America and Eastern European 22  countries having the highest 
foreign ownership ratios.  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
22 The comparison with these countries is to be made with caution though, since transition economies had no 
history of commercial banking and therefore faced quite specific problems and needs compared to the long- 
established players of the Turkish sector (Steinherr et al 2004). 
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Table 2.1 Percentage of foreign ownership of banks across countries  
 
1990 2000 2002 
 Turkey 2.9 3.6 3.3 
Asia Hong Kong SAR 45.7 87.2 88.6 
 
India  21.0 42.0 40.0 
 
Malaysia 22.3 24.9 25.2 
 
Singapore 89.4 75.7 76.0 
Latin America Argentina 17.0 48.1 41.6 
 
Brazil - 25.2 21.5 
 
Chile 18.6 33.1 44.8 
 
Colombia 3.7 18.0 16.4 
 Mexico 0.3 54.6 81.9 
 Peru 0.0 32.6 30.4 
Eastern Europe Czech Republic 26.4 65.4 85.8 
 Hungry 11.4 69.9 90.4 
 Poland 0.02 69.5 67.4 
Source: Adapted from Moreno & Villar (2005). Assets owned by banks with 50% or more foreign 
ownership. 
 
 
In conclusion, despite completing the bank deregulation process and undertaking further 
financial liberalisation policies to become a truly “open economy” as of 1988, the 
politicisation of banking regulation and supervision led to excessive risk taking that 
distorted the financial market. External bodies such as the IMF and the WB played 
important roles in the introduction of regulations, yet their pressure to get these 
implemented was not enough due to the involvement of the political authority into the 
regulatory and supervisory institutions. Moreover, the negligible presence of foreign banks 
and the politicisation of bank entry and bank lending decisions distorted competition and 
the stability of the banking sector. All these incidents in the banking sector, coupled with 
persistent macroeconomic imbalances, chronic fiscal deficits and high rates of inflation, 
21 
 
contributed to the outbreak of the deep economic recession towards the end of 1990s. The 
government again cooperated with the IMF and introduced a new economic stabilisation 
programme, including a new banking act, which was introduced in 1999 to reinforce the 
economy and to revamp the inefficient regulatory and supervisory structure. 
 
2.4 The outbreak of the twin crises in 2000-2001 
Prior to the outbreak of the 2000-2001 twin crises, the IMF-supported exchange-rate-based 
stabilisation programme23 introduced in December 1999 brought tight monetary control, a 
wide ranging fiscal adjustment to eliminate inflationary pressures, and a series of structural 
precautions designed to liberalise the economy further. In addition to this stabilisation 
programme, the IMF-sponsored Banks Act (No. 4389) was passed in June 1999. This act 
involved a combination of measures to ensure financial stability, improve the functioning 
of the Turkish banking sector and align Turkish banking regulations with European Union 
(EU) directives. 24  At the centre of these measures was the establishment of a new 
independent Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) in conjunction with the 
Banking Act. The supervision duties that had been shared between the Treasury and the 
CBT until this point were accordingly transferred to the BRSA. As a result, this institution 
became the sole authority responsible for regulating, supervising, and auditing Turkish 
banks.25 Moreover, a new central banking law giving a legal independence to the CBT from 
the government was being drafted. These efforts were arguably an attempt at the de-
politicisation of bank lending and the rise of the regulatory state in monetary and financial 
governance (Bakır and Öniş, 2010). In addition, other primary measures, including tighter 
risk control and management procedures, external auditing of banks, as well as new 
principles used to calculate the minimum capital requirement and foreign exchange 
exposure were introduced. In other words, with the introduction of this new Banking Act, 
the authorities aimed to strengthen regulatory and supervisory institutions and ensure that 
                                                 
23 Turkish authorities had had 16 stand-by agreements with the IMF before this stabilisation programme, all 
but two of which were abandoned.   
24 Turkey was granted a formal candidate status in the EU’s Helsinki Summit in 1999. This arguably gave the 
key political and economic actors incentives for change and the implementation of deep-seated institutional 
reforms (Öniş and Bakır, 2007).  
25 According to Barth et al. (2013), the Turkish policy makers have empowered the supervisory agency by 
providing more explicit power to the supervisors. 
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the prudential regulatory and supervisory framework was compatible with internationally 
accepted banking principles.  
 
However, the implementation of this act was discontinuous and it did not have the 
expected favourable influence on the banking sector’s stability and performance. For 
example, it is contended that there was no natural constituency pressuring for the 
establishment of an regulatory and supervisory agency like the BRSA and there was also a 
lack of political and bureaucratic will as well as strong resistance from powerful banking 
lobbies before the twin crises experienced in 2000 and 2001 (Öniş and Bakır, 2007). As a 
result, the operation of the BRSA was delayed until mid-2000 due to the late appointment 
of the members of the administration board. This phenomenon accordingly contributed to 
the aggravation of the asset quality of banks in the early 2000s (BRSA, 2001). Moreover, it 
is posited that the design of the stabilisation programme put more emphasis on correcting 
the fiscal disequilibrium, namely that it did not put necessary emphasis on the restructuring 
and regulation of banking sector (Alper and Öniş, 2002). In addition, both duty losses and 
open positions were well above the regulatory limits, with the full knowledge of the 
Treasury and the Central Bank. Besides to the caveats in the banking sector, endemic 
problems of the Turkish economy such as high and volatile inflation, high fiscal deficits 
and soaring concerns about the financing problems of the current account deficit, 
contributed to loss of confidence of foreign investors. All these economic and banking 
sector related incidents inevitably induced a huge capital outflow and due to the lower 
liquidity levels in financial market, this volatility induced interest rates to soar up to 100%. 
 
In retrospect, these developments arguably triggered the first liquidity crisis occurred in 
November 2000. As a result, five banks and two investment banks went bankrupt. Twenty 
banks were transferred to the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF), which proves the 
severity of the crisis. Following this crisis, although the authorities endeavoured to 
strengthen policies and regulations introduced by the stabilisation programme of 1999, 
fragilities in the banking sector aggravated. First, banks heavily suffered from bad loans 
due to the sharp contraction in the economy. Second, the duty losses of state banks soared 
due to the need to finance large budget deficits, which is arguably one of the most crucial 
point contributed to the subsequent liquidity crisis of February 2001. Since the Treasury 
was not willing to finance the duty losses, this role was filled with the state banks which 
had to borrow heavily from the inter-bank market to finance their day-to-day liquidity 
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needs. This inevitably led to artificially high interest rates on deposits and interbank 
borrowing, and subjected the financial system extremely vulnerable to an exogenously 
generated shock (Altunbas et al., 2009). Third, the IMF insisted on the controlled exchange 
rate policy under this unstable macroeconomic situation, thus contributing to a full-scale 
capital outflow at the outset of 2001, which effectively put an end to the stabilisation 
programme of 2000 (Alper and Öniş, 2002). 
 
All these factors led the Turkish currency depreciated by about 130%, triggering one of the 
country’s most severe domestic financial crises in February 2001. The gross domestic 
product (GDP) contracted by almost 6% and inflation rates rose to about 70%. In addition, 
while the budget balance to the GDP ratio reached almost 12%, the ratio of public debt to 
GDP was almost 80%. The number of banks taken over by the SDIF reached 22. Thus, this 
crisis proved that there was a need for more precautions in the Turkish banking sector 
despite the endeavours of regulatory authorities. 
 
2.5 Regulatory reforms in the post-crisis period 
The previous sections have pointed out that the regulatory reforms undertaken in the post-
crisis era were incomplete and discontinuous.26 This discontinuity have been explained by 
the fact that: (i) the regulatory reform process was heavily politicised,; (ii) the Treasury, the 
principal institution responsible for bank supervision and regulation, was far from effective 
in terms of accomplishing a proper regulatory role due to the conflict objectives that 
characterised its operation; (iii) these reforms were largely driven by external actors and 
manifested itself as a discontinuous process; 27 (iv) the participation of foreign banks into 
the Turkish banking sector was peripheral and rent oriented.  
 
However, in the aftermath of the destructive twin crises experienced in November 2000 
and February 2001, the BRSA introduced the “Banking Sector Restructuring Programme” 
                                                 
26 Due to the discontinuity in the regulatory reform processes of 1980s and 1990s, we accept the regulatory 
reforms introduced in the aftermath of the November 2001 crisis, which have been implemented effectively 
and have manifested continuity in their implementations, as a corner stone in the regulatory process of the 
Turkish banking. Not sure why but this will not move into footnotes on previous page! 
27 This is arguably because only when the domestic economy experiences crises, the power of external actors 
rises while the power of domestic actors such as politicians and banking lobbies shrinks. 
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in cooperation with the IMF in May 2001. This programme initially focused on 
restructuring problematic banks and then introduced many new prudential regulation and 
supervision norms in 2002. It aimed to restore the fragilities in the banking sector and 
improve the regulation and supervision structure, which in turn can promote efficiency, 
competition, and stability of the banking sector (Pazarbasioglu, 2005). Compared to the 
regulatory reforms of the 1980s and 1990s it is fair to argue that the implementation of the 
programme has been more effective despite the authorities implementing the reforms 
without adopting a consultative or gradual approach. This is arguably due to the fact that 
these crises provided a window of opportunity for banking sector restructuring via various 
channels (Alper and Öniş, 2004; Öniş and Bakır, 2007). First, it created public support for 
the reform process that broke down the resistance of bank lobbies and politicians. Second, 
it strengthened the role of key external organisations such as the IMF and the EU, 28 
enabling them to push in the direction of reform. Third, it exposed the structural weakness 
and the fragility of the sector since some banks experienced erosion of their capital base 
and deterioration of their asset quality. Fourth, the independent regulatory and supervisory 
agency, the BRSA that started to function properly as of 2000, contributed to the 
establishment and implementation of an effective prudential regulation and supervision. 
Lastly, the ongoing EU membership negotiations and a favourable global environment in 
the first half of the 2000s, leading to strong capital inflows, facilitating the ease of 
implementation of the reforms since 2002 (Altunbas et al., 2009). As a result, the 
independent regulatory institutions have been able to reform the banking regulatory and 
supervisory framework with the support of domestic and international organisations.  
 
The fundamental pillars of the programme are: (i) the restructuring of state-owned banks in 
both a financial and operational manner; (ii) the resolution of the banks that were taken 
over by the SDIF;29 (iii) the resolution of the private banks adversely affected by the crises; 
and (iv) the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks. We will now 
elaborate on these pillars. The first pillar of the banking restructuring process was to seek 
                                                 
28 These external anchors can support governments to overcome the resistance of domestic interest groups 
and can create greater commitments on the part of key economic and political agents. They can also make the 
reforms more credible by imposing conditional agreements on governments, compelling them to implement 
reforms (Öniş and Bakır, 2007).  
29 The resolution of these banks involved acquisitions by either domestic or foreign banks, consolidations 
into a single bank, or liquidations.  
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solutions for state banks facing financial and operational problems with the ultimate aim of 
privatising these banks. Their balance sheets were significantly deteriorated due to the 
delays in the repayment of loans used by the Treasury for budget financing, the duty losses 
that reached almost 50% of the balance sheet as of the end of 2001 and the shortcomings in 
management (BRSA, 2002). Therefore, public resources were transferred to the state banks 
to liquidate their duty losses which amounted to a total of USD 21.9 billion at the end of 
2001 and the regulations leading to duty losses were abolished. Their capital base was 
strengthened through capital support. Efforts were also accelerated towards their 
operational restructuring, which was strengthened through mergers between the state banks 
and by significantly reducing branches and employees by 33% and 50% respectively by 
the end of 2003 (BRSA, 2009). In addition, their technological infrastructure, financial 
control and risk management were restructured, enabling them to operate more in line with 
the requirements of modern banking and international competition.   
 
The second pillar of the restructuring process was the resolution of the banks taken over by 
the SDIF since their financial structure weakened and they faced problems to meet their 
liabilities. Twenty banks were transferred to the SDIF in 1996-2003. The funds used in this 
process were borrowed by the SDIF from the Treasury, reaching USD 28.2 billion at the 
end of 2003. The resolution process of these banks was carried out rapidly to avoid greater 
losses and ensure stability in the sector (Pazarbasioglu, 2005). The SDIF either sold them 
to foreign and domestic investors or encouraged mergers with other domestic banks. Only 
two banks were still under its management in 2003 and only one as of today.  
 
The third pillar was the establishment of a sound private banking sector. The financial 
structure and profitability of the banks deteriorated sharply with the twin crises. Therefore, 
the authorities aimed to reinforce the equity capital of private banks, limit foreign currency 
open positions, resolve the NPLs, and promote mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to ensure 
soundness and sustainability of private banking. In line with the scope of the programme, 
considerable steps were taken towards strengthening the capital base of private banks, 
which had eroded during the crises. While one bank was transferred to the SDIF due to 
shortage of capital, solvent banks that did not satisfy minimum capital requirements were 
recapitalised through capital injections by the SDIF or forced to merge with other banks. 
The NPLs problem of banks, which had considerably increased by 2001, was sought to be 
resolved through debt restructuring programmes. A multiphase auditing process was 
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undertaken in 2001 to enhance transparency and credibility. Banks were required to 
improve their accountability and transparency to shareholders. Tax advantages were given 
to banks by the law of 2001 to encourage M&As with the hope that this consolidation 
process would eliminate weaker banks and increase activity and competition in the sector.  
 
The aim of the fourth pillar was to reinforce the regulatory and supervisory framework, 
ensure efficiency and competitiveness, and facilitate sound banking practices to establish 
confidence in the banking sector (BRSA, 2002). Therefore, prudential regulations were 
concentrated on the following areas: capital adequacy, internal audit and risk management, 
loan exposures, loan loss provisioning, accounting standards, independent audit, and 
M&As, all of which were made compliant with international regulatory standards. For 
example, the “Regulation on Measurement and Assessment of Bank Capital Adequacy” 
that defines principles and procedures for the calculation of the CAR of banks by taking 
into account market risks (namely interest rate, exchange rate, and equity risks) was 
published in January 2002 (BRSA, 2002). The “Regulation on Banks’ Internal Audit and 
Risk Management System” that sets out principles and procedures to establish an effective 
internal auditing system and an effective risk management system was put into force in 
January 2002. This in turn aims to ensure risk-focused supervision of banks on an activity 
basis (BRSA, 2002). The “Regulation on External Audit Principles” was put into force in 
2002 to determine the procedures and principles for auditing the conformity of accounts 
and records of banks (BRSA, 2002). In addition, some other reforms were introduced to 
improve the regulatory structure and prudential re-regulation/supervision (see Appendix 
2.1). Finally, reforms concerning market infrastructure, such as the formation of the 
Competition Authority and the Capital Market Board, were also introduced to enhance 
competition and efficiency in the financial and banking sectors. 
 
The developments in regulatory standards after 2001 have probably affected the presence 
of foreign banks in the Turkish banking sector. As discussed in Section 2.4, despite the 
relatively early adoption of liberal policies, the market share of foreign banks had been 
negligible until the early 2000s. Yet this trend showed a drastic change following the 
implementation of the regulatory reforms in the post-crisis era. The potential factors 
explaining this phenomenon are that the regulatory reforms led to a banking sector 
characterised by strongly recapitalised banks having higher capital ratios, a tightly 
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regulated banking sector, and the banking regulations that have been aligned with 
internationally accepted norms (Aysan and Ceyhan, 2006). Moreover, the ongoing 
membership negotiations with the European Parliament, the growth potential of the 
Turkish banking sector, the growing consumer credit and mortgage markets, along with 
notable untapped banking potential, arguably also raised the interest of foreign banks to the 
Turkish banking sector (Altunbaş et al., 2009). As a result, foreign investors’ interest 
started to increase after the twin crises, engendering a considerable number of foreign 
banks penetrated into the Turkish banking sector during 2005 and 2006 (see Appendix 2.2). 
Specifically, foreign investors such as Citigroup, UniCredito, BNP Paribas, and Fortis, 
whose headquarters are located in EU countries, invested around USD 14 billion between 
2005 and 2006. Figure 2.1 shows the participation trend of foreign banks into the Turkish 
banking sector over time. It denotes that until 2005, the market share of foreign banks was 
miniscule. Yet this trend reversed as of 2005. That is, the total assets of foreign banks 
started to increase comprehensively after 2005 when the heavy penetration of foreign 
banks was realised. It should be also noted that the entry of new foreign banks into the 
Turkish banking sector were realised either through acquisition of the shares of locally 
established medium-sized domestic private banks or opening of a branch. In other words, 
instead of starting a de novo bank or greenfield investment, they entered into the Turkish 
banking sector through acquisition. This in turn has affected not only the efficiency of the 
domestic banking sector, but also the degree of competition (Clarke et al., 2003).30 
 
                                                 
30 We will elaborate on the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry in Section 3.3. 
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Figure 2.1 Ratio of total assets of foreign banks to total industry assets 
 
Note: Figure is based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the SDIF,      
development and investment banks) 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), author’s calculation 
 
In conclusion, the lack of internationally accepted banking principles and the pervasive 
failure to provide proper prudential regulation and supervision of the banking sector due to 
the political intervention into the regulatory process and the lack of a sound regulatory 
framework and institutions, led banks to take excessive risks, increasing fragilities in the 
sector in the 1980s and 1990s. The fragile banking sector coupled with macroeconomic 
instabilities and large fiscal deficits arguably laid the basis for the financial crises in 1994, 
2000, and 2001. Yet the radical changes undertaken in the legislative and institutional 
framework following the twin crises have contributed to the improvements in the 
prudential regulation and supervision of Turkish banks, which in turn have had 
repercussions on the market structure, performance and soundness, which will be analysed 
in the following section. 
 
2.6 A brief analysis of contemporary Turkish banking 
The changes in the regulatory environment since 1980s have not only rendered alterations 
in the market structure of the Turkish banking sector but also have changed the business 
strategy of banks. Therefore, to shed light on the transformation of the sector in response to 
the changes in the regulatory environment, this section investigates selected primary 
banking sector metrics for the period 1988-2016. These metrics are not necessarily 
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measures of competition or efficiency, yet they give preliminary evidence as to how the 
Turkish banking sector has reacted to the legislations introduced by the banking authorities 
over time, with particular interest devoted to repercussions of the regulatory reforms 
implemented in the aftermath of the twin crises. The metrics that will be investigated 
below are related with market structure, cost structure, competition, income structure, and 
quality of assets. 
 
First, we start by investigating the impacts of alterations in the regulatory framework on 
the market structure of the Turkish banks. The changes in market structure are manifested 
in the increasingly diversified ownership and reduction of the number of banks. As seen in 
Table 2.2, summarising the changes in the number and market share of three ownerships, 
the number of public banks dropped until 2001 and remained stable thereafter. It is 
noteworthy that these banks have witnessed an almost consistent decline in market share 
during the entire period. Thus, it can be inferred that the efficiency-driven ownership 
reforms and concomitant privatisation policy implemented after 2001 reduced the state 
ownership of banks. At the end of 2016, the three public banks accounted for 33.5% of 
market share in terms of total assets, a decline of 21.2% compared to 1988. The loan 
market share of public sector banks also plummeted from 54.7% in 1988 to 33.5% in 2016. 
The changes in the number and share of public banks arguably stemmed from the 
introduction of the deregulation policies aiming to increase the role of private banks and 
the concomitant regulatory reforms of consolidated or privatised state-owned banks. On 
the other hand, the number of domestic private banks was inconsistent until 2001 and their 
numbers have consistently dropped thereafter. This trend is largely attributable to the 
restructuring programme, introduced in the aftermath of the twin crises, inducing the 
private banks that were taken over by the SDIF to be closed or consolidated. In other 
words, the restructuring programmes (in the form of compulsory M&As) worked as an exit 
strategy for weak commercial banks. Specifically, new foreign banks have penetrated into 
the Turkish banking sector by acquiring domestic private banks since 2005, which explains 
some of the drops in the number of private domestic banks. The market share of domestic 
private banks in terms of total assets has showed inconsistency during the entire period, 
though the market share of these banks in terms of loans showed a steady increase from 
1988 to 2005 and then started to reduce thereafter, possibly due to the global financial 
crisis. However, it is interesting to note that these banks extended the largest amount of 
loans compared to other ownerships as of 2016, indicating their importance in the loan 
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market. Foreign banks used to have a miniscule share in the sector until 2005, yet their 
number and specifically the shares in the sector in terms of assets and loans have almost 
quadrupled after 2005 due to their heavy penetration into the Turkish banking market at 
this time. In other words, although their market shares in terms of assets and loans are still 
low compared to their domestic counterparts, it can be concluded that these banks are not 
anymore marginal players in the Turkish market.  
 
Table 2.2 Summary of the number and market share of three ownerships (1988-2016) 
 Public banks Domestic private banks Foreign banks 
Year 
Number 
of 
banks 
Share 
in 
sector 
(assets) 
Share 
in 
sector 
(loans) 
Number 
of 
banks 
Share 
in 
sector 
(assets) 
Share in 
sector 
(loans) 
Number 
of 
banks 
Share 
in 
sector 
(assets) 
Share 
in 
sector 
(loans) 
1988 8 47.6 54.7 25 48.4 41.9 19 4.0 3.4 
1992 6 46.4 47.6 31 49.6 49.0 20 3.9 3.4 
1996 5 40.7 38.9 33 56.1 59.1 18 3.2 2.0 
1999 4 38.9 32.7 31 55.2 63.9 19 5.8 3.4 
2001 3 35.3 25.1 22 61.4 71.1 15 3.3 3.9 
2005 3 32.6 21.7 17 62.0 71.1 13 5.4 7.1 
2009 3 32.4 28.4 11 53.6 53.9 17 14.0 17.6 
2013 3 30.9 29.3 11 53.1 54.6 17 16.0 16.0 
2016 3 32.7 33.5 9 39.5 39.4 21 27.7 26.8 
Note: Figures are based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the SDIF,      
development and investment banks) 
Source: The BAT, author’s calculation 
 
Table 2.3 presents two measures of the changing level of concentration of the banking 
sector, the Five-firm Concentration Ratio (CR5) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). The CR5, which measures the market share of the five largest banks in every given 
year, is generally used to reflect the extent of market control of the largest firms, but it does 
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not provide much detail on the competitiveness of the sector.31 The HHI, on the other hand, 
is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all the banks within the 
industry. The higher level of index indicates that the higher level of concentration in the 
industry, namely the index, is inversely proportional to the level of competitiveness.  
 
Table 2.3 Summary of selected market structure indicators (1988-2016) 
Year 
Number 
of 
banks 
Defined by total assets Defined by gross loans 
HHI CR5 HHI CR5 
1988   52 1.024 0.624 1.324 0.676 
1992   57 0.860 0.542 1.151 0.611 
1996   56 0.779 0.504 0.891 0.526 
1999   54 0.822 0.530 0.788 0.530 
2001   40 1.013 0.619 1.001 0.644 
2005   33 1.069 0.658 0.906 0.587 
2009   31 1.071 0.657 0.934 0.586 
2013   31 0.966 0.609 0.944 0.595 
2016   33 0.976 0.608 0.976 0.602 
Note: Figures are based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the SDIF, 
development and investment banks); Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Five-firm Concentration 
Ratio (CR5) are calculated relative to total assets and total loans respectively. 
Source: The BAT, author’s calculation 
 
 
Looking at concentration ratios (see Table 2.3), both the CR5 and the HHI exhibit similar 
trends over time. Specifically, both indexes are defined by total assets and total loans and 
showed a decreasing trend between 1988 and 1999, due possibly to the introduction of 
deregulation policy, increasing the number of banks in the industry. This trend was 
reversed in 2001 as the indexes increased in the aftermath of the twin crises. This is largely 
because banks having weak financial structures were either closed or merged into stronger 
                                                 
31 Bikker & Haaf  (2002) provided a detailed discussion on why this ratio does not provide information on 
the competition level of a banking sector. 
32 
 
banks, hence a significant drop in the number of banks was experienced. What is 
noteworthy is that while the concentration levels defined by the total assets tended to 
decline after 2005, the levels defined by total loans tended to increase after 2005. To put it 
differently, the concentration levels in terms of total assets was higher than the 
concentration levels in terms of loans between 2001 and 2013. This may indicate that 
competition in the loan market was higher than the total assets after 2005. This can be 
explained by the fact that fiscal discipline comprehensively reduced the public sector 
borrowing requirement and decreased interest margins, which in turn rendered Turkish 
banks to focus on the lending market instead of keeping most of their assets in the form of 
government securities. However, the concentration levels measured by using HHI or CR5 
need to be treated with caution, since these concentration measures have been found to be 
poor proxies for competition in banking (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Delis, 2012). 
Therefore, we now report more specific information concerning with the competitiveness 
of the banking sector. 
 
Second, we now turn our attention to the impact of changes in the regulatory framework on 
the cost structure of the Turkish banks. As illustrated in Table 2.4 presenting the ratio of 
non-interest expenses over total earning assets shows an inconsistent trend between 1988 
and 1999, yet it skyrockets in 2001 and it shows a persistent decline thereafter. As 
discussed by (Elliehausen, 1998), the incremental compliance cost incurred by the revision 
of regulation is primarily manifested in the increase of non-interest expenses. Therefore, 
the extraordinary increase of non-interest expenses corresponding with per unit earning 
assets observed from 1999 to 2001 seems to relate with banks’ effort of implementation of 
adaptation to the change in the prudential regulations introduced in the aftermath of the 
twin crises. Table 2.4 also shows that the changes in the ratio of personnel expenses over 
total earning assets closely mirror the change of the ratio of non-interest expenses over 
total earning assets. This point also restates Elliehausen (1998), who argues that labour 
costs are the main component of the compliance cost. Therefore, it is possible to expect 
Turkish banks to intensify their labour intensive collection efforts with the introduction of 
the regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the twin crises. This is because these reforms 
have dictated to the banks to close their open positions and resolve the NPLs that 
skyrocketed after the twin crises of 2000-2001, possibly resulting in one-shot large 
increase in personnel expenses and non-interest expenses.   
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Table 2.4 Non-interest expenses as a percentage of total earning assets 
Year 
Non-interest expenses 
 
Total 
earning 
assets 
Ratios 
Personnel 
expenses 
Physical 
capital 
expenses 
The ratio of 
non-interest 
expenses over 
total earning 
assets 
The ratio of 
non-interest 
expenses over 
personnel 
expenses 
1988 382.83 677.31 9,187.88 11.4 4.1 
1992 621.79 697.52 10,721.83 12.3 5.8 
1996 561.05 1,041.85 16,593.51 9.7 3.4 
1999 745.02 1,145.71 18,578.01 10.2 4.0 
2001 703.01 2,144.67 13,383.05 21.3 5.3 
2005 583.34 1,635.63 32,802.06 6.8 1.8 
2009 774.53 1,913.50 52,830.43 5.1 1.5 
2013 930.11 2,150.06 77,034.36 4.0 1.2 
2016 1,008.31 2,586.77 96,046.24 3.7 1.0 
Note: Figures are based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the 
SDIF, development and investment banks). Monetary values are adjusted for inflation (millions TRY). 
Non-interest expenses=personnel expenses + physical capital expenses; 
Total earning assets=total loans +other earning assets. 
Source: The BAT, author’s calculation 
 
 
Third, the impact of changes in the regulatory framework on the competition of the Turkish 
banks can be examined by looking into the net interest margins (NIM). Turkish banking 
deregulation that began in the early 1980s has allowed the Turkish banks to become bigger 
by achieving economies of scale and scope. Yet, this has arguably contributed to the fact 
that the realised outcome of high levels of concentration and the formation of 
conglomerates may have negative effects on competition if banks collude over setting 
interest rates. The evolution of the NIM can reflect the competitive climate facing Turkish 
commercial banks. Figure 2.2 presents the evolution of the NIM by ownership and average 
of the NIM of these ownerships. To begin with, average of the NIM values of three 
ownerships indicates that these banks experienced a strong growth in the NIM from 1988 
to 1996. In other words, despite the banking deregulation programme initiated in the early 
1980s and accompanying reductions in concentration levels (see Table 2.3), the Turkish 
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banking sector had a non-competitive banking structure. Yet the increasing trend in the 
NIM has been reversed as of 1996 and Turkish banks arguably have faced fiercer 
competitive pressure since that time. Once we investigate this graph by ownership, 
different stories emerge. For example, all ownerships manifested an increasing trend in 
their NIM between 1988 and 1999. Yet state banks experienced a sharp increase from 1999 
to 2001 while the opposite trend is observed in other ownerships’ margins. This might be 
due partly to the fact that duty losses accumulated due to the extension of loans at 
subsidised rates (below market interest) to the government and favoured sectors were 
eliminated with the introduction of regulatory reforms as of 2001. Another interesting point 
in the figure is that foreign banks had higher margins compared to domestic counterparts 
during 1988-2001, which is compatible with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
(1999). The authors argue that foreign banks have higher margins and profits compared to 
domestic banks in developing countries, since they are less subjected to credit allocation 
rules, have better production technologies, and have relatively low loan loss provisions 
because they do not generally engage in retail banking. Similarly, Turkish state banks had 
the lowest margins in the same period, arguably because of the fact that the rent 
distribution through the state banks mechanism was actively used until the end of 1990s 
(see Section 2.3). In the same vein, Altunbaş et al. (2009) suggest that the primary 
objective of these banks was performing specific missions that they undertook rather than 
profit maximisation. Yet it is noteworthy that the differences in the margins of different 
ownerships observed prior to 2001 have almost vanished since 2005. Moreover, there has 
been significant drops in the NIM of all ownerships, which in turn might indicate that 
recent regulatory reforms have to some extent managed to generate a more level playing 
field for Turkish banks, leading to greater competition in the Turkish banking sector. 
Conversely, some studies argue that shifting from deregulation to re-regulation and making 
domestic legislation more compatible with international standards can reduce competition 
in a banking sector (Casu et al., 2017). Therefore, it is possible to infer that the evolution 
of NIM may not necessarily reflect the changes in competitive condition in a banking 
market. Furthermore, there is also no consensus in the literature whether a high or low 
interest margin manifest is better for a more efficient banking system. Some argue that 
high NIM is unfavourable since it induces a disintermediation (Brock and Rojas Suarez, 
2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). Moreover, high NIM might stem from low 
deposit rates and indicates the unattractiveness of maintaining deposit accounts, which in 
turn discourages savings. Furthermore, high lending rates associated with high NIM in turn 
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prohibit potential borrowers and hence restrain investment. On the other hand, low NIM 
may not necessarily be a good thing, in particular in liberalised systems that have weak 
management and legal systems, since some weak banks may adopt a strategy of offering 
lower lending rates to acquire additional market shares. Moreover, low NIM might damage 
the stability of the overall banking system, because in this case banks are not able earn 
enough profit which could be channelled to their capital bases (Claessens et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 2.2 Evolution of net interest margin (1988-2016) 
 
Note: Figures are based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the SDIF, 
development and investment banks); NIM values defined as the net interest income divided by total assets 
following Naceur and Goaied, (2008). 
Source: The BAT, author’s calculation 
 
Fourth, Table 2.5 illustrates some selected banking indicators to further investigate the 
effects of the undertaken legislations and reforms on the income structure of Turkish 
banks. To start with, Spread I and Spread II, measured as the difference between the 
implicit loan rate and implicit deposit rate, and as the difference between the implicit loan 
rate and loanable fund price respectively, tend to show a declining trend over time. These 
trends may indicate the fact that the spreads have been narrowed for the Turkish banks, 
which in turn may indicate that Turkish banks have obtained less profit from traditional 
banking activities. Yet it is not straightforward to suggest reasons behind the declining 
trends of the spreads, since both the implicit loan rate and the deposit/loanable fund rates 
have showed similar declining trends over time. Likewise, the average of the pre-tax profit 
ratios in the pre-2001 period is larger than average based on the post-2001 period, 
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indicating that a decline in the profits derived from the traditional banking activities. 
Furthermore, the fee-based income ratio manifesting a progressive increasing trend over 
time signals a change of business focus from on-balance-sheet to off-balance-sheet 
activities. This trend may indicate Turkish banks’ efforts to catch new development 
opportunities, generated by financial innovation and deregulation as of the 1990s, allowing 
banks to generate new forms of intermediation and other fee-based activities. This could 
also be rooted in the fact that Turkish banks have sought to neutralise the negative impacts 
of the fall in the spread of traditional banking activities on their profits.  
 
The table also shows that the total loans ratio had an increasing trend from 1988-1996; yet 
the economic turmoil of the 1990s, coupled with the financial crises of 2000 and 2001, 
reversed this situation. This ratio dropped almost 10% after 1996 and it bottomed as of 
2001. In the post-crisis period, this ratio presented a slow growth until 2005, yet the loan 
market has experienced a noticeable growth following the global financial crisis in 
particular and it has peaked as of 2016. The evolution of this ratio could be, among other 
things, explained by the change in banks’ risk taking considerations. That is, Turkish banks 
inherited high NPLs from the pre-reform period and the post-2001 reforms compatible 
with the international standards have brought about a risk-based capital regulatory regime. 
Therefore, these factors induced banks to shift from loans to safer, more liquid earning 
assets, in particular government securities in the post-2001 period. Since the upward 
revised risk-based capital requirement made lending more expensive, banks changed their 
product mix in favour of assets having lower risk weight. As a result, the securities, the 
composition of risk-free assets to total earning assets ratio skyrocketed in the aftermath of 
the financial crises of 2000 and 2001. However, the shares of securities have dropped 
considerably after 2009 specifically, coinciding with the drastic increase in the shares of 
loans.  
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Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics of chosen banking indicators (1988-2016) 
 
 
1988 1992 1996 1999 2001 2005 2009 2013 2016 
a) Implicit deposit rate 
(1) 
19.0 21.6 22.3 30.7 22.3 8.0 6.7 4.1 5.0 
b) Implicit loan rate (2) 33.7 36.0 35.7 35.8 31.7 13.9 14.0 8.4 9.5 
c) Loanable funds price 
(3)
 
19.5 20.7 20.1 27.0 20.3 7.5 6.5 3.9 4.8 
Spread I = (b) – (a) 14.7 14.4 13.4 5.1 9.4 5.8 7.3 4.2 4.5 
Spread II = (b) – (c) 14.2 15.3 15.6 8.8 11.4 6.3 7.5 4.5 4.6 
d) Pre-tax profit/total 
earning assets 
(4)
 
3.5 3.3 4.4 7.4 -2.6 2.3 3.1 1.8 1.8 
e) Fee-based 
income/total income 
(5)
 
9.4 4.4 3.8 3.7 6.4 13.1 11.9 14.7 12.4 
f) Total loans/ total 
earning assets 
47.1 50.1 52.2 43.9 41.5 41.9 49.4 63.9 68.5 
g) Securities (6)/ total 
earning assets 
13.9 14.6 20.1 26.7 16.0 40.4 37.5 20.1 16.4 
Note: Figures are based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the SDIF, 
development and investment banks). 
(1) implicit deposit rate = interest paid on deposits/ total deposits, 
(2) implicit credit rate = interest income received on loans/total loans, 
(3) loanable funds price = total interest payment/total deposits + total money market borrowings, 
(4) total earning assets = total loans + (cash + due from banks + central bank + other financial institutions 
+ interbank funds sold + securities + legal reserves + financial assets), 
(5) total income = fee-based income + total interest income. 
(6) securities = treasury bills + government bonds + other securities, 
Source: The BAT 
 
 
Finally, turning to the effect of reforms on the quality of assets (see Table 2.6), both gross 
NPLs and net NPLs ratios consistently reduced between 1988 and 1996, indicating an 
amelioration in the quality of loan portfolios in relative terms. This might be due to, among 
other things, the fact that after the 1994 crisis, the SDIF sought to strengthen and 
restructure poorly performing banks. Yet this declining trend observed in the NPLs was 
reversed after 1996, due probably to the ongoing chronic problems in economy and 
banking regulation (see Section 2.3). The biggest jump in the NPLs ratios came in 2001 
and stemmed largely from the sharp contraction in the economy and the financial crises. 
Turkish banks nevertheless recovered quickly after the financial crises and the NPLs ratios 
dropped to their pre-crises levels. The amelioration of the NPLs was arguably driven by 
vigorous economic activity and coupled with decreasing inflation and real interest rates 
and an increase in the provisions maintained by the banking sector for non-performing 
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receivables (Altunbaş et al., 2009). Moreover, the debt-restructuring programme adopted in 
the aftermath of the crisis in 2001 has also relieved the pressure on the absolute amount of 
NPLs. Yet one should investigate further whether banks manage to reduce the NPLs ratios 
either through the recovering NPLs or through inflating their loan portfolios. This is 
because the empirical findings show that the NPLs burden is accumulated while the NPLs 
ratio reduces, shedding light on the propensity of banks engaging in “upward window 
dressing” adjustments at the quarter-end reporting dates, which enables banks to build up a 
large loan balance (Allen and Saunders, 1992).  
 
Table 2.6 Profile of the NPLs in Turkish banking (1988-2016) 
Year 
Gross  
loans 
Gross  
NPLs 
Net  
loans 
Gross 
NPLs 
ratio 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Net 
NPLs 
Net 
NPLs 
ratio 
1988 6,812.85 440.32 6,372.53 6.46 320.84 119.48 1.87 
1992 8,230.01 260.86 7,969.15 3.17 173.33 87.53 1.10 
1996 11,926.16 249.77 11,676.39 2.09 173.96 75.81 0.65 
1999 11,347.11 644.11 10,703.01 5.68 300.09 344.02 3.21 
2001 7,936.32 3,174.36 4,761.97 40.00 1349.34 1,825.02 38.32 
2005 16,658.53 830.36 15,828.17 4.98 745.31 85.05 0.54 
2009 29,873.99 1,662.06 28,211.93 5.56 1406.84 255.22 0.90 
2013 58,349.21 1,944.13 56,405.08 3.33 1577.9 366.23 0.65 
2016 77,015.24 2,601.09 74,414.15 3.38 2042.54 558.55 0.75 
Note: Figures are based on the scheduled commercial banks (excluding local banks, banks under the SDIF, 
development and investment banks); Monetary values are adjusted for inflation (millions TRY). Net NPLs 
refer to loan loss provisions adjusted gross NPLs, is measured by the difference between gross NPLs and 
loan loss provisions; Gross NPLs ratio=gross NPLs/gross loans; Net NPLs ratio=net NPLs/net loans 
Source: The BAT, author’s calculation 
 
 
To examine this issue further, Table 2.7 tabulates the correlation matrix among the 
variables. It is observed that the correlation coefficient of the net and gross NPLs ratios 
have the most positive, significant (except with the gross NPLs) and strongest correlation 
between the absolute amount of NPLs. This in turn might depict that Turkish banks did not 
engage in “upward window dressing” as the ratios were likely to be reduced by the 
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improvement in the NPLs and not by inflating the loans. This result might also signal that 
the restructuring programme and concomitant regulatory reforms have induced banks to 
adopt a comprehensive risk management framework, resulting in the improvement in 
credit quality since 2002. Furthermore, the loan loss provisions, reflecting credit quality of 
banks over time and the overall attitude of the banking system to control risks, have 
significantly increased after 2002 when the reforms initiated. This increase therefore is 
likely to lend support to the conclusion drawn regarding the improvement in the NPLs in 
the post-reform period. 
 
Table 2.7 Univariate matrix, net/gross loans, net/gross NPLs, net/gross NPLs ratio 
 
Net loans Net NPLs Net NPLs ratio 
Net loans 1 
  
Net NPLs -0.035 1 
 
Net NPLs ratio -0.3165 0.9551* 1 
    
 
Gross loans Gross NPLs Gross NPLs ratio 
Gross loans 1 
  
Gross NPLs 0.54 1 
 
Gross NPLs ratio -0.293 0.6331 1 
Note: * shows significant at 5% level 
 
 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is a proxy measured by dividing a bank’s amount of capital 
by its assets weighted by risk. This ratio is used by banking authorities to ensure that a 
bank has enough cushions to absorb a reasonable amount of losses before it becomes 
insolvent. Therefore, higher CAR ratios lower the risk of becoming insolvent, i.e. if a bank 
has a higher CAR ratio, it will be more likely for it to meet its financial obligations during 
a winding-up and so provides a higher degree of protection to its depositors. A bank’s total 
capital is composed of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals. Tier 1 capital, composed of a bank’s 
disclosed reserves such as shareholders equity and retained earnings, is capable of 
absorbing shocks without causing any drastic impact on its business operations. Tier 2 
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capital, consisting of a bank’s undisclosed reserves such as revaluation reserves, hybrid 
capital instruments and subordinated term debt, general loan-loss reserves, and undisclosed 
reserves, is used as supplementary capital. A bank’s risk-weighted assets are obtained by 
undertaking a risk assessment of each type of bank asset. That is, an asset backed by little 
or no collateral induces a bank to a higher propensity of credit exposure. According to the 
Basel III rules, the CAR of a bank should be a minimum of 8%, yet Tier 1 capital should 
be at least 6% of the CAR of the bank. Figure 2.3 shows the CAR of Turkish banking 
during the period between 1988 and 2016. The figure denotes that Turkish banks largely 
managed to meet the minimum CAR set by the banking authorities, except for 1999 and 
2001, which largely stemmed from the economic turmoil and the financial crises. Yet this 
ratio improved immediately after the crises due largely to the restructuring programme and 
the regulatory reforms and stayed above the minimum requirements thereafter. The 
banking authorities of Turkey introduced legislation on the Measurement and Evaluation of 
Banks Capital Adequacy (2006) and this is compliant with the Basel-II Provisions related 
to market risk. Therefore, the figure also shows the risk-adjusted capital ratios as of 2006. 
This ratio appears to be higher than the CAR based on Basel I. This can be partly attributed 
to the large government debt portfolios of Turkish banks, which are accepted as risk-free 
assets.  
 
Figure 2.3 Capital adequacy ratios, 1988-2016 
 
Note: Figures reflect the entire Turkish banking sector; CAR based on Basel I is measured by shareholders' 
equity/total assets; whilst CAR based on Basel II is measured by shareholders’ equity / ((capital to be 
employed to credit + market + operational risk)*12.5)*100 
Source: The BAT. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the development of the Turkish banking sector with respect to 
the changes in the regulatory environment. During the pre-deregulation period, the role of 
the Turkish banking sector was to meet the needs of the state-led economic development 
programme. Economic turmoil and an inefficient banking sector contributed to the change 
in policy focus from 1980. This year has been a cornerstone in the regulatory framework of 
the Turkish banking sector, as the banking authorities started to adopt banking deregulation 
policies to enhance competition and hence improve efficiency and productivity. Yet the 
implementation of deregulatory reforms without establishing a proper regulation of the 
banking system contributed to the domestic financial crises of the early 1980s and hence 
forced the authorities to start a process of prudential re-regulation as of 2001. The new 
policy focus aimed at strengthening the foundations of the banking system to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the Turkish banks in the long run. In short, it is therefore possible to 
divide the whole reform process into two stages: the first stage relates to structural 
deregulation targeted at enhancing competition and efficiency; the second stage targeted 
strengthening financial stability. After reviewing the evolution of the regulatory reforms, 
we provided descriptive statistics to shed some light on the changes in market structure and 
behavioural responses of banks during the reform period. However, one cannot achieve a 
clear understanding of whether the regulatory reforms have had the intended positive 
effects on banking competition and efficiency by only looking into the metrics, thus this 
study will use an empirical approach to further investigate the impact of financial reforms 
on Turkish banks’ efficiency and competition.  
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Appendix 2.1 Turkey legislation for regulatory reforms 
 
Important acts and principles Date 
Act on Restructuring of Debts to the Financial Sector and Making 
Amendments to Some Acts (4743) 
January, 2002 
Regulation on Measurement and Evaluation of Capital Adequacy of 
Banks 
January, 2002 
Pursuant to the Regulation on the Calculation and Implementation of 
Foreign Currency Net General Position/Equity Standard Ratio by Banks 
on Consolidated and Non-Consolidated Basis 
January, 2002 
Regulation on External Audit Principles January, 2002 
Regulation on External Audit Principles and Regulation on 
Authorisation of Institutions to Perform External Audit and Termination 
of Authorities Temporarily or Permanently Thereof 
January, 2002 
 
Regulation on General Conditions Concerning Approval, Recognition 
and Implementation of Financial Restructuring Framework Agreements 
 
 
April, 2002 
Accounting Practice Regulation and related Communiqués  
Communiqué on Uniform Accounting Plan and Prospects June, 2002 
Communiqué on Accounting Standard of Financial Instruments June, 2002 
Communiqué on Accounting Standard of Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Assets 
June, 2002 
Communiqué on Accounting Standard of Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates 
June, 2002 
Communiqué on Accounting Standard of Net Profit/Loss of the Period, 
Fundamental Errors and Changes made in Accounting Policies 
June, 2002 
Communiqué on Uniform Accounting Plan and Prospects June, 2002 
Source: BRSA (2009)  
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Appendix 2.2 Entry of foreign banks to the Turkish banking sector 2001-2015 
Year 
Target domestic 
bank 
Foreign bank 
Country of origin 
of foreign bank 
Stake 
bought 
(%) 
2001 Demirbank HSBC UK 100 
2002 Kocbank UniCredito Italy 50 
2005 Yapi ve Kredi  UniCredito/ Kocbank Italy/Turkey 57 
2005 TEB BNP Paribas France 50 
2005 Disbank Fortis Belgium 89 
2005 Garanti Bank GE Capital USA 26 
2005 C bank Bank Hapoalim Israel 58 
2005 Finansbank Naional Bank of Greece Greece 46 
2006 Tekfenbank EFG Eurobank* Greece 70 
2006 Denizbank Dexia Bank* Belgium 75 
2006 Sekerbank BTA Kazakhstan 34 
2006 MNG Bank Arab Bank/ Bank Med Lebanon 91 
2006 Akbank Citigroup USA 20 
2007 Oyak Bank ING Bank Netherland 100 
2013 Alternatifbank Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar 100 
2013 EFG Eurobank* Burgan Bank Kuwait 99.3 
2013 Dexia Bank* Sberbank Rossii Russia 99.9 
2015 Tekstil Bank 
 
Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China 
China 75.5 
Note: Adapted from Altunbas et al. (2009) and from annual reports published by the BAT. 
*These banks, whose parent banks are located in EU, sold their investments to other foreign investors. 
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review  
3.1 Introduction 
The core activity of a bank is to collect deposits from savers and extend loans to 
borrowers.32 Phrased differently, it acts as an intermediary between savers and borrowers 
since it collects funds from surplus units and channels these funds to those with a deficit of 
funds. This intermediary role of enabling surplus funds to be transferred and allocated to 
their most productive opportunities in turn results in a better allocation of financial 
resources and thereby increases economic efficiency (Hermes and Lensink, 1996; Casu et 
al., 2015). To investigate how a bank improves the allocation of financial resources in an 
economy, one needs to focus on the functions of a bank. In theory, these functions are 
classified into four main categories: A bank (i) offers liquidity and payment services, (ii) 
transforms assets, (iii) manages risks, and (iv) processes information and screens 
borrowers, which will be briefly examined below (Freixas and Rochet, 2008).  
 
First, surplus units prefer holding assets that are more easily converted into cash due to 
their lack of knowledge of future events. Therefore, once they deposit their cash into a 
bank, this bank offers financial or secondary claims that are easily convertible into cash 
without loss of capital value. A bank facilitates the transfer of funds between the bank 
accounts of economic agents by settling the debt of the payer to the payee through a 
transfer of money. Second, a bank provides the missing link between savers and borrowers 
by performing size, maturity, and risk transformations. A bank has access to a larger 
number of depositors than any other individual borrower does, it thus performs a size 
transformation by collecting funds from savers in the form of small size deposits and then 
invests these into larger-sized loans. A bank’s liabilities (i.e. the deposits collected from 
savers) are generally repayable on demand or at relatively short notice, while a bank’s 
assets (loans extended to borrowers) are normally repayable in the medium- or long-term. 
It hence undertakes a maturity transformation by transforming funds lent for a short period 
                                                 
32 Although the core activity of a bank is to be a financial intermediary between savers and borrowers, it can 
also offer payment services as well as a wide range of additional services such as securitisation, brokerage, 
etc. Yet its former function constitutes its distinguishing feature compared to other financial intermediaries.  
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of time into medium- and long-term loans. Individual borrowers have a risk of default, 
namely not being able to repay their loans. A bank therefore performs a risk transformation 
by diversifying its loan portfolio, pooling risks, monitoring and screening individual 
borrowers and holding capital which can be used in case of turmoil. Third, another 
important function of a bank is to manage risks such as credit, interest rate, and liquidity 
risks. The task of monitoring and screening credit risk is costly for an individual saver. Yet 
this depositor can delegate the task of monitoring to the bank that has expertise and 
economies of scale in processing information on the risks of borrowers. A bank also takes 
risks when transforming maturities and when issuing liquid deposits guaranteed by illiquid 
loans. The cost of deposits depending on short-term interest rates may rise above the 
interest income received from loans granted by the bank. Moreover, even a bank pays no 
interest on deposits, it may be forced to seek more expensive sources of funds in the case 
of unexpected cash withdrawals of depositors. That is, it needs to manage the interest rate 
risk stemming from differences in maturity and liquidity risk driven by the nature of 
deposits and loans. Finally, a bank has a particular part to play in managing some of the 
issues arising from imperfect information on borrowers. For a bank, moral hazard occurs 
after a loan has been extended, because the borrower may engage in activities that are 
undesirable for the bank since these activities make it less likely that the loan will be 
repaid. Thus, a bank regularly monitors the project and the performance of the borrower by 
acquiring a series of financial information. In addition, adverse selection may result for a 
lender to attract the wrong type of clients, which in turn increase loan rates or insurance 
premiums to the levels that are to the detriment of lower-risk borrowers. A bank therefore 
invests in technologies allowing them screen out excessively high-risk lenders by 
investigating their risk profile and adjusting loan rates to manifest the risks of borrower.  
 
Aside from potential increases in the savings rate, a well-functioning banking sector 
renders improved financial products and services, risk-taking capabilities, and 
intermediates greater amounts of funds by offering better prices and service quality for 
customers (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Molyneux et al., 1996a). Moreover, both the 
theoretical and empirical literature posit that a well-functioning banking system is likely to 
result in a much better allocation of capital and thereby increase economic growth (Beck 
and Levine, 2004; King and Levine, 1993a). Nevertheless, banks are fragile, and the 
banking sector is exposed to instability owing to unique characteristics of this business 
such as risk-shift incentives, moral hazard, and financial contagion (Allen & Gale 2004). 
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Their fragilities, which would trigger banking sector-induced systemic crises, will of 
course disrupt the flow of credit from savers to consumers and investors, resulting in a 
reduction in investment and consumption. Therefore, to obtain an efficient yet sound 
banking sector, policy makers have implemented financial deregulation and concomitant 
regulatory reforms consisting of prudential re-regulations and restructuring programmes. 
We thereby investigate the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concerning the 
effects of financial reforms on bank performance. This is of interest since if efficiency is 
increased, the improvement in allocation of capital benefits society and may result in price 
reductions and/or service expansion for consumers, if competition warrants (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). The rest of the chapter will thereby review the theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence on the four interrelated aspects associated with the impacts of 
financial reforms on bank efficiency and competition. Therefore, Section 3.2 examines the 
impacts of financial deregulation on bank efficiency. Section 3.3 assesses the impacts of 
regulatory reforms on bank performance, Section 3.4 looks into the relationship between 
bank ownership and efficiency, and finally, Section 3.5 reviews the association between 
regulatory reforms and ownership, and bank competition. 
 
3.2 Banking deregulation and bank efficiency 
The discussion on financial liberalisation more or less starts with the seminal publications 
of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). These authors coincidentally developed a 
theoretical model concerned with the growth-inducing effects of financial liberalisation in 
contrast to financial repression. They posit that financial repression policies - forcing 
financial institutions to pay low and often negative real interest rates - reduces the volume 
of funds available for investment and hence engendered low growth rates in many 
developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s. They instead advocate financial 
liberalisation policies that abolish institutional constraints on nominal interest rates and 
eliminate the obstacles on competition among financial institutions. This is because 
financial liberalisation would increase the volume of savings as well as the quantity and 
quality of investments, which in turn would lead to higher economic growth rates.  
 
In the late-1970s, many emerging market countries experienced deteriorating economic 
and financial conditions. They therefore undertook economic reforms to generate a 
sustainable investment environment and develop an economic system that relied on the 
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market mechanism. Financial liberalisation was the primary component of these economic 
reforms. Beginning with financial liberalisation, from the 1980s banking authorities 
embarked on a process of deregulatory reforms, including elimination of the control on 
interest rates and credit allocation, privatisation of public banks, and liberalisation of 
capital flows. These deregulatory policies are in turn expected to promote competition and 
thereby improve both static and dynamic efficiency (Stefano and Nicoletti, 2003). Static 
gains occur due to the elimination of x-inefficiencies, since deregulation-driven 
competition is likely to hinder the monopolists’ “quiet life” habits. Dynamic gains, on the 
other hand, are also likely as banks’ managers continue to enhance their productivity under 
more competitive pressure, since they need to do so to stay in business or to maximise their 
own wealth (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991). Accordingly, the first sub-section investigates 
theoretical arguments concerning the impacts of bank deregulation on both static and 
dynamic efficiency. The second sub-section reviews empirical literature focusing on this 
relationship and in particular elaborates on the studies testing this relationship for the 
Turkish banking sector. 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical arguments 
The anticipated positive impacts of deregulation-driven competition on static efficiency 
stems from the fact that it should sharpen incentives for managers to avoid sloth and slack 
(X-inefficiency) (Vickers, 1995; Schmidt, 1997).33 The theoretical arguments investigating 
the effects of competition on static efficiency can be summarised in the following five 
channels. First, x-inefficiency, i.e. managerial slacks, can only persist in the presence of 
supernormal profits, since owners who lack of information on costs due to imperfectly 
competitive situations assume that the poor performance of the bank emanates from higher 
cost not from managerial slacks. Yet increased competition is likely to reveal more 
information about prices and costs in the banking industry and is also likely to disclose 
information concerning managerial effort by increasing the sensitivity of profits to costs, 
                                                 
33 X-efficiency reflects the ability of management to control costs and employ resources to produce outputs. 
In other words, this measure reflects to what extent a bank is operating with an efficient mix of inputs. This 
proxy consists of technical and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency for a given bank can be calculated 
as the ratio of the input usage of a fully efficient bank producing the same output vector to the input usage of 
the bank under given consideration, whilst allocative efficiency can be defined as the success of a bank in 
choosing the cost minimising combination of inputs. 
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which in turn induce owners to design better incentive systems and to monitor managers, 
in turn reducing managerial inefficiency (Hart, 1983). Second, deregulation-induced 
competition puts pressure on the monopoly rents enjoyed by banks. This in turn mitigates 
the potential for bank managers to seize these rents in the form of slack or lack of effort 
(Molyneux et al., 1996a; Nickell, 1996). Third, increased competition in product markets 
threatens bank managers’ of inefficient banks since these banks may lose their market 
share under more competitive conditions (Machlup, 1967). Furthermore, potential entrants 
into the sector can also pose a threat to inefficient banks (Aghion and Howitt, 2012). These 
in turn provide substantial incentives for inefficient banks’ managers to improve their 
efficiency to protect their market share. Finally, banking deregulation open the domestic 
banking sector to new entrants having better superior management skills and expertise. 
This in turn is expected to develop indigenous technological infrastructure and 
management practices of incumbents via technology transfer and skill diffusion, resulting 
in improvements in the efficiency of domestic banking sector (Glass and Saggi, 1998). 
 
Banking deregulation arguably leads to favourable impacts on the dynamic efficiency of 
banks via four different channels. Firstly, it relaxes regulatory restrictions and reserve 
requirements, which in turn result in a decrease in the regulatory costs of production. 
Therefore, the cost of producing a given level of output plummets and the cost-output 
relation level increases (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005a). Secondly, it reduces 
restrictions on activities, hence providing incentives for banks to exploit cost-saving 
opportunities from broad financial services provisions; that is, it enables them to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988). Thirdly, it creates 
new development opportunities and forces bank managers to speed up the adoption of new 
technologies to avoid loss of control rights due to bankruptcy. These motives in turn induce 
banks to be proactive in research and development activities as well as in the adaptation of 
technological innovation (Berger and Mester, 2003). Lastly, it is suggested that cost-
reducing improvements in productivity can result in higher revenue and profit in a more 
competitive operational environment where the price elasticity of demand is likely to be 
higher (Stefano and Nicoletti, 2003). Therefore, since banking deregulation speeds up the 
reallocation of resources from inefficient banks to efficient banks, this in turn provides 
more incentives for the efficient ones to invest in technological development enabling them 
to reduce the cost of production further. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, the relationship between competition and bank efficiency 
is more complex and the theoretical considerations suggesting that competition is 
unambiguously beneficial to static and dynamic efficiency is more naïve in banking than in 
other markets (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). From a static efficiency point of view, the 
adverse impact of deregulation on banking efficiency posits that deregulation of deposit 
interest rates coupled with the increased competition from non-bank financial 
intermediaries may raise funding costs and lower profits for banks. Although banks seek to 
compensate these losses driven by deregulation by reducing operating costs, they also 
embark on concentrating on a more risky set of borrowers in search for higher revenue 
which is likely to result in loan losses and adversely affect profit efficiency (Humphrey and 
Pulley, 1997).  Deregulation bringing freedom to banks to engage into non-traditional 
activities may also reduce bank efficiency due to diseconomies of scope in the joint 
production of traditional and non-traditional banking activities (Mester, 1992). It is argued 
that the negative impact might be due to the inexperience of managers in dealing with 
deregulation-induced non-traditional activities and/or the rise in agency costs, provided 
that the joint production requires another layer of management. The adverse effect of 
deregulation on dynamic efficiency might be related to the basic Schumpeterian model 
positing that incentives for innovation and R&D may plummet in accordance with the 
increase in competition since the monopoly rents derived from these activities tend to 
disappear more quickly when there is fiercer competition (Stefano and Nicoletti, 2003). 
Moreover, deregulation-induced competition may push banks to invest in new financial 
technologies and new services and improve the quality of some of the services in 
operation. These additional services or higher service quality in turn could increase costs, 
resulting in reductions in cost productivity (Berger and Mester, 2003).  
 
3.2.2 Empirical evidence on deregulation and bank efficiency relationship 
Empirical studies investigating the relationship between banking deregulation and banking 
efficiency within and across countries have so far given rather mixed results. For example, 
evidence from the US banking industry indicates that banking cost efficiency and 
productivity remained relatively unchanged or showed little improvement in the aftermath 
of deregulation reforms (Bauer et al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; Grabowski et 
al., 1994). The researchers attribute the poor trends in the performance of US banks to the 
increased cost of funds brought about by the liberalisation of deposit rates and by the 
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increase in non-bank competition that forced banks to lower the interests charged on loans. 
Others however suggest that reforms encouraged banks to innovate and to offer a wider 
variety of financial services and products to customers. So although the measured cost 
efficiency of banks decreased, the unmeasured quality of outputs might have increased 
(Bauer et al., 1993).  
 
Rather mixed results are also found by studies investigating the impact of deregulation on 
the performance of banking sectors in Asia. Evidence from South Korea (Gilbert and 
Wilson, 1998), Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998), China (Chen et al., 2005), and India 
(Zhao et al. 2010; Casu et al 2013) finds that deregulation led to improvements in 
efficiency and productivity. Opposite findings for India are, however, reported by 
Kumbhakar & Sarkar (2003) and Das and Ghosh, (2006). The latter attribute this result to 
the unique characteristics of the Indian banking sector which is dominated by state-owned 
banks that arguably did not respond well to the introduction of deregulatory reforms due to 
their different business strategy and customer orientation compared to their private 
counterparts. 
 
Evidence for European banking sectors generally supports the hypothesis that deregulation 
leads to improvements in efficiency and productivity. Improvements in efficiency are 
reported for Spain (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005), Norway (Berg et al., 1992), 
Portugal (Canhoto and Dermine, 2003), Hungary (Hasan and Marton, 2003), and the 
Czech Republic (Matoušek and Taci, 2004). Contrary to the above findings, however, 
Lozano-Vivas (1998), analysing the Spanish banking sector, finds that deregulation is 
associated with a decline in the relative cost efficiency of commercial banks which is 
attributed to the under-utilisation of resources and over-branching. A similar finding is also 
reported by Havrylchyk (2006) who could not find improvements in efficiency in the 
Polish banking sector following the implementation of deregulatory reforms, attributed in 
part to the increasing costs of funding for banks. 
 
Focusing on the Turkish banking sector, the studies investigating the impact of financial 
deregulation on Turkish banks’ efficiency also show mixed results. While some papers find 
that financial deregulation-induced Turkish banks to improve their efficiency (Ertugrul and 
Zaim, 1999; Isik and Hassan, 2003a; Zaim, 1995); others find that the banking sector’s 
overall trend in efficiency was negative or that banks could not gain sustainable efficiency 
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improvements (Denizer et al., 2007; Isik and Hassan, 2002b; Yildirim, 2002). These papers 
offer some country-specific explanations. The former group of studies finding favourable 
impacts of deregulation on bank efficiency attributes their findings to the notion that 
deregulation-induced competition stimulated banks to use their resources more efficiently. 
Consequently, inefficient banks managed to catch-up with the best-practice banks and 
hence overall efficiency in the sector increased.34 Moreover, deregulation allowed banks to 
offer and benefit from new financial products and services, further enabling them to 
improve their technical and allocative efficiency. The latter group of studies finding 
adverse or no impact of deregulation on bank efficiency suggests a rather different 
interpretation of events. In their view, financial repression policies led to over-branching 
and over-staffing problems in the pre-1980s period, and the deregulatory policies of the 
early 1980s were expected to help these very large banks to optimise their scale economies 
via an increase in competition, forcing them to reduce their costs. However, capital account 
liberalisation along with rather uncontrolled bank deregulation enabled banks to borrow 
from abroad and induced them to increase their risks. The excess demand for banking 
services stemming from the large funding needs of the public sector, coupled with an 
under-developed financial system that made banks the main source of funds, exacerbated 
the scale inefficiency problems of Turkish banks, undermining the benefits of bank 
deregulation and liberalisation. 
 
In conclusion, the inconsistency observed in theoretical arguments has been reflected in 
empirical evidence investigating the impact of deregulation policies on bank efficiency. 
The reviewed literature indicates that this discrepancy might be due to the fact that 
empirical studies employ different methods, or measure variables using different 
approaches, or focus on different periods, or investigate different countries, all of which 
might arguably explain the contradictory findings. Some countries have also implemented 
prudential regulations along with deregulation policies, complicating the isolation of 
impacts of the deregulation policies. Moreover, it is argued in the literature that the effects 
of bank deregulation may rely on industry conditions prior to the deregulation process 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In addition, deregulation policies are multi-faceted; namely 
                                                 
34 It is argued that Turkish banks did not have sustainable technological progress in the 1990s (Isik and 
Hassan, 2003a; Kasman, 2002). This in turn might have made it easier for the banks entered into the sector 
following the liberalisation policies in 1980s to catch-up with the best-practice ones given the technological 
regress.  
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they comprise of many different policy tools that can affect the performance of banks in 
different ways. Finally, yet importantly, deregulation is a continuous process with possibly 
lagged effects. The short time periods analysed by many empirical studies obviously limit 
the inference that can be taken and this study aims to circumvent this issue in our study by 
taking a very long time span in our empirical analysis. 
 
3.3 Prudential re-regulations and bank efficiency 
Deregulation reforms implemented in many countries since the 1980s were followed by 
financial crises in developing countries during the 1990s in particular. This in turn lends 
support on the hypothesis that deregulation triggerred fragilites in financial sectors - in 
particular in banking sectors - because the deregulation-induced competition undermined 
banks prudent behaviour and these reforms were implemented without establishing sound 
and independent regulatory and supervisory institutions (Andersen and Tarp, 2003; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hellmann 
et al., 2000; Mishkin, 1999). This explains why from the late-1990s the emphasis of 
reforms shifted from deregulation to the stability of banking sectors through the 
implementation of regulatory reforms, including prudential re-regulations and restructuring 
programmes. The first sub-section investigates theoretical arguments concerned with 
prudential re-regulation and bank performance. The second sub-section reviews empirical 
literature focusing on this relationship. 
 
3.3.1 Theoretical arguments 
The prudential re-regulations which are essential pillars of regulatory reforms consist of 
four basic instruments: (i) mixture of regulations such as tighter capital requirements, (ii) 
activity and entry restrictions, (iii) powerful and independent official supervision, and (iv) 
private monitoring policies (Barth et al., 2006, 2013). However, the impact of these 
instruments on banks’ performance is not clear from a theoretical perspective as each 
instrument can produce opposite effects on the efficiency of banks. First, there are different 
views on the influence of capital requirement on bank performance. Tighter capital 
requirements can diminish banks’ perceived risk, which in turn reduces their borrowing 
costs and improves their cost effectiveness. However, they may also impose unnecessary 
costs on banks if they are compelled to raise equity capital at a price higher than the 
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interest rate on deposits (Barth et al., 2013). Moreover, Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz 
(2000) who developed a theoretical dynamic model on the impacts of capital requirement 
of bank performance, posit that capital requirements render banks to invest in prudent 
assets rather than gambling since they put their own capital at risk, which in turn forces 
them to internalise the efficiency of gambling. On the other hand, they argue that while this 
policy makes it possible to combat moral hazard, it is found that only adopting this policy 
to ensure the prudent behaviour of banks forces them to hold an inefficiently high amount 
of capital. This is because deregulation policies led deposit rates to be determined in free 
markets; thus, under this condition banks tend to offer inefficiently high deposit rates with 
the objective of stealing share from their rivals. In other words, freely determined deposit 
rates are inconsistent with Pareto efficiency, which in turn reduces the cost efficiency of 
banks.  
 
Second, there is a discrepancy on the impact of activity restrictions and bank performance. 
On the one hand, the activity restrictions can prevent banks from exploiting economies of 
scale and scope in collecting and processing information concerned with borrowers, 
building reputational capital and providing various services to customers  (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007). They can also reduce banks’ ability to diversify their income streams. This 
decreases their franchise value, potentially encouraging banks to take more risks which 
increases instability in the sector (Barth et al., 2013). On the other hand, unrestricted 
activities could intensify moral hazard issues which too can make banks more likely to 
take more risks, bringing about a reverse impact on banking sector performance (Boyd et 
al., 1998). The improved official supervision could reduce market failure and weaken 
corruption in bank lending by monitoring and screening banks, thereby improving their 
effective functioning. Nevertheless, strengthening the power of official supervisors may 
lead them to extract private or political benefits (Barth et al., 2004). Independence of 
supervisors also affects the performance of banks in different ways. This is because 
independent supervisors are free from political pressure and are likely to monitor the 
financial health of banks in a strictly professional and consistent manner and give banks 
constructive criticisms and guidance (Barth et al., 2013), and vice versa.  
 
Third, the official supervisor power and its independence arguably affects bank 
performance in different ways. On the one hand, the public interest hypothesis suggests 
that banks’ supervisors having necessary incentives and expertise are likely to tackle 
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market failures arising from imperfect information (Barth et al., 2006). Therefore, 
powerful supervisors who can directly monitor and discipline banks would increase the 
ownership of banks and enhance bank efficiency (Barth et al., 2013). This in turn indicates 
that the power of supervisors positively affects bank efficiency. On other hand, the private 
interest hypothesis suggests that powerful supervisors are likely to not focus on 
circumventing market failures; they instead would focus on promoting their private interest 
or extract bribes (Djankov et al., 2002). It is argued that if they have power to discipline 
non-compliant banks, they might exploit their powers to induce or compel banks to 
allocate credit to create private or political benefits (Barth et al., 2006). This in turn 
indicates that the power of supervisors may negatively affect bank efficiency.  
 
Finally, private monitoring would be a useful complement to the official supervision, yet 
the success of private monitoring depends to a great extent on the ability of private 
investors to overcome informational barriers (Beck et al., 2006; Bliss and Flannery, 2002). 
This is because if private investors have accurate information on the financial conditions of 
banks, they could exert effective screening and governance, which in turn improves the 
effectiveness of the banking sector. Moreover, official supervision does not have an 
ownership stake in banks, in turn inducing different incentives than private monitoring 
when it comes to monitoring and disciplining banks. Furthermore, banks are more likely to 
ask politicians to pressure official supervisors to take actions that mainly serve the special 
interests of banks (Barth et al., 2013). However, the implementation of private monitoring 
is challenging due to the complexity of financial markets. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical evidence on re-regulations and bank efficiency relationship 
Earlier studies investigating the impacts of prudential re-regulations on bank performance 
tend to use accounting ratios to investigate their effects on the efficiency and productivity 
of banks. One of these studies examines the effect of re-regulations, market structure, and 
national institutions on the cost of financial intermediation measured by accounting ratios 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004). They find that regulatory restrictions tightening bank entry 
and limiting banks from engaging in non-traditional activities tend to increase the cost of 
financial intermediation. Another similar yet more comprehensive study by Barth et al. 
(2004) investigates the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices 
and bank development, performance and instability using a survey dataset covering 107 
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countries. They find that stringent capital regulation and official supervisory indicators do 
not have a statistically significant relationship with bank performance and stability. On the 
other hand, they find that restricting banking activities has a negative impact on bank 
performance and stability, highlighting the importance of allowing banks to diversify their 
income sources. In addition, they suggest that regulations encouraging and facilitating the 
private monitoring and accurate information disclosure of banks improve their 
performance. 
 
Another well-developed strand of the literature criticises the above studies since they rely 
on accounting ratios to measure the performance of banks. Recent empirical studies instead 
rely on either parametric or non-parametric methods to obtain efficiency and productivity 
measures, arguably providing sounder information on the performance of banks. After 
obtaining these measures, the instruments of prudential regulations are regressed on these 
measures. Two recent pieces of international empirical evidence provided by Barth et al. 
(2013) and Pasiouras et al. (2009) suggest that stricter capital requirements and greater 
market discipline are more likely to have favourable effects on banks’ performance. Yet 
they find that restrictions imposed on bank activities are more likely to have an adverse 
impact on bank efficiency. The former study finds that there is no significant relation 
between the strengthening of official supervisory power and bank efficiency, yet the 
independence of supervisory authorities tends to exert a significant and positive impact on 
banks’ performance. The latter study finds that empowered supervisory authorities improve 
bank efficiency, since they compel banks to release accurate and timely information 
facilitating proper monitoring by private agents, therefore improving market discipline, 
which in turn induce banks to increase their efficiency. Another cross-country study by 
Chortareas et al. (2012) provides evidence from 22 EU countries between 2000-2008. They 
also find some results are consistent with previous studies. That is, they contend that 
capital requirements and official supervisory power improve the efficiency of banks, since 
these may diminish agency problems, market power, and the likelihood of financial 
distress. In addition, they similarly suggest that activity restrictions exert negative impacts 
on bank efficiency. Finally, one recent cross-country study by Delis et al. (2011) also 
provides evidence about the impact of prudential re-regulations on the productivity of  
banks operating in 22 transitional countries over the period 1999-2009. Contrary to the 
above studies, they find that capital requirements and official supervisory power do not 
have a statistically significant impact on bank productivity, which are attributed to specific 
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characteristics of the transition countries, such as overcapitalisation and the difficulties in 
enforcing regulatory rules. However, they also suggest that these re-regulations have 
started to exert a positive impact in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
 
As mentioned above, the emphasis of the reform process switched from deregulation, 
aimed at fostering competition, towards strengthening the stability of the banking system 
through prudential re-regulations and banking restructuring in the aftermath of the 
financial crises in Asia, Latin America, and some European countries. There are some 
empirical studies evaluating the overall impact of such regulatory reform processes on the 
performance of banks instead of focusing on the impact of individual instruments of 
regulatory reforms. One of these studies is based on banks in eight Asian countries in the 
period 2001-2010 and finds that financial liberalisation policies exerted a positive impact 
on bank efficiency and cost technology (Casu et al. 2016). However, prudential re-
regulation and supervision policies adversely affected the efficiency of banks but not cost 
technology. Therefore, they argue that the coexistence of deregulation and prudential 
regulation - that is, regulatory reforms - has been beneficial for the cost performance of 
Asian banks. Although recent tighter prudential regulations have slowed down efficiency, 
they did not aggravate cost technology improvements. This highlights the importance of 
combining policies that enhance financial stability with policies that foster financial 
intermediation. In another cross country study, Hermes & Meesters (2015) examine the 
impact of financial liberalisation and the quality of bank regulation and supervision on 
bank efficiency using data covering 61 countries during 1996-2005. Similar to their 
previous study, they also find that that financial liberalisation has exerted a positive impact 
on bank efficiency, although this is conditional on the quality of regulation and 
supervision; that is, liberalising financial markets without setting a sound and strong 
regulatory and supervisory framework may reduce the efficiency of banks. Accordingly, it 
can be inferred from these studies that financial liberalisation policies should be 
implemented along with a proper and sound prudential regulation and supervision.  
 
Another recent strand of literature pays more attention to the impact of regulatory reforms 
on the ownership-performance relationship. On the one hand, regulatory changes aim at 
creating a level playing field for all banks and this in turn may lead to inter-ownership 
convergence in efficiency levels. For example, deregulation-induced competition should 
discipline managers and induce them to enhance the efficiency of banks regardless of the 
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type of ownership (Zhao et al., 2010). On the other hand, the differences in operational 
structure and customer base may lead banks to be affected differently by changes in their 
operational environment. Similarly, once banks start operating in a deregulated framework, 
the changes in policy towards prudential regulations may affect them differently. For 
example, a prudential regulatory framework requires better risk management tools for 
which foreign banks might have a relative superiority due to better risk management 
strategies, experienced managers and staff, resulting in a relative advantage, but they may 
need more time to adjust to the domestic regulatory framework, resulting in disadvantages. 
Empirical evidence from India by Zhao et al. (2010) shows that at the initial stages of 
deregulation, foreign banks are more efficient due to their relatively stronger operating 
background, but they lose their advantage compared to state banks once tighter prudential 
regulations are implemented. They ascribe this finding to the fact that the majority of 
public banks’ customers are state-owned, credit-worthy firms. Moreover, domestic private 
banks have been more greatly affected under tighter regulations since they are more likely 
to provide financial services to the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) customers 
that are informationally opaque small firms. In a complementary study, Casu et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of financial regulations on productivity of Indian banks. They find 
that different ownerships react differently to the changes in regulatory policies and 
operating environment. In particular, foreign banks have benefited more from regulatory 
changes compared to state banks, thanks to their superior ability at engaging in cost 
technology innovation. They suggest that the removal of restrictions has allowed foreign 
banks to familiarise themselves with the local loan market and they have reached an 
optimal scale of production of performing loans. However, they conclude that the 
technology gap between foreign banks and state banks has increased, suggesting the lack 
of prominent technological spill-overs among different types of banks.  
 
Focusing on the empirical evidence on the Turkish banking sector, many studies find an 
improvement in the performance of banks in the post-2001 period when effective and 
tighter prudential regulation and supervision were implemented along with liberal policies. 
Assaf et al. (2013) and Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) find an improvement in the 
productivity of Turkish banks and attribute this to new modern risk management 
techniques and internal control systems adopted by banks following the implementation of 
prudential regulations, which required them to adopt better risk management technologies. 
Another study investigates the profit efficiency of Turkish banks in the same period and 
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concludes that regulatory changes initially led to a decline in profit efficiency (Davutyan & 
Yildirim, 2015). Yet Turkish banks on average improved their efficiency once they 
implemented the necessary regulatory changes and adjusted to the new market 
environment, indicating that it takes time for banks to adjust themselves to the changes in 
the regulatory environment. However, it should be noted that these studies investigated the 
bank efficiency relationship after or during the prudential re-regulation period without 
covering the period before re-regulations; that is, they do not cover whole regulatory 
reform process. This might have changed the real effect of such programmes. Moreover, 
their model specification does not include a proxy variable capturing the effect of 
regulatory reforms. Instead, they interpret the general trend in efficiency and attribute the 
changes over time to the regulatory reforms. Therefore, extending the examination to 
before and after re-regulation as well as incorporating a proxy capturing the effects of 
reforms are more likely to disclose the real effects of re-regulation on bank performance.  
 
In conclusion, the literature investigating the performance change of banks following the 
implementation of regulatory reform policies has inconclusive findings. This result may 
relate to the fact that banking prudential regulation and supervision reforms are multi-
faceted; that is, some instruments of the reforms may lead to favourable outcomes, while 
others may adversely affect performance. Financial fragilities driven by the adoption of 
liberal financial reform have led authorities to implement prudential regulations to 
eliminate risks linked to reforms that are more liberal. Although regulatory reforms have 
widely been implemented by policy makers, only a limited number of empirical studies 
have investigated the joint impact of these reforms. In particular, none of the Turkish 
banking efficiency studies have investigated their joint, overall influence on the banking 
sector and on bank ownership. This study intends to fill this gap. 
 
3.4 Bank ownership and performance 
The previous section briefly mentioned that banking deregulation might have different 
impacts on different bank ownerships, namely resulting in efficiency differences among 
different ownerships. 35  Therefore, this section aims to shed light on the impact of 
                                                 
35 Three ownership structures have usually dominated the majority of the commercial banking sectors around 
the world: state banks, domestic private banks, and foreign banks. In literature, state-owned banks - namely 
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ownership and bank performance. It begins with comparing state ownership versus private 
ownership of banks, and then reviews the theoretical arguments focusing on the differences 
in efficiency between foreign banks and domestic banks. It also reviews the theories 
arguing the pros and cons of foreign bank penetration. Moreover, evidence investigating 
how different ownerships react to the changes in the regulatory environment is also 
presented. Finally, we summarise the empirical evidence investigating how different 
ownerships have manifested different performance in the Turkish banking sector. 
 
3.4.1 Theoretical arguments  
i. State vs private ownership 
State-owned banks were the major player in the banking sector of many developing 
countries during the pre-deregulation period. Although this domination has started to 
reduce with the implementation of banking deregulation and privatisation policies, these 
banks still remain a significant player of the banking sector of developing countries. The 
well-established banking efficiency literature suggests that although state-owned and 
privately-owned banks operate in the same competitive markets, state-owned banks tend to 
be less efficient compared to their private counterparts. This discrepancy in performance is 
generally explained by three main reasons: political intervention, ownership issues, and 
problems concerning competition (Shirley et al., 2001). First, state-owned banks are more 
prone to political intervention aiming to use these institutions to achieve their political and 
personal goals, in turn resulting in the inferior performance of the state banks (Clarke et 
al., 2005). It is argued that private banks might also be exposed to interventions by 
politicians, but compared to state banks run by public managers these banks are more 
likely to oppose such interventions so as to protect the bank’s prudential lending or cost 
minimisation policies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Second, the principal-agent theory36 
suggests that private ownership can result in better performance because managers are 
prone to incentives and are being observed closely by the capital market, which has been 
                                                                                                                                                    
public banks - are defined as the banks where the government or a government agency holds more than 50% 
of voting rights. Private domestic and foreign banks are also defined in a similar way. This study thereby 
classifies ownership by relying on this approach. 
36  The principal stands for the shareholders of a bank while agent represents the managers of a bank, 
indicating that there is a separation between ownership and management. 
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the fundamental underlying factor leading to the privatisation of publicly owned banks 
(Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Levy, 1987). State banks’ ownership on the 
other hand have many objectives and principles that have no clear responsibility for 
screening and monitoring, while private banks have clearly defined incentives and 
objectives (Alchian, 1965). Moreover, state banks’ managers have less motivation 
compared to private banks’ managers, since they are less likely to be fired for non-
performance and less likely to receive performance-related bonuses, which in turn 
engenders poor performance (Clarke et al., 2005). Finally, state-owned banks may face less 
competition compared to their private peers. This is because these banks may have more 
branches, higher deposit interest rates and lower lending rates then its private counterparts 
since they can compensate these losses through government subsidies. In other words, they 
can undermine competition by undercutting private rivals that need to be profitable to 
survive (Sappington and Sidak, 2003).  
 
Although these three reasons discussed above are in favour of the privatisation of state 
banks, there is no guarantee that a privatised bank will perform better than it would under 
state ownership. One explanation states that privatised banks do not usually mimic private 
banks perfectly (Kay and Thompson, 1986). Moreover, underdeveloped capital markets, 
coupled with inadequate procedure for takeover, may prevent privatised banks from 
performing efficiently (Caves, 1990). Furthermore, the same government officials 
contributing to the poor performance of state-owned banks are responsible for designing 
and executing privatisation programmes, which might also lead to the poorer performance 
of the privatised banks (Clarke et al., 2005). 
 
An alternative theoretical argument contends that the degree of competition might have a 
more substantial effect than the ownership structure and internal governance mechanisms 
on disciplining agents. In other words, competition and ownership can be substitutes in the 
sense that the higher the competitive pressures, the lower the relative significance of 
management and vice versa (Berglöf and Roland, 1997). Therefore, this theoretical 
argument posits that if deregulation-induced competition is sufficient to equalise the 
performance of public and private banks, then there is little or no need to deem the nature 
of ownership (Shirley et al., 2001).  
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ii. Domestic banks vs foreign banks 
The literature investigating the performance of foreign banks in host countries has gained 
further importance following the growing trend of the internationalisation of banking 
sectors spurred by financial liberalisation/deregulation as well as increased  international 
trade flows and foreign direct investment (Lensink et al., 2008). As a consequence of these 
developments, since the 1980s foreign banks have increasingly been allowed to operate not 
only in developed countries but also in many developing countries. Therefore, it is crucial 
for policy makers and researchers to examine the performance of foreign banks and their 
impact on the banking sectors of host countries.  
 
We will first briefly review the theoretical arguments investigating the potential impacts of 
foreign penetration on the banking sector of host countries. Levine (1996) argues that 
foreign banks would lead to improvements in financial services in host countries by 
bringing high-quality financial services and products as well as modern banking 
management skills and state-of-the-art technologies. They may also facilitate accessing 
international financial markets, which in turn facilitate the raising of capital to meet 
financing needs. In addition to these direct benefits, the entry of foreign banks is expected 
to exert competitive pressure on domestic banks (Levine 1996; Claessens et al. 2001; 
Claessens & Laeven 2004). This in turn would force domestic banks to improve the quality 
of their products and services, reduce their costs, and start operating more efficiently in 
order to retain their market shares. Moreover, foreign bank entry would put pressure on 
governments to improve and harmonize the legal, regulatory, and supervisory systems with 
internationally accepted standards. 
 
On the other hand, Stiglitz et al. (1993) postulate that the penetration of foreign banks 
would have adverse impacts on the host country’s banking sector, local entrepreneurs and 
regulatory structure. First, domestic banks have to compete with foreign banks that are 
larger and have a better reputation, which may impose extra costs on the domestic banks. 
Second, these foreign banks tend to extend less loans to SMEs or local entrepreneurs 
because these banks may focus on multinational firms, namely they may cherry-pick high 
quality (low default risk) borrowers, which in turn might weaken domestic banks’ 
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profitability.37 Third, governments and local regulatory and supervisory institutions may 
find it more difficult to control these banks since they are more likely to be less sensitive to 
their wishes. Another point argues that if foreign bank entry increases competition, this in 
turn would reduce the franchise value of domestic banks and they would be forced to take 
more risks, thereby making the domestic banking sector more vulnerable (Claessens et al., 
2001). 
 
Recent literature also elaborates on the implications of the modes of entry of foreign banks 
on bank performance. Foreign banks enter into a host country in different forms. First, they 
can open a branch or a subsidiary, second they set up a new (de novo or greenfield) 
operation, and finally they acquire a domestic bank (takeover) (Clarke et al., 2003). 
Greenfield or de novo entrance implies the establishment of a foreign bank from scratch, 
while a merger or acquisition involves the purchase of a domestic bank’s shares or other 
form of capital.38 It is argued that entering through a greenfield investment enables entering 
a foreign bank to benefit from its international reputation, specifically in less developed or 
less stable economies where depositors might prefer their savings in this well-known bank 
(Thi and Vencappa, 2008). In addition, greenfield entry mode can allow entering a foreign 
bank to choose their targeted market segments, which would not be possible in the case of 
the acquisition of a domestic bank. This is arguably because the acquisition of a local bank 
would in turn leave the acquiring foreign bank with the customer profile of the old 
domestic banks. This might be inconsistent with the overall market positioning of the 
parent bank of the acquiring foreign bank which might need to undertake costly 
adjustments (Thi and Vencappa, 2008). Whilst, greenfield banks often penetrate into new 
markets following their clients or large multinational corporates, this in turn enables them 
to have higher efficiency (Havrylchyk, 2006). Moreover, greenfield banks are more likely 
to benefit from better risk management technologies and rely on modern information 
technologies than acquisition banks (Havrylchyk, 2006). However, it is also posited that 
once business strategy requires a comprehensive retail network, acquisition might be a 
more advantageous mode of entry, since the acquirer bank which inherits the customer 
                                                 
37 See Clarke et al. (2003) for a comprehensive review on foreign bank entry 
38 In this paper, we suggest that if a foreign banks’ acquirers are equal to or more than 50% of a domestic 
bank’s capital, the ownership changes from a domestic to a foreign bank. Moreover, since we do not include 
foreign banks in the form of branch or subsidiary in our empirical analysis, we do not review literature 
concerning these forms of entry. 
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base of the acquired local bank are likely to access to local knowledge (Thi and Vencappa, 
2008). 
 
Following these arguments discussing the performance impact of foreign banks 
penetration, we now elaborate on why foreign and domestic banks might have different 
efficiency levels. Two alternative hypotheses can explain the discrepancy in performance 
between foreign and domestic banks: the home-field advantage and the global advantage. 
The former posits that domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks. This could be 
due to operational diseconomies as foreign banks are operated and monitored from a 
distance. The disadvantages of foreign banks could also be due to barriers other than 
distance such as language, culture, regulatory and supervisory structure, legal environment, 
and potential bias against foreign banks. Finally, information asymmetries would make it 
difficult to establish and maintain local retail banking relationships, for example with 
SMEs and households, since such accounts require local information and a local focus. All 
these disadvantages may impose extra costs on foreign banks or lead to lower revenues, 
and thus to lower efficiency compared to domestic banks. 
 
On the other hand, the global advantage hypothesis suggests that some efficiently managed 
foreign banks can overcome the above disadvantages and operate more efficiently than 
domestic banks. It is argued that their superior management skills and advanced 
technologies may enable foreign banks to enjoy and maintain lower costs. Their superior 
risk management and investments skills not only enable them to offer higher quality and 
variety of services to customers but also allow them to undertake investments with higher 
risks and higher expected returns, which in turn may increase their revenues. It is also 
noteworthy that the authors Berger et al. (2000) consider two forms of the global 
advantage theory: the general and limited form. 39  Under the general form, efficiently 
managed foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks irrespective of their country 
of origin, since they are able to overcome the disadvantages. Under the limited form of the 
hypothesis, foreign banks from one or a limited number of nations are more efficient than 
domestic banks. This is because these successful foreign banks have headquarters in 
                                                 
39 This is because some studies find that on average foreign banks are less efficient than domestic banks, but 
these results do not indicate that all foreign banks in those markets are showing poor performance. To unlock 
the mystery, they propose two forms of the global advantage hypothesis. 
64 
 
specific countries where favourable markets as well as regulatory and supervisory 
conditions provide a proving ground for efficient organisations. The favourable conditions 
in the home country may include having access to an educated labour force that has the 
ability to develop and adopt state-of-the-art technologies and risk-management strategies; 
tough product market competition forcing banks to be efficient and to employ superior 
management skills to survive; and having access to well-developed security markets 
enabling banks to exploit economies of scope. Therefore, banks coming from countries 
with competitive markets and sound regulatory and supervisory structures are able to 
overcome the disadvantages related to distance. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership and bank efficiency  
Studies investigating this association between ownership and bank efficiency are likely to 
rely on cross-country analysis since this may help to draw general conclusions on the 
association. For example, evidence drawn from two comprehensive review papers (Berger, 
2007; Clarke et al., 2003) and one cross-country empirical study (Claessens et al., 2001) 
suggest that foreign banks operating in developing countries are more likely to be more 
efficient than domestic banks, while the opposite is the case for developed countries. That 
is, the general conclusion would be that while the global advantage hypothesis is more 
likely to hold for developing countries, the home-field advantage hypothesis is realised in 
developed countries. Evidence on the efficiency of transition banks also suggests that the 
performance of these banks with foreign ownership are likely to be better than that of their 
domestic counterparts (Kenjegalieva et al., 2009). There are, however, notable exceptions 
to these findings. For example, although Berger et al. (2000) similarly find that domestic 
banks are more efficient than foreign banks in developed countries, this finding does not 
hold all the time. They argue that some foreign banks from specific countries, e.g. the 
United States, could outperform their domestic peers even in developed countries, lending 
some support on the limited global advantage hypothesis. Contrary to the general 
conclusion, a cross-country study by Lensink et al. (2008) investigating 105 countries for 
the years 1998-2003 also finds that on average foreign banks are less efficient than 
domestic banks. However, they suggest that good governance as well as the sound 
regulatory and supervisory structure in the home and host country boosts the efficiency of 
foreign banks. In addition, the higher quality of institutions in the home country and 
similarities in the governance and institutional quality between home and host countries 
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improve foreign banks’ efficiency. Another contradictory finding comes from Micco et al. 
(2007) who look at banks from 179 countries for the period 1995-2002. They suggest that 
there is no correlation between ownership and efficiency in developed countries, though 
they find that state banks in developing countries are more likely to be less efficient 
compared to their private peers and foreign banks are more profitable, lending some 
support to the general conclusion. They also highlight that state banks in developing 
countries are subject to political influence while this is not true for developed countries. 
This may explain the underperformance of state banks in developing countries while 
justifying their findings for developed country case. Bonin et al. (2005) look at 11 Eastern 
European transition countries and find that state banks are as efficient as their private 
counterparts, thus concluding that privatisation is not in itself sufficient to boost efficiency. 
Finally, there are also single country studies finding evidence in favour of the inferior 
operating performance of foreign banks compared to their domestic counterparts in Hungry 
(Hasan and Marton, 2003) and Indonesia (Hadad et al., 2011). Considering all accounts, it 
seems that it is difficult to reach a clear conclusion related with the ownership and 
efficiency association. 
 
Another recent strand of literature pays more attention to whether the entry strategy - 
namely entry mode - of foreign banks influences the efficiency of bank performance 
differently. The empirical studies suggest that a different entry mode is likely to affect the 
performance of banks differently. For example, it is found that greenfield banks employ 
better risk management techniques and rely on more modern information technology 
compared to acquisition banks, therefore resulting in superior performance (Havrylchyk, 
2006). Another study finds that greenfield banks are more efficient than domestic banks 
while this is not the case of acquisition banks (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011). In an 
another attempt to compare the performance of foreign banks entered through two modes 
of entry, Thi and Vencappa (2008) conclude that greenfield banks are more cost efficient 
than acquisition banks. These empirical studies therefore suggest that the mode of entry 
should also be accounted for when the association between ownership and efficiency is 
analysed. 
 
Focusing on the Turkish banking sector, studies also reveal contradictory results. Some 
studies find that state banks are more efficient than private banks, both domestic and 
foreign (see  Zaim, 1995 and Yildirim, 2002), while others find the opposite result (Demir 
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et al., 2005; Isik and Hassan, 2002a; 2003b). The former studies suggest that, until 2001 
the government was interfering too heavily with public banks’ lending decisions in order to 
extract political benefits. These banks accessed the cheaper funds provided by state 
institutions but were then forced to extend credit to specific sectors, even in unstable 
economic conditions. The positive result on efficiency of these studies might depend 
heavily on the fact that all of them considered total loans as an output and ignored the 
existence of NPLs. This would possibly mask the inefficient lending practices of public 
banks which would report higher than real loan portfolios, resulting in higher efficiency 
scores. 40  The studies finding in favour of private banks’ superior efficiency generally 
ascribe their results to the relatively smaller size of domestic and foreign private banks, 
which they say might have been optimal, especially at times of macroeconomic and 
financial instability, along with the higher interest rates that were effective in the 1990s. 
Foreign banks, albeit smaller in size, may have managed to attract both sound foreign and 
domestic customers due to their modern techniques, business practices and better 
management skills, which in turn lead to better loan performance when NPLs were high in 
the 1990s. Moreover, inclusion of off-balance sheet (OBS) items by some studies may also 
be one of the underlying reasons leading to discrepancies in the empirical findings, as 
private banks have a higher proportion of these assets compared to state banks, resulting in 
higher output to input ratios. However, most of these studies use a two-step procedure to 
investigate the ownership and efficiency relation and this might produce misleading 
results. It is argued that if environmental variables (ownership in this case) are not 
incorporated in the first stage, this practice results in biased estimators of the parameters of 
the deterministic part of frontier, thereby one obtains biased estimators of efficiency as 
well (Coelli et al., 2005; Simar and Wilson, 2007). It is for this reason that in our study we 
will account for both NPLs and the OBS items and will employ a one-step procedure to 
address the potential drawbacks of the two-step procedure detailed above.  
 
Recent studies have also investigated the association between ownership and efficiency, 
yet they also produce different results. Most of the studies find that foreign banks 
outperform their domestic counterparts (Akın et al., 2013; Assaf et al., 2013; Davutyan and 
                                                 
40 It is expected that this practice is highly likely to exacerbate the quality of loan portfolios due to higher the 
NPLs. Thus, these studies, by not taking into account the NPLs, would over-estimate the public banks’ 
performance. 
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Yildirim, 2015), with the exceptions of Fukuyama & Matousek (2011), who do not find 
any difference, and Aysan et al. (2011), who find that state banks are more efficient. The 
studies confirm the hypothesis and also suggest that most foreign banks in Turkey targeted 
the acquirement of the best performing local banks, with lower NPLs, better practices and 
technologies. This would explain why they outperformed their domestic counterparts. 
Fethi et al. (2012) also suggest that the heavy penetration of foreign banks after 2005 has 
contributed to technological improvements since they are expected to bring new practices 
and state-of-the-art technologies and escalate competitive pressure, resulting in 
performance improvements. The studies not confirming the hypothesis argue instead that 
foreign banks did not engage in retail banking and lending to SMEs businesses until 2001, 
thus they could not improve the managerial skills and infrastructure necessary for these 
businesses. They started to engage in retail banking and other services with a wide branch 
network and employment following the effective implementation of restructuring and 
prudential re-regulation policies in 2002. This put them at a disadvantage compared to 
domestic banks that had already developed the necessary management and technological 
infrastructure and were therefore able to perform better.  
 
To sum up, foreign banks tend to operate more efficiently than domestic banks in 
developing countries, though there are some notable exceptions. Moreover, changes in the 
operational environment tend to affect the performance of different ownerships differently 
due possibly to the differences in operational structure, customer base, and management 
strategies. The empirical evidence concerning the Turkish banking sector is mixed, making 
it difficult to draw some clear general conclusions. In particular, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence investigating the impact of different reforms such as deregulation, prudential re-
regulation and banking restructuring on different ownerships. Therefore, this study 
undertakes a long-term analysis to investigate how the deregulation and coexistence of 
deregulation along with effective prudential regulation and supervision have affected the 
performance of different ownerships. 
 
3.5 Regulatory reforms, ownership and bank competition 
The efficient functioning of the banking sector is important for a better economic 
performance of a country. This is arguably because banking sector funds in developing 
countries in particular are still the main source of funds for customers and SMEs for their 
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financial services and external finance. Therefore, the factors affecting the efficient 
functioning of the banking sector have caught attention of policy makers and researchers. 
Competition is argued to be one of these factors that can improve the efficient functioning 
of the banking sector, since it has direct impacts on the conditions for access to finance, 
such as lower interest rates for loans, and on financial innovation (OECD, 2009). In the 
following sub-sections, we will investigate two phenomena that impact banking 
competition. Accordingly, we initially review theoretical arguments on the association 
between competition and regulatory reforms, and between competition and ownership, 
then provide relevant empirical evidence on these arguments. 
 
3.5.1 Theoretical arguments  
Regulatory reforms affecting the competitive structure of a banking sector can be classified 
into two strands. First strand of regulatory reforms promotes deregulation of the banking 
sectors to stimulate competition among banks, while the second strand of reforms impose 
regulations on the banking sector to ensure the coexistence of competition and stability. 
The proponents of the banking deregulation argue that regulations limit competition and 
this lack of competitive pressure leads to the accumulation of substantial managerial slack 
or inefficiency; that is, firms do not minimise the cost of producing a given level of output 
(Winston, 1998). Instead, they suggest that authorities should liberalise the banking sector, 
which in turn would stimulate competition among banks and consequently lead to a more 
efficient production and marketing practices. That is, in theory it is expected that removal 
of restrictions on entry and on private ownership, lifting controls imposed on interest rates, 
and increasing the range of permissible activities both lead to an increase in competition 
among incumbents and allow new entrants into the sector stimulating competition further. 
For example, the removal of entry restrictions allows new banks to enter into the sector 
and this in turn would foster competitive behaviour as incumbents’ market power reduces 
(Pasadilla and Milo, 2005). Moreover, foreign banks, which are likely to have superior 
technology and risk management skills, can penetrate into the domestic banking sector, 
creating a more competitive environment (Claessens et al., 2001). In addition, allowing 
banks to engage in a wide range of activities as well as deregulation of branching 
restrictions increase competition in the banking sector (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2001; 
Rice and Strahan, 2010). Furthermore, banking deregulation is likely to have positive 
implications for advances in information technology, in the processing of transactions 
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(automatic tellers, e-banking), in computational capacity, in management technique and 
risk coverage, and consequently generates a more competitive environment (Vives, 2001). 
Finally, deregulation forces inefficient banks to either enhance their performance to be able 
to survive or exit the banking industry through merger and outright failure (Winston, 
1998). However, banking deregulation tends to induce consolidation in the banking 
sectors, since it exposes incumbents to more intense competition through new entry and 
lowers bank spreads by removing interest rate ceilings (Berger et al., 1999). These in turn 
foster mergers and acquisitions between banks to offset the impact of declining bank 
spread by exploiting scale and scope economies. As suggested by the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, a rise in concentration due to increase in consolidation is regarded 
as increasing collusive opportunities among banks and therefore would lead to higher 
prices and hence lower competition in the market. In addition, the contestable market 
theory suggests that competitiveness of the banking sector does not merely depend on 
market structure indicators like concentration or number of incumbent banks. A 
concentrated banking sector can behave competitively even if the barriers to new entry are 
low. This because this theory posits that incumbent banks are always susceptible to hit-
and-run entry when they seek to exploit their potential market power, therefore the threat 
of potential entry pushes these banks to price their products competitively under certain 
conditions. That is, it can be argued that market structure may not be a significant 
determinant of competitive structure; instead, market contestability rather than the 
structure might be more important for competitive behaviour (Casu and Girardone, 2006; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Therefore, there is no academic consensus on whether 
banking deregulation leads to more or less competition in the banking system. 
 
The second strand of reforms suggests imposing prudential regulations on banks to 
increase the solvency of the banking sector (Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger, 2000). This 
view, based on the “competition-fragility” hypothesis, argues that deregulation-induced 
competition among banks can lead to more financial fragility; as more competition erodes 
market power, reduces profit margins, and consequently results in reduced franchise value. 
This in turn induces banks to take on more risk to increase returns, resulting in higher 
fragility (Keeley, 1990). Similarly, it is argued that elimination of interest rate barriers on 
deposit rates erodes franchise value and hence leads to moral hazard behaviour by banks 
(Hellmann et al., 2000). Furthermore, banks gain lower informational rents from their 
relationship with borrowers due to increased competition, this in turn reduces their 
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incentives to properly screen borrowers, again rising the risk of fragility (Allen and Gale, 
2004). Therefore, this view proposes that increased competition due to banking 
deregulation may lead to instability in the banking sector, calling for increased prudential 
regulation to control banks’ risk taking incentives. However, the “competition-stability” 
view argues that an increase in competition can result in more, rather than less, stability in 
the banking sector. It is argued that deregulation of loan interest rates increases competition 
in this market and hence lower the lending rates. This reduction in the cost of borrowing 
for the entrepreneurs increases the success rate of investments, and consequently banks 
face lower credit risk on their loan portfolio in more competitive markets, resulting in 
increased banking sector stability (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). Yet the issue of regulation 
and its impact on competition and stability is suggested to be considerably more complex 
and multi-faced, as the theoretical analyses based on different models provide different 
answers (Allen and Gale, 2004).41 Although these arguments have led to an extensive body 
of work focusing on the impact of regulations on competition and stability, we will 
specifically review the theoretical arguments focusing on the impacts of prudential 
regulations on competitive conducts in the banking sector.  
 
In general, stricter prudential regulations impose higher costs and hence increase the costs 
of operating in the industry (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). This may in turn reduce the 
number of firms and hence with fewer banks, the market becomes less competitive. On the 
other hand, it is argued that stringent prudential regulations do not necessarily imply lower 
competition (Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger, 2000). This is because higher costs imposed 
by regulations may induce exit from the industry, yet the stricter regulatory environment 
may motive banks to choose a lower degree of product differentiation, forcing banks to 
compete more aggressively in prices. Further investigation of the individual prudential 
regulations also gives controversial arguments regarding their impacts on competition. 
That is, some of the banking regulations target limiting permissible banking activities in 
space and scope; they impose restrictions on the banks’ potential to diversify and utilise 
scale and scope economies (OECD, 2006). On the one hand, these restrictions may prevent 
banks engaging in securitisation and insurance activities, which in turn lower competition 
                                                 
41 There is also empirical evidence showing that different environmental factors (market, regulatory and other 
institutional factors) in which banks operate is critical in assessing the impact of competition on stability 
(Beck et al., 2013).  
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in the banking sector. Yet, these restrictions would lead to greater competition in banking 
since without these restrictions banks are likely to have market and political power, which 
in turn could impede competition (Barth et al., 2004). Some other regulations impose 
restrictions on asset holdings and activities, tighter capital requirements, separate banking 
and other financial service industries, and require official supervision and private 
monitoring (OECD, 2009). As before, these policies may weaken competition, but also 
may result in higher competition. For instance, greater supervision, depending on the 
incentives facing bank supervisors and the ability of taxpayers to screen this supervision 
might hinder bank operations and hence competitive structure of the banking sector (Barth 
et al., 2004).  On the other hand, stringent capital requirements render banks to choose a 
lower level of product differentiation, allowing for more competition and lower spreads 
(Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger, 2000). However, imposing minimum capital 
requirements on banks might lower competition; since the owners of banks are forced to 
put up considerable amounts of capital, they in turn would be less eager to take risks as 
they can lose large amount of funds (Allen and Gale, 2004). Therefore, from theoretical 
arguments point of view, the issue of prudential regulations and their impact on 
competition is inconclusive. 
 
We now investigate the theoretical arguments on the relationship between ownership 
structure and its effect on competition in the banking sector. In theory, foreign banks can 
stimulate competition of a host country’s banking sector via higher efficiency and 
improved quality of service delivery. Moreover, their penetration can also contribute to the 
deployment of modern banking technologies, superior management, better risk analysing 
skills, high product quality, human resource development, and can also improve the 
regulatory framework and legal structure of the host country (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 
2001). Their entrance exerts competitive pressure on domestic banks by forcing them to 
lower their costs (Clarke et al., 2003). It can be inferred from these arguments that foreign 
banks may spur domestic competition and their existence may therefore compel domestic 
banks to adopt strategies that would improve their competitiveness. In addition, Claeys and 
Hainz (2007) suggest that the mode of entry of foreign banks would have a different 
impact when they compete with domestic banks. That is, foreign banks can either penetrate 
a host country’s banking sector by acquiring a domestic bank (takeover) or establishing a 
foreign greenfield bank. While both these entry modes would have superior screening 
technology compared to domestic banks, the takeover banks would also enjoy access to 
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soft information obtained from the acquisition of an existing domestic bank. Therefore, 
this indicates that domestic banks have to charge lower loan rates when competing with 
takeover banks than with greenfield banks when soft information is important (i.e., opaque 
borrower). However, when hard information matters (i.e., transparent borrower), greenfield 
banks are likely to behave more competitively and charge lower lending rates as their 
screening advantage compensates its disadvantage of having no information on incumbent 
firms (Claeys and Hainz, 2007). State ownership of banks can also influence the 
competitive dynamics of a banking sector due partly to their strategies or their roles. It is 
suggested that these banks may compete differently than privately-owned banks, since they 
tend to finance politically attractive projects, not economically efficient ones (Shleifer, 
1998). Moreover, their existence might impede private-sector corporate control of banks, 
since banking authorities might be more willing to deny entry applications to protect these 
banks, which in turn reduces bank competition (Barth et al., 2004). 
 
3.5.2 Empirical evidence  
We first review the empirical evidence concerning the impact of deregulation on the 
competitive structure of the banking sector. Although majority of the literature tends to 
treat the increase in competition as an automatic outcome of banking deregulation, this 
literature provides conflicting results. For example, a positive link between bank 
deregulation and competition is documented by Shaffer (1993) for the Canadian banking 
sector, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) for the Italian banking sector, Zhao et al. (2010) for 
the Indian banking sector, Mwega (2011) for the Kenyan banking sector, Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) based on 50 countries’ banking sectors. On the other hand, there are studies 
finding a certain level of decline in competition following the deregulation (Maudos and 
Solís, 2011; Yildirim and Mohanty, 2010; Zardkoohi and Fraser, 1998).  Therefore, the 
empirical literature suggests that banking deregulation may not necessarily lead to the 
increase of competition in the banking sector. Among others, this unexpected adverse 
impact in given literature arguably might arise from the oligopolistic nature of the banking 
sector, coupled with the freedom granted by deregulation over both interest rates and credit 
allocation, enabling banks to engage in collusive behaviour to gain monopoly rents 
(Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). In addition, various studies tend to use different 
approaches to measure the evolution of competition during the deregulation process; this in 
turn might lead to the contradictory results. Finally, regulatory reforms are often a mixed 
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process combining banking deregulation and re-regulation policies. That is, as it will 
documented below, greater prudential control might imply a cost in terms of competition 
(Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger, 2000), thus the parallel use of different policies makes it 
difficult to assess the net impact of financial reforms on competition. 
 
The evidence from studies investigating the impact of prudential regulations on bank 
competition also gives controversial results. An empirical study relying on three different 
waves of the World Bank survey spanning between 1998 and 2006 finds that, in general, 
stringent prudential regulations do not have an adverse effect on the intensity of 
competition (Ahrend et al., 2009). However, the same study indicates that some of the 
regulations have different impacts on competition. For example, while the strength of 
official supervision improves competition since it generates a level playing field among 
banks in a market; tighter regulations with respect to entry rules and ownership structure 
reduce bank competition, implying that not having contestable market conditions adversely 
affects competitiveness. Another empirical study examining this relation based on a sample 
of developed and emerging market economies finds that an increase in capital requirements 
lower the bank spread for emerging economies while it has no influence for developed 
countries (Schargrodsky and Federico, 1998). From a different perspective, There are also 
single country studies investigating this relation. For example, a study using a dummy 
variable to capture the impact of prudential regulations on competition in the Indian 
banking sector concludes that prudential regulations might not necessarily come at the 
expense of competition, because despite the implementation of tighter prudential norms, 
competition in the lending market increases (Zhao et al., 2010). Another single-country 
empirical study investigating prudential regulation and competition in the case of the 
Argentine banking industry finds that the effects of capital requirement on profitability are 
not clear (Burdisso and D’Amato, 1999). It can be inferred from the review of these 
empirical studies that each prudential norm may lead to different effects on competition, 
thus making it difficult to conclude that prudential regulations benefit competition in 
general.  
 
The association between ownership and competition is also not clear-cut. In a cross-
country study, Claessens and Laeven (2004) find that greater foreign presence is more 
likely to result in more competitive banking sectors. Another cross-country study obtains 
similar findings, suggesting that increased foreign bank presence is correlated with a 
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reduction in profitability and margins for domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2001). There 
are also evidence in favour of the positive effect of foreign participation in a single-country 
case (see, Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Simpasa, 2013). However, a cross-country study 
focusing on the African banking sector finds that there is an inverted U-shaped association 
between foreign bank entry and competition, indicating that when the share of the foreign 
bank is less than or equal to the value of the turning point, foreign bank entry increases the 
competitive environment in banking (Boubacar, 2016). In addition, Yildirim (2014) finds 
that, despite foreign participation, the level of competition in the Turkish banking sector 
did not increase. Furthermore,  Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (2000) find that foreign entry 
gives rise to a deterioration in the quality of domestic banks’ loan portfolio, which is 
attributed to the hypothesis that greater competition increases risk by inducing a loss of 
bank franchises’ value.  
 
The empirical studies indicate that the mode of entry of a foreign bank generates a 
differential competition effect. For example, Claeys and Hainz (2007), investigating this 
hypothesis for ten Eastern European countries, find that on average foreign bank entry 
results in reductions in interest rates due to their screening technology and that increased 
competition has a stronger effect on domestic banks if the mode of entry is greenfield.  
Similar findings support this evidence when new foreign banks are likely to charge lower 
interest rates relative to domestic banks, and this is more so for greenfield bank than 
takeover banks (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). However, another study suggests that 
greenfield banks charge lower interest rates, not solely due to their superior performance or 
screening technology, but because they have a higher share of the most transparent 
borrower in their portfolio whose cost of credit is lower than opaque borrowers  (Degryse 
et al., 2012). Moreover, another study also suggests that if foreign banks are unable to 
distinguish between good and bad borrowers, the mode of entry comes to a standstill. This 
is because foreign banks are more likely to concentrate on the sector least subject to 
information asymmetries (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999).  
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the effects of financial deregulation, prudential re-regulations, 
and ownership on bank efficiency and competition from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. It is possible to infer from this review that inconsistencies observed in 
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theoretical arguments are reflected in empirical evidence investigating the impact of 
banking reforms and ownership on bank efficiency and competition. In other words, 
despite a growing number of studies, these literatures are still rather limited and 
inconclusive on many aspects. One of the most important points not fully recognised is that 
banking deregulation is a continuous process with possibly lagged effects. Therefore, the 
short time periods analysed by many empirical studies obviously limit the inference that 
can be driven. Another point is that financial fragilities stemming from the implementation 
of deregulatory policies without setting out a sound regulatory framework have led 
authorities to implement concomitant prudential re-regulations to eliminate risks linked to 
reforms that are more liberal. Although regulatory reforms have widely been implemented 
by policy makers, the number of empirical studies investigating the joint impact of these 
reforms is rather limited. The Turkish banking sector in particular does not have any study 
investigating the joint impact of these reforms. Moreover, changes in the operational 
environment tend to affect the performance of different ownerships differently due 
possibly to the differences in operational structure, customer base, and management 
strategies. However, the literature sheds light on the reactions of different ownership and 
the different mode of entry of foreign banks to the changing regulatory environment is 
lacking. Furthermore, the existing empirical studies tend to focus on the existence of a 
relationship between competition and bank efficiency without digging into the means by 
which this association takes place. That is, the literature lacks a measure of the evolution of 
competition during the banking reform process and to what extent this reform process 
affects competition.   
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Chapter 4  
Measuring Frontier Efficiency 
4.1 Introduction 
Banking sector funds form surplus units to deficit units, thus increasing economic 
efficiency by improving a better allocation of economic resources (Casu et al., 2015). This 
important financial intermediary role played by banks make competition and efficiency 
among banks pivotal and timely policy issues. Therefore, a crucial question to be answered 
is: what is an effective way to measure the degree of efficiency and competition? This 
chapter will focus on the approaches used to measure efficiency, while Chapter 6 will 
elaborate methodologies used to measure the degree of competition. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 starts by introducing approaches, 
parametric and non-parametric, used to measure the efficiency of a decision-making unit. 
Section 4.5 describes the non-parametric method and pays more attention to the Data 
Envelopment Analysis. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 focus on parametric methods with particular 
attention paid onto the Stochastic Frontier Analysis and its extensions. Section 4.5 
compares these two different approaches and Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2 Frontier efficiency 
The two most widely used concepts to assess a firm’s production performance are 
productivity and efficiency. Although these two concepts are sometimes used 
interchangeably, they are not identical (Coelli et al., 2005). That is, whilst productivity is a 
descriptive measure of the ratio of outputs to inputs for a particular firm, efficiency is a 
normative measure of the observed ratio of outputs to inputs for a particular firm against an 
optimal one that is generally accepted as the “frontier.”  
 
The notion of “frontier efficiency” is based on the recognition that some firms in an 
industry are more successful than their counterparts in meeting their objectives and hence 
it is usual to observe different efficiency levels among them. The available techniques that 
enable identifying the efficiency of competitors can be grouped into two major streams: 
parametric and non-parametric approaches. Although both approaches measure efficiency 
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as a radial distance from an efficient frontier consisting of best-practice firms, one of the 
fundamental differences between these methods lies in how the efficient frontier is 
constructed. That is, given that the efficiency in production among firms is investigated, 
the parametric approaches require imposing a specific functional form characterising the 
production process. The non-parametric methods instead construct a piece-wise linear 
convex frontier from the linear combination of the best observed practices on the sample.  
 
4.3 Parametric frontier efficiency approaches 
Early parametric frontier approaches used to estimate firm-level efficiency levels did not 
allow for the presence of statistical noise. Aigner and Chu (1965), Afriat (1972) and 
Richmond (1974) considered a Cobb-Douglas production frontier of the form:  
ln 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝛽) − 𝑢𝑖 (4.1) 
where 𝑞𝑖  is the output vector for firm i, 𝑓(. ) is the production function, 𝑥𝑖  is the input 
vector for firm i, 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and 𝑢𝑖 is a non-
negative random variable. Therefore, this model indicates that all deviations from the 
efficient frontier are assumed to be the result of technical inefficiency. The model (4.1) 
does not take measurement errors and other sources of statistical noise into account. The 
inefficiency component, 𝑢𝑖 ,  possibly captures all these effects, resulting in inconsistent 
measurements of inefficiency. An obvious solution to this issue is to incorporate another 
random variable representing statistical noise into the model. The resulting frontier is 
known as a stochastic frontier approach.  
 
4.4 Stochastic parametric frontier approaches 
Stochastic parametric frontier approaches include methods such as the stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), the thick frontier analysis (TFA), the distribution free approach (DFA) and 
the recursive thick frontier analysis (RTFA). Since the SFA is the most widely employed 
method among the stochastic parametric frontier approaches and it will be used in Chapter 
5 to measure cost efficiency levels of Turkish banks, we elaborate on this method as a 
representative stochastic parametric frontier approach. 
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4.4.1 The stochastic frontier analysis 
Similar to the early parametric frontier approaches, the SFA also makes assumptions on the 
functional form of the production process and includes a non-negative random variable 
capturing inefficiency, but it differently adds a symmetric random error to account for 
statistical noise. That is, the stochastic parametric frontier approaches depart from the early 
literature by including a random error to capture the effects arising from the unintentional 
omission of relevant variables, from measurement errors as well as from approximation 
errors related with the choice of functional form. This approach accordingly requires an 
explicit functional form for the frontier as well as distributional assumptions on random 
error and inefficiency. Therefore, this model attributes the radial distance between the 
observed performance of a firm and the efficient frontier to both random noise and 
inefficiency. 
 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen & van Den Broeck (1977) independently proposed the 
stochastic frontier production function model which is specified as follows: 
ln 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 ; 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑖 (4.2) 
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 (4.3) 
where 𝑞𝑖  is the output vector for firm i, 𝑓(. ) is the production function, 𝑥𝑖  is the input 
vector for firm i, 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 𝜀𝑖 is the composite 
error terms that can be directly observed in the estimation and it consists of 𝑢𝑖, one-sided 
inefficiency term, and of  𝑣𝑖 , two-sided random error. The random error, which can be 
positive or negative, captures measurement error and other random factors affecting the 
production process that go beyond the control of the firm, while the non-negative 
inefficiency term (as this can only reduce output) accounts for technical inefficiency, 
namely each firm’s shortfall in output relative to the frontier. In addition, 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑢𝑖  are 
assumed to be independently distributed from each other. The model (4.2) therefore is 
called a stochastic frontier production function, since the output values are bounded from 
above by the random variable 𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖). In other words, since the symmetric random 
error 𝑣𝑖  can be negative or positive, the stochastic frontier outputs vary about the 
deterministic component of the model.  
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These features of the stochastic frontier model can be illustrated graphically. To ease the 
illustration, two firms, A and B, producing output qi using only one input, xi are taken into 
consideration. In this case, a Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier model can be shown below: 
⁡ln 𝑞𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖 +𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 (4.4) 
 
or                                         𝑞𝑖 = 𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖) ⁡⁡⁡× ⁡⁡⁡𝑒(𝑣𝑖) ⁡⁡⁡⁡× ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 𝑒(−𝑢𝑖) 
 
 
                                                    deterministic             noise             inefficiency 
                                                               component 
 
(4.5) 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the inputs and outputs of two firms, A and B, and the deterministic 
frontier model reflects the existence of diminishing returns to scale. Output values are 
shown on the vertical axis, while input values on the horizontal axis. Firm A employs input 
𝑥𝐴  to produce output 𝑞𝐴 , while Firm B employs input 𝑥𝐵  to produce output 𝑞𝐵  (these 
observed values are illustrated by the points marked with ¤, while the unobserved frontier 
values are shown by the points marked with ×). 
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Figure 4.1 Stochastic production frontier 
 
 
  
 
Source: (Coelli et al., 2005) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the deterministic frontier, 𝑞𝑖 = exp⁡(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖) , which reflects the 
efficient (or best practice) maximum output level attainable by using a given quantity of 
input, and it is estimated based on the observed outputs and inputs of all firms in the 
industry. The key points in the figure are that the frontier output of Firm A [𝑞𝐴
∗ = exp⁡(𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐴 + 𝑣𝐴)] lies above the deterministic part of the production frontier only because the 
impact of noise is positive (i.e.,𝑣𝐴 > 0) , while the frontier output of Firm B [𝑞𝐵
∗ =
exp⁡(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐵 + 𝑣𝐵)] lies below the deterministic part of the production frontier only 
because the impact of noise is negative (i.e., 𝑣𝐵 < 0). Since 𝑣𝑗 is assumed to be a two-
sided random error term, noise can be positive and negative reflecting this assumption. 
Moreover, stochastic frontier outputs tend to be evenly distributed above and below the 
deterministic part of the frontier. The observed output of Firm A [𝑞𝐴 = exp⁡(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐴 +
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𝑣𝐴 − 𝑢𝐴)] lies below
42 the deterministic part of the frontier as the sum of the noise and 
inefficiency effects is negative (i.e., 𝑣𝐴 − 𝑢𝐴 < 0). The same applies to the case of Firm B. 
The primary aim of the stochastic frontier analysis is to predict inefficiency effects. 
Therefore, the most common output-oriented measure of technical efficiency is the ratio of 
observed output to the corresponding stochastic frontier output, namely: 
 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝑞𝑖
exp⁡(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖)
=
exp⁡(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖)
exp⁡(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖)
= exp⁡(−𝑢𝑖) (4.6) 
 
The predicted technical inefficiency effects take a value between 0 and 1 and they measure 
the output of the i-th firm relative to the output that could be produced by a fully efficient 
firm employing the same input vector. Since predicting inefficiency effects is the most 
important objective of stochastic frontier analysis, the estimation of parameters of the 
model is understated in the literature. Yet the estimation process is quite complicated given 
the fact that the model itself has two random errors, a symmetric error, 𝑣𝑖, and a one-sided 
random variable, 𝑢𝑖, requiring assumptions with regards to these two random variables.     
 
4.4.2 Estimating parameters and predicting efficiency 
i. Choosing a functional form 
Estimation of the parameters of the stochastic production frontier model starts with 
choosing a functional form for the production process. Among the possible models 
discussed by the literature are the Cobb-Douglas, the normalised quadratic, the 
transcendental logarithmic (translog), the generalised Leontief and the constant elasticity of 
substitution. In detail, the translog offers a flexible functional form and makes fewer 
assumptions than alternative forms on the structure of the production process, specifically 
on production and substitution elasticities. It is also argued that more flexible functional 
forms such as the alternative Fourier flexible leads to a further loss of degrees of freedom 
(Filippini et al., 2008), yet it produces similar average levels of inefficiency (as found by 
Berger & Humphrey (1997)). Non-flexible alternative functional forms like Cobb-Douglass 
                                                 
42 Observed outputs tend to lie below the deterministic part of the frontier, yet they can (though rarely) lie 
above the deterministic frontier if 𝑣𝐴 − 𝑢𝐴 > 0 (Coelli et al. 2005). 
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and Leontief, on the other hand, are too restrictive compared to the translog functional 
forms as they place a priori restrictions on the substitution possibilities among the factors of 
production. Yet the increased flexibility leads to loss in econometric efficiency and other 
econometric challenges due to possible multicollinearity and loss of degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, this study will use the translog form in the one of the empirical analyses of this 
thesis.  
 
The choice between these different forms can also be made based on four principles which 
are discussed by Coelli et al. (2005). First, if a functional form has sufficient parameters to 
yield a first-order differential approximation to an arbitrary function at a single point, this 
function is called first-order flexible, while if it has sufficient parameters to yield a second-
order approximation it cis called second-order flexible. The Cobb-Douglas form is a first-
order flexible, whilst other functional forms are second-order flexible. The literature 
suggests one to use a second-order flexible functional form since this provides greater 
information reflecting the input-output relations more clearly. Second, the functional forms 
should be linear in parameters to be able to estimate them by applying linear regression 
techniques. Third, the functional forms need to satisfy the economic regularity features, 
which are non-negativity, non-decreasing in input prices, non-decreasing in quantity, 
homogeneity and concave in input prices. Lastly, the principle of parsimony contends that 
simplest functional form that is adequate for the estimation should be preferred. Therefore, 
while it is suggested to examine the adequacy of a functional form before estimation, this 
practice is not straightforward, leading practitioners to determine adequacy by conducting 
post-estimation tests such as a residual analysis, hypothesis testing, calculating measures of 
goodness-of-fit, and examination predictive superiority (Griffin et al., 1987). 
 
ii. Estimating parameters via the maximum likelihood method 
As noted, the model (4.2) has two random errors, a symmetric error, 𝑣𝑖, and a one-sided 
random variable, 𝑢𝑖, making it more complicated to estimate. Therefore, it is common in the 
literature to assume that each 𝑣𝑖 is distributed independently of each 𝑢𝑖 and that both errors 
are uncorrelated with the independent variables in xi. Also,  
𝐸(𝑣𝑖) = 0, (4.7) 
𝐸(𝑣𝑖
2) = 𝜎𝑣
2, (4.8) 
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𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑗) = 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑙𝑙⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, (4.9) 
𝐸(𝑢𝑗
2) = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡, (4.10) 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑗) = 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑙𝑙⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. (4.11) 
 
Therefore, it is possible to assume that the statistical noise component, 𝑣𝑖 , has similar 
properties to the noise component in the classical linear regression model. That is, the errors 
are independently and identically distributed normal random variables with zero means and 
variances 𝜎2, (𝑣𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑉
2)) . Although the inefficiency component has similar 
properties with the statistical noise, it has a non-zero mean since inefficiencies can only 
have negative impacts on production process. 
 
Given these assumptions, one can obtain consistent estimators of the slope parameters 
employing ordinary least square (OLS). Yet this estimation method arguably results in a 
downward bias in the intercept term, indicating that the OLS estimates cannot be used to 
compute measures of technical inefficiency. Therefore, it is suggested in the literature that 
the maximum likelihood (ML) method enabling one to make distributional assumptions for 
the two error terms as well as having many desirable large sample features offers better 
solution (Coelli et al., 2005).  
 
The ML method has been widely used by many empirical studies. The estimation of 
stochastic frontier models via this method requires distributional assumptions on the 
inefficiency component entering the composite error, in addition to the customary ones 
made for the stochastic error. The symmetric random error,⁡𝑣𝑖, is commonly assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance, while the 
stochastic frontier literature offers various specifications for the distribution of the second 
non-negative random error term (𝑢𝑖≥0) associated with inefficiency. That is, overall one 
needs to estimate all parameters under the assumptions and then the separate effects of 
inefficiency and statistical noise from the estimated composite error term. 
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iii. The Half-Normal Model 
Aigner et al. (1977) assumes 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑉
2)  for 𝑣𝑖 , yet assumes 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)  for 𝑢𝑖 , 
indicating that a half-normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance. Aigner et 
al. (1977) parameterised the log-likelihood function for the half-normal model in terms of 
𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2  and 𝜆2 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2 ≥ 0 . This suggests that if λ=0 technical inefficiency 
effects do not exist, which in turn indicate that all the deviations from the efficient frontier 
stems from statistical noise. On the other hand, Battese & Corra (1977) parameterised the 
log-likelihood in terms of 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 and  𝛾 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎2. This suggests that γ parameter 
ranges between 0 and 1, and if γ =0 then all deviations from the efficient frontier driven by 
statistical noise, while γ =1 indicates that all deviations are thanks to technical inefficiency. 
The latter parametrisation is arguably a more convenient way for iterative optimisation and  
will hence be elaborated below.  
 
Under the Battese & Corra (1977) method, the log-likelihood function is parametrised as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝑞|𝛽, 𝜎, 𝛾) = ⁡−
1
2
ln (
𝜋𝜎2
2
) +∑𝑙𝑛Ф
(
 −
𝜀𝑗√(
𝛾
1 − 𝛾)
𝜎
)
 −
𝐽
𝑖=1
1
2(𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2)
∑𝜀𝑖
2
𝑀
𝑖=1
 (4.12) 
 
In the equation (4.12), q is a vector of outputs; 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 − 𝒙𝑖
′𝛽  is the i-th 
composite error term; Ф(𝑥) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
random variable evaluated at x. The maximisation of the log-likelihood function in 
equation (4.12) with respect to the unknown parameters (𝛽, 𝜎, 𝛾 ) results in the ML 
estimates of these parameters.  
 
Once we have the estimates of the technology parameters,⁡𝛽, and the two distributional 
parameters, 𝜎⁡and⁡𝛾, the next step is to derive estimates of firm specific efficiency scores. 
As noted in the equation (4.12), the estimated residual of the model is  𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 . 
Although this obviously contains information on 𝑢𝑖 , it is not straightforward to extract 
information from 𝜀𝑖 about 𝑢𝑖. A solution offered by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt 
(1982) (JLMS) is to use the conditional distribution of 𝑢𝑖  given 𝜀𝑖 . Namely, if 
𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑈
2), then the conditional distribution of u given ε is as follows: 
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𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) =
𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀)
𝑓(𝜀)
=
1
√(2𝜋𝜎∗)
⁡× exp [−
(𝑢 − 𝛿∗)
2
2𝜎∗2
] / [1 − Ф(−
𝛿∗
𝜎∗
)] (4.13) 
 
where  𝛿∗ = −𝜀𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎2 and 𝜎∗
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2/𝜎2. 
 
Moreover, because 𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) is distributed as 𝑁+(𝛿∗, 𝜎∗
2), either the mean or the mode of this 
distribution can serve as point estimator of 𝑢𝑖 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). They are 
given as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = 𝛿∗𝑖 + 𝜎∗ [
𝜃 (−
𝛿∗𝑖
𝜎∗
)
1 − Ф(−
𝛿∗𝑖
𝜎∗
)
] = 𝜎∗ [
𝜃 (
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)
1 − Ф(
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)
− (
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)] (4.14) 
 
Finally, when point estimates of 𝑢𝑖  are acquired, estimates of firm-specific technical 
efficiency can be derived from 𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−û𝑖).  
 
Alternatively, the point estimator of firm-specific technical efficiency can be obtained from 
the conditional expectation given the observed composite error term following Battese & 
Coelli (1988) as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸[exp⁡(−𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖] = [1 −
Ф(𝜎∗ −
𝑢𝑖
∗
𝜎∗
)
1 − Ф(−
𝑢𝑖
∗
𝜎∗
)
] 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
𝜎∗
2
2
− 𝑢𝑖
∗} (4.15) 
 
where 𝑢𝑖
∗ = −𝜀𝑖 , 𝛾 = −(𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽)𝜎𝑈
2/𝜎2 and 𝜎∗
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2/𝜎2. 
 
iv. Other models 
As noted, the models assuming a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency component is 
a single-parameter distribution, which in turn arguably restricts the distributional shapes of 
inefficiency. This led researchers to develop more flexible two-parameter distributions for 
the inefficiency term: Stevenson (1980) offered a truncated-normal distribution model 
generalisation of a half-normal distribution, and Greene (1990) proposed a gamma 
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distribution model generalisation of an exponential distribution. The former assumes the 
inefficiency term, 𝑢𝑖, is assumed to be distributed as a truncated normal with mean μ: 
 
𝑢𝑖~⁡𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁
+[μ, 𝜎𝑢
2]. (4.16) 
 
The gamma distribution assumes that inefficiency term is assumed to be distributed as: 
 
𝑢𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝐺(𝜆, 0)⁡⁡⁡(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙⁡𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡𝜆) (4.17) 
 
It is argued in the literature that the half-normal distribution which has a zero mode is 
somewhat restrictive, since most of the observations are clustered near full efficiency. For 
example, operational units in the state sector or firms in a recently privatised industry are 
likely to suffer from inefficiency (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). That is, the appropriate 
distribution of inefficiency should have a non-zero mode. The truncated and the gamma 
densities having a mean and mode different from zero 43  do not impose any a priori 
restrictions on the efficiency. Since the half-normal is a special case of truncated normal, it 
is suggested that one should estimate the model with the truncated normal assumption and 
test the hypothesis that the mean is zero (Kumbhakar et al., 2015).  
 
However, the flexibility of these distributional assumptions comes at the cost of substantial 
numerical complexity, as there are more parameters to be estimated. There are also studies 
controlling the effect of possible misspecification in the density assumption imposed on 
inefficiency. For example, Greene (1990), investigating to what extent the average 
inefficiency scores are sensitive to choice of distributional assumption (half-normal, 
truncated normal, exponential and gamma) imposed on inefficiency, found that mean 
inefficiency levels across these distributional specification for inefficiency are quite 
similar. Ruggiero (1999) assumed two distributional assumptions (half-normal and 
exponential) for inefficiency and found that the rankings of firms on the basis of predicted 
efficiency levels were quite robust to the distributional specification. Although one should 
                                                 
43 If μ=0, the truncated normal density collapses to the half-normal density. 
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take into consideration the specific conditions observed in the market and their 
repercussions on the firms before imposing a distributional assumptions, the principle of 
parsimony favours the simpler single-parameter distributions of half-normal models 
(Coelli et al., 2005). 
 
v. Hypothesis testing 
Practitioners are usually interested in testing the significance of the inefficiency effects. In 
the half-normal model, this can be undertaken by testing the null hypothesis of 𝐻0 = 𝜎𝑢
2 =
0 , against 𝐻1 = 𝜎𝑢
2 > 0 . In addition, a practitioner can also use estimates from the 
truncated-normal model to test to what extent the simpler half-normal model is sufficient. 
Moreover, it is also suggested to undertake a test of model adequacy, for example, to test to 
what extent a restricted Cobb-Douglass functional form is sufficient against a more flexible 
translog functional form. This test can be conducted by proposing a Wald, Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) or Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests. The Wald, LR and LM tests are all only 
asymptotically valid. The same applies to the t-test and F-test since the stochastic frontier 
model which has a composite error term is no longer normally distributed. That is, the 
distribution of composite error is either negatively or positively skewed depending on 
whether it is measuring cost or production efficiency. 
 
4.4.3 Accounting for exogenous environmental factors 
The analysis of productive efficiency arguably has two objectives. The first one is the 
prediction of a stochastic frontier serving as a benchmark against which to estimate 
efficiency of firms, which has been reviewed in the above sections. The second aim, 
although much less frequently explored, is to the incorporation of exogenous 
environmental factors with neither inputs nor outputs to the production process, yet it 
exerts an impact on firms’ performance (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). That is, the ability 
of firms to transform inputs into output is often affected by some exogenous factors 
characterising the production environment. Examples of such factors are regulatory 
changes, the degree of competitive pressure, input and output quality proxies, ownership 
structure, network characteristics, and various managerial features. For instance, Coelli et 
al. (1999), measuring the efficiency of international airlines in their study, account for 
environmental factors like network conditions and geographical factors.  
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In the SFA literature, two alternative methods have been used to take into account 
environmental factors. First, since they might affect the structure of the production 
technology by which conventional inputs are converted into output(s), leading practitioners 
to incorporate these observed factors into the deterministic part of the stochastic frontier 
model. Second, since they may influence the efficiency with which inputs are converted 
into output(s), led practitioners to include these factors as covariates in the inefficiency 
term of the stochastic frontier model. 
 
i. Early approaches handling exogenous environmental factors 
 The first approach handles the exogenous environmental variables by incorporated them 
directly into the structure of production process, giving the form of: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 = ln⁡(𝑥𝑖𝛽) + 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 (4.18) 
 
where 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of environmental factors and 𝛿 their corresponding vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. The equation (4.18) has the same structure as a conventional 
stochastic production frontier model discussed in Section 4.4 and this expanded model can 
also be estimated using similar estimation techniques. If one uses the ML approach for the 
estimation, it is inherently assumed that the environmental factors as well as the input 
variables are not correlated with each disturbance component 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖. This indicates that 
the environmental factors affect the production performance by influencing the structure of 
the production frontier by influencing efficiency with which it is assumed to be 
uncorrelated. Therefore, although these factors are assumed to affect efficiency, the 
variations in efficiency are left unexplained by this model.  
 
Some researchers take into account the environmental variables in a two-step approach 
(eg., Pitt & Lee 1981). The first-step involves estimating the stochastic frontier model 
without incorporating the environmental variables, thus firm-specific efficiency scores are 
obtained without controlling for environmental factors. The second-step involves 
regressing these predicted firm-specific efficiency scores on the environmental variables 
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with the expectation that variations in efficiency are explained. This approach arguably 
produces biased and inefficient estimators for the following reasons. The environmental 
variables,⁡𝑧𝑗 , must be assumed to be uncorrelated with the elements of 𝑥𝑗 . If they are 
correlated, the first step estimation undertaken by omitting the environmental variables 
from the frontier in turn give biased ML estimates of β, 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝑣
2. Therefore, the predicted 
inefficiencies being accounted for in the second-stage regression are biased predictions of 
the true inefficiencies, since they have been predicted relative to a biased representation of 
the production frontier. A second and less widely recognised problem is that in the first 
stage it is assumed that inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖, is assumed to be identically distributed. Yet this 
assumption is contradicted in the second stage regression, as the inefficiencies predicted in 
the first step are now assumed to have a functional relationship with the environmental 
variables,⁡𝑧𝑗. Due to these caveats, concerning the validity of the results of the two-step 
approach, recent empirical studies have preferred using different ways of handling the 
environmental factors. 
 
ii. Incorporating exogenous environmental factors as covariates  
The one-step approach handles the environmental variables by allowing them to directly 
affect the stochastic component of the frontier model; namely, the environmental variables 
are included as covariates in the inefficiency term of the stochastic frontier model. 
Kumbhakar et al. (1991) formulated this model as: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 = ln⁡(𝑥𝑖𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖  (4.19) 
                                                  𝑢𝑖 = 𝛿
′𝑧𝑖 +𝜔𝑖 (4.20) 
so that single-step production frontier model is: 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 = ln⁡(𝑥𝑖𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖 − (𝛿
′𝑧𝑖 +𝜔𝑖) (4.21) 
 
where one-sided error term,⁡𝑢𝑗, in the equation (4.19) has a truncated normal structure with 
the mean relying on the vector of environmental variables, 𝑧𝑖, shown as 𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(𝑧𝑖
′𝛿, 𝜎𝑢
2). 
This approach involves simultaneous estimation of the stochastic frontier model and the 
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inefficiency component expressed as a function of the environmental variables. It offers a 
solution to the endogeneity issues presented in the two-step approach and hence has been 
widely used in the empirical literature.  
 
In the literature, similar models have been proposed following Kumbhakar et al. (1991). 
Huang & Liu (1994) proposed a model imposing a different specification for inefficiency, 
which is: 
 
𝑢𝑖 = g⁡(ℎ𝑖; 𝛿) + 𝜔𝑖 (4.22) 
 
so the one-step production frontier is written as: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 = ln(𝑥𝑖𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖 − [g(ℎ𝑖; 𝛿) + 𝜔𝑖]. (4.23) 
 
The novelty of this model is that the function g⁡(ℎ𝑖; 𝛿) allows for incorporating interactions 
between exogenous environmental variables (ℎ𝑖) and explanatory variables (𝑥𝑖) into the 
deterministic frontier and the environmental variables can exert non-neutral impacts on 
inefficiency.  
 
Lastly, other approaches handling with the environmental variables do not clearly target 
the deterministic or stochastic components of the frontier. For instance, the study carried 
out by Reifschneider & Stevenson (1991) takes into account the conventional frontier 
model shown in the equation (4.19) and assumes that: 
 
𝑢𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑧𝑖) + 𝜔𝑖 (4.24) 
 
where g(.) is a non-negative function and 𝜀𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝜀
2). On the one hand, this model 
seems to correlate the environmental variables with the inefficiency effects, yet 
substituting the equation (4.24) into the equation (4.19) results in a model of the form: 
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𝑞𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 − 𝑔(𝑧𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖 −𝜔𝑖 (4.25) 
 
which apparently has the identical error structure as a basic half-normal stochastic frontier. 
Therefore, it is possible to view the model proposed by Reifschneider & Stevenson (1991) 
as the one assuming that the environmental factors affecting the shape of the production 
technology (or deterministic component of the frontier), though with a slightly different 
variance to the model (4.18). This indicates that this approach of tackling environmental 
variables raises an identification problem; namely, it is not straightforward to distinguish 
whether the environmental variables affect the inefficiency effects or the production 
technology itself (Coelli et al., 2005). 
 
4.4.4 Predicting cost efficiency 
When input price data are available and cost minimisation is a reasonable assumption to 
make for firms, one can estimate the economic characteristics of the production technology 
using a cost frontier from which cost efficiency measures can be derived. In the case where 
we have cross-sectional data, the Cobb-Douglas cost frontier model can be written as:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑚𝑖
𝑀
𝑚=1
+∑𝛽𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ 𝜀𝑖 (4.26) 
 
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
(4.27) 
 
In the equation 4.5,  𝑐𝑖 represents the observed cost of the i-th firm; 𝑤𝑚𝑖 is the m-th input 
price of the i-th firm; 𝑦𝑛𝑖  is the n-th output of the i-th firm; 𝜀𝑖  is composite error term, 
consisting of a two-sided random variable, 𝑣𝑖 , accounting for statistical noise and a non-
negative random variable, ⁡𝑢𝑖 , representing cost inefficiency, which may increase costs 
above the best-practice level. The cost function is non-decreasing in input prices and 
outputs, linearly homogenous and concave in inputs prices, so that the following restrictions 
must be true:𝛽𝑚 >0 and ∑ 𝛽𝑚 = 1
𝑀
𝑚=1 . Linear homogeneity is customarily imposed prior to 
estimation leading to the following specification: 
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𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑗/𝑤𝑀𝑖) = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑚𝑖/𝑤𝑀𝑖)
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+∑𝛽𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (4.28) 
 
Expressing the equation (4.28) in a compact form as: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑖/𝑤𝑀𝑖) = 𝑟𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  (4.29) 
 
The measure of cost efficiency for the i-th firm is the ratio of minimum cost, adjusted for 
the random error, to observed cost: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑖 =
exp⁡(𝑟𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖)
exp⁡(𝑟𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖)
= exp⁡(−𝑢𝑖) (4.30) 
 
Similar to technical efficiency scores, predicted cost efficiency scores range over (0,1). This 
indicates that a firm is assumed to be fully cost efficient (with an efficiency score equal to 
1) if it lies on the efficient cost frontier, while it is classified as inefficient (with an 
efficiency score between 0 and 1) if its outputs could be produced at lower cost under the 
same conditions. The cost frontier function in  the equation (4.28) is structurally similar to 
the production frontier function specified in the equation (4.2). This indicates that from a 
statistical viewpoint the analysis tools used for the stochastic production frontier model can 
be utilised to analyse the stochastic cost frontier model.  
 
The empirical estimation of a cost function for a banking sector entails a set of 
requirements. It involves the specification of an appropriate functional form of the cost 
function, the input-output composition of the cost function, the measurement of quantities 
and prices of such inputs and outputs, the specification of other cost drivers, and post-
estimation tests associated with the nature of the frontier model and regularity conditions 
to ensure the consistency of the cost function with its theoretical properties. 
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4.4.5 Stochastic frontier panel data models 
The stochastic frontier models discussed up to this point are generally for the analysis of 
cross-sectional data. This section now extends the discussion to cases where the stochastic 
frontier models are based on panel data. Panel data, which consists of observations for 
each firm over more than one period of time, inherently contains more observations than a 
cross-sectional data set and hence, for this reason alone, it is expected to obtain more 
efficient estimators of the unknown parameters as well as more consistent predictors of 
inefficiency. Another advantage of panel data models is that they allow for examining the 
evolution of efficiency and production technology over time. In addition, it also enables 
one to relax some strong distribution assumptions imposed on error components due to the 
nature of cross-sectional data. Yet, the panel data models also require making some other 
assumptions that will be outlined below. 
 
The fundamental stochastic frontier model of Aigner et al. (1977) of the equation (4.2) is 
based on cross-sectional data. A panel data version of this model can be written in the 
general form  
 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.31) 
 
where the only difference stems from the additional subscript “t”, representing time. 
Arguably, if one assumes that the statistical noise (𝑣𝑖𝑡) and inefficiency component (𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
are independently distributed, then this model can be estimated using methods applied in 
the cross-sectional cases (see Section 4.4.2). Although it is appropriate to use these 
methods for estimation purposes, the assumption that the inefficiencies are independently 
distributed is likely to be incorrect. This is because it is expected that an efficient firm is 
more likely to stay efficient over time, while an inefficient one is likely to improve its 
efficiency levels over time as it will learn from its counterparts and mistakes. For these 
reasons, one needs to impose some structure on the inefficiency effects in equation (4.31). 
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i. Time-invariant inefficiency models 
This case imposes the simplest structures on inefficiency. This model is related to whether 
inefficient firms enhance their inefficiency over time. If inefficiency is assumed to be fixed 
over time, this phenomenon can be modelled as: 
 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.32) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖  and ⁡𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖.  
As previously noted, the subscript “t” is dropped from 𝑢𝑖  to reflect fact that the 
inefficiency of firm i is not changing over time. The model in equation in (4.32) can be 
estimated by assuming 𝑢𝑖  as a fixed or as a random parameter. The former can be 
estimated by employing the fixed effects model in the OLS regression framework using 
dummy variables (known as LSDV), while the latter can be estimated by employing the 
random effects model using either generalised least squares (GLS) or the ML method. 
While the LSDV approach does not impose any distributional assumptions for the 𝑢𝑖𝑠, the 
GLS and ML require imposing an arbitrary structure for the distribution of 𝑢𝑖𝑠. One study 
finds that efficiency estimates obtained using the LSDV are very similar to the GLS and 
ML estimators (Gong and Sickles, 1992). On the one hand, this finding favours the LSDV 
method. This is arguably because, first, it does not require to impose any arbitrary structure 
for the distribution of inefficiency to separate statistical noise and inefficiency, and second, 
one does not need to assume that input levels and inefficiency are uncorrelated. On the 
other hand, the LSDV method does not allow including any other time-invariant repressor, 
while the GLS and the ML make it possible to include other time-invariant variables into 
the vector of explanatory variables without leading to the perfect collinearity issue. 
 
The time-invariance assumed by these methods arguably may not be realistic for many 
industries, as it is expected that firms learn over time or competitive forces induce them to 
enhance their efficiency. This assumption becomes untenable for firms operating in an 
environment constantly changing due to globalisation, technological advancements and 
shifts in regulatory framework. Therefore, researchers have developed time-varying 
models to overcome the restrictiveness of the time-invariant models. 
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ii. Time-varying inefficiency models 
The time-invariant inefficiency models discussed in the previous section are somewhat 
restrictive, as it is expected that managers would learn from experience and hence the 
efficiency levels change systematically over time. Moreover, the levels of production 
efficiency are likely to change due to, among other things, the adoption of technologies. 
The assumption that inefficiency levels do not change over time therefore would be 
misleading when the time period of panel data gets longer. Due to these caveats, various 
models allowing inefficiency to change over time have been proposed and time-variant 
inefficiency models are expected to accommodate the productivity and efficiency 
improvements as well as accounting for market competition. 
 
Two stochastic frontier models allowing for time-varying inefficiency take the form: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑡) 𝑢𝑖 (4.33) 
where 𝑓(. ) is a function determining how inefficiency varies over time: 
Kumbhakar (1990)                        f(𝑡⁡)=[1+exp (𝜑⁡1𝑡⁡+𝜑⁡2𝑡⁡
2)]-1  
Battese and Coelli (1992)              f(𝑡⁡)=𝑒⁡𝑥⁡𝑝⁡[𝜂⁡(𝑡⁡−𝑇⁡)]  
where 𝜑1 , 𝜑2 , and 𝜂  are unknown parameters to be estimated. On the one hand, 
Kumbhakar's (1990) 𝑅(𝑡) function ranges [0,1], thus it might be non-increasing, non–
decreasing, concave or convex based on the results of the estimated parameters of 𝜑1 and 
𝜑2. On the other hand, Battese and Coelli’s (1992) 𝑅(𝑡) function has features 𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0 
and 𝑅(𝑇) = 1, and the function can be non-increasing or non-decreasing based on the sign 
of 𝜂, yet it is convex for all values of 𝜂. The former model has two parameters and hence 
the temporal pattern is more flexible compared to the Battese & Coelli (1992) model. Both 
of the models can be estimated by using the fixed effects method, yet neither Kumbhakar 
(1990) nor Battese & Coelli (1992) proposed estimating the models in a random effects 
framework employing the ML method. Therefore, they needed to assume the independence 
of inefficiency and impose distributional assumptions on the composite error which is 
defined as 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅(𝑡)𝑢𝑖. These assumptions are 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) and 𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) where 𝑢𝑖 
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has a truncated normal distribution. If these assumptions are correct, it would be possible 
to disentangle inefficiency from technical change, which was a shortcoming in other time-
varying models. 
 
One of the limitations of the Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese & Coelli (1992) time-varying 
models is that they assume inefficiency is driven by time in the same manner for all firms, 
and that the efficiency ranking of firms within the sample is therefore the same over time. 
Another limitation might arise from the fact that there might be non-stochastic exogenous 
factors which are observable during production process are likely to exert influence on 
efficiency of firms. Therefore, the model allowing both environmental variables and time 
effects to interact with the inefficiency component might increase the efficiency of 
estimators. We now investigate the model, proposed by Battese & Coelli (1995), 
accommodating these cases. 
 
iii. The Battese and Coelli (1995) model 
The models proposed by Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Huang & Liu (1994) in Section 
4.4.3 allow non-stochastic environmental variables to directly affect the inefficiency 
component of the stochastic frontier. These models were originally developed in the 
context of cross-sectional data. Then they were extended to panel data by the Battese & 
Coelli (1995) model (hereafter BC95) which allows not only non-stochastic environmental 
variables, but also time effects to affect the inefficiency component.  
 
The BC95 model of the stochastic frontier production function for panel data is specified 
as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖𝑡 = ln⁡(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.34) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a vector of non-stochastic environmental variables with an intercept and 𝜃 is a 
vector of unknown parameters to estimate. The 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑠 is assumed to be independently but not 
identically distributed, such that 𝑢𝑗𝑡  is obtained by truncation at 0 of the normal 
distribution as 𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃, 𝜎𝑢
2) . The statistical noise is assumed to be normally 
distributed with 0 mean and constant variance 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). The random error variable, 
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𝑤𝑖𝑡 , is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with 0 mean and variance 
𝑤𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑤
2), such that the truncation point is at⁡−𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃, so that  𝑤𝑖𝑡 ≥ −𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃, which in 
turn guarantees  𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.   
 
The log likelihood function of the BC95 model is a generalisation of Stevenson's (1980) 
truncated-normal distribution model where the constant mean μ is exchanged with the 
variable mean 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃. The unknown parameters of the BC95 model (β, 𝜃⁡, ⁡𝜎𝑢
2, 𝜎𝑣
2) can be 
estimated using the ML method. Then the estimated parameters can be used to predict 
firm-specific technical efficiency, which is shown as: 
 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒
(−𝑢𝑗𝑡) = 𝑒(−𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃−𝑤𝑖𝑡). (4.35) 
The conditional expectation of technical efficiency, 𝑒(−𝑢𝑖𝑡) , is specified by Battese & 
Coelli (1993) as: 
 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑒
−𝑢𝑖𝑡) =
Ф(
𝜇∗
𝜎∗
− 𝜎∗) 𝑒
−𝜇∗+
1
2𝜎∗
2
Ф(
𝜇∗
𝜎∗
)
. (4.36) 
 
where Ф(. )  stands for the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution, 𝜎 𝑣
2
 is the estimated variance of the statistical noise 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ; 𝜎 𝑢
2
 is the estimated 
variance of the inefficiency component 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ; 𝜇∗ = (1 − ?̂?)𝜇 + 𝛾 𝜀 ; 𝜎∗ = (?̂?(1 − ?̂?)𝜎 
2)
1
2 ; 
𝜎 2 = 𝜎 𝑢
2 + 𝜎 𝑣
2
; ?̂? =
𝜎 𝑢
2
𝜎 2
; 𝜇 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜃  is the expected value of the inefficiency component 
derived from the estimators of the 𝜃-vector in equation (4.34). After obtaining the technical 
inefficiency, the partial effect of each non-stochastic environment variable on technical 
inefficiency can be investigated by employing the formula proposed by Battese & Coelli 
(1993). 
 
The advantages of the BC95 model compared to the Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Huang & 
Liu (1994) models are that it accounts for both environmental and time effects on 
inefficiency and the specification of the model allows the estimation of change in 
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production technology and efficiency of firms. The BC95 model can be estimated 
simultaneously in a single-step using ML; this allows one to estimate the parameters of the 
cost function, the inefficiency estimates, and the potential correlates of bank inefficiency 
while avoiding the bias and inefficiency problems of two-step methods (Wang & Schmidt, 
2002; Coelli et al., 2005; Simar & Wilson, 2007). ML estimation seeks to maximise the 
log-likelihood function to derive the parameter estimations. Due to these novelties, this 
thesis will apply the BC95 model to investigate how the shifts in the regulatory 
environment influences the cost efficiency of Turkish banks. 
 
4.5 Non-parametric frontier efficiency approaches 
Non-parametric methods rely on mathematical linear programming tools to construct the 
efficiency frontier and then measure efficiency of a firm as a radial distance from this 
frontier. In other words, unlike many parametric methods involving specification of a 
functional form for the frontier and distributional assumptions about statistical noise and 
inefficiency, these approaches neither impose a functional form for the production process 
nor distributional assumptions on inefficiency. Moreover, widely used deterministic non-
parametric methods such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposal Hull 
(FDH) methods do not account for statistical noise and hence attribute deviations from the 
constructed efficiency frontier as inefficiencies. Since the DEA has been extensively 
employed in the frontier efficiency literature, this approach will be briefly discussed below. 
 
The DEA uses linear programming techniques to construct the efficient frontier and does 
not require a choice of functional form for the frontier or any distributional assumptions on 
inefficiency. Inefficiency scores are measured as deviations from the frontier, with no 
allowance made for statistical noise. The method was first introduced by Charnes et al., 
(1981; 1978) who contended that an input oriented model with constant returns to scale 
and the technical inefficiency for the i-th firm can be derived by solving the linear 
programming (LP) problem: 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜗,𝜇𝜗 (4.37) 
                                                           st          −𝑞𝑖 + 𝑄𝜇 ≥ 0, 
                                                                        𝜗𝑥𝑖 − 𝑋𝜇 ≥ 0, 
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                                                                                     𝜇 ≥ 0, 
 
where 𝑞𝑖 is a (K×1) vector of outputs for the i-th firm (i=1,2,….,I), 𝑥𝑖 is a (L×1) vector of 
inputs for the i-th firm, Q is a (K×1) matrix of outputs for I, and X is a (L×1) matrix of 
inputs for I, .⁡𝜇 is a (1×1) vector of constants and 𝜗 is a scalar that will be estimated. The 
LP problem above should be solved for I times to acquire estimates of each firm in the 
sample. Each LP generates estimates for 𝜗 and 𝜇. On the one hand, the 𝜗 stands for the 
estimation of technical efficiency for the i-th firm and these estimates range between 0 and 
1 where 1 indicates the firm is technically efficient. On the other hand, the vector 𝜇 defines 
the projected point (𝑄𝜇, 𝑋𝜇) against which efficiency measures of the i-th firm is obtained. 
This projected point represents the linear combination of all the observed data points in the 
sample. In other words, this projected point is an efficient frontier set by firms exhibiting 
best practices and the efficiency levels of other firms that are not on this frontier are then 
assigned according to their distances to this efficient frontier.  
 
4.6 Comparison of parametric and non-parametric approaches 
There are several advantages leading many practitioners to adopt the DEA approach in 
their analyses. First, this approach is a computationally easy method and less data 
demanding. Moreover, it can be undertaken without knowing the deterministic connections 
between outputs and inputs. In other words, it does not require any assumptions concerning 
the functional form of the production process or with the distribution of component errors. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that this method enables one to avoid the issues associated 
with model sensitivity and functional instability. Yet this method is not without caveats. 
The primary disadvantage is its deterministic nature; that is, this method cannot account 
for the statistical noise stemming from luck, data issues, and other measurement issues. 
This translates into the fact that this method is sensitive to outliers and treats any 
deviations from the estimated efficient frontier as inefficiency. The deterministic nature 
also prevents one to undertake statistical tests on estimation results. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the concept of efficiency and frontier efficiency before 
reviewing non-parametric and parametric approaches used to measure it. A brief revision 
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has been made on the most widely used non-parametric method, DEA. In particular, this 
chapter has elaborated on the SFA method and a number of its extensions, based on the 
considerations of our research focus. It has also compared the relative merits of the DEA 
and the SFA. Overall, it can be inferred from this review that the SFA model is more 
flexible and arguably takes a better account of exogenous environmental factors. Yet there 
is no theoretical foundation for suggesting one method over another, indicating that the 
decision of the method and/or model should be given on a case-to-case basis.  
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Chapter 5  
The Impact of Regulatory Reforms on the Cost Efficiency of Turkish 
Banks 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter empirically investigates the impact of a deregulation-prudential re-regulation 
framework on the characteristics of cost structure and on the ownership-cost efficiency 
relationship. Moreover, this study also explicitly accounts for the recent heavy penetration 
of foreign banks on the cost efficiency of Turkish banks. Let us summarise at this stage 
what we believe are the main contributions of our work to the existing literature in more 
detail. 
 
First, we start by investigating the impact of the regulatory reforms on banking cost 
characteristics related to the cost efficiency and production technology enabling a bank to 
reduce cost of production. As expounded in Chapter 2, the regulatory reform process in 
Turkish banking comprised of two stages: the first stage44 consisted of the deregulation of 
the sector aimed at increasing its competitiveness (1988-2001);45 the second stage (post-
2001) 46  shifted the emphasis onto the stability of the banking system by introducing 
restructuring programmes as well as prudential re-regulation and supervision policies. 
Despite its relevance and complexity and the potentially important lessons for countries in 
similar positions, very little work has been carried out on Turkey. Specifically, the 
empirical studies investigating the regulatory reforms and performance of Turkish banks 
have provided rather mixed results (for a review of literature, see the Sections 3.2.2 and 
                                                 
44 The main policy focus of the regulatory authorities in the period before 2001 was the deregulation of 
Turkish banking market; therefore, the authorities overlooked the prudential regulation and supervision of the 
banking sector (see Section 2.3) 
45 As we mentioned earlier, although the financial deregulation policy was initiated in 1980, the liberalisation 
of interest rates on deposits and loans was short-lived due to the banking sector induced crisis in 1982, 
resulting in re-regulation of interest rates by the CBT until 1988. Since the liberalisation of interest rates is 
one of the fundamental components of the deregulation policy, we start our empirical analysis in 1988 since 
then interest rates have been determined under free market conditions. 
46 After 2001, the regulatory authorities implemented the restructuring programme along with a prudential 
regulation and supervision programme that is compatible with international standards, these policy 
implementations has indicated that ensuring stability has been the focus of the policies undertaken in this 
period. 
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3.3.2 of Chapter 3). Moreover, the established literature examining this relationship tends 
to focus either on the pre-2001 period when the policy focus was deregulating banking 
sector or the post-2001 period when stability-oriented prudential re-regulations was at the 
centre of policy reforms. That is, despite the fact that the banking authorities have adopted 
a deregulation and concomitant prudential re-regulation framework, there is need for more 
study to shed light on the effects of the deregulation-prudential re-regulation framework on 
cost characteristics. To the author’s knowledge only one empirical study47 merges these 
two periods (1990-2007), yet it adopts a non-parametric approach to measure performance 
and does not explicitly account for changes in regulatory reforms. Given Turkish banks 
suffered from financial crises and were exposed to regulatory changes during this period, 
using a non-parametric approach might lead to biased estimations. This is because this 
method assumes away statistical noise in data and fails to successfully account for 
environmental impacts on estimated inefficiency (Liu and Tone, 2008). This study attempts 
to handle this issue by employing a parametric approach. Moreover, their sample dataset 
includes only the banks that consistently operated during their sample period. This in turn 
is likely to cover only the best-performing banks, concealing the true nature of the banking 
sector and is therefore likely to suffer from survivorship bias (Carhart et al., 2002). This 
study instead includes both surviving and failing banks. Unlike any of the existing 
literature, we undertook a rigorous process of data adjustments to homogenise the dataset 
before and after the accounting reporting changes were introduced. Our very long dataset 
spanning from 1988 to 2016 puts us in an ideal position to isolate and investigate the 
impact of the shift in regulatory reforms on cost characteristics and to evaluate to what 
extent financial deregulation is conditional on a quality and proper implementation of 
prudential re-regulation and supervision of the banking system. This improves the quality 
of the resulting policy recommendations and deals with the limitations of former research 
based on insufficient data. This study also explicitly takes into account risk, loan quality 
and the off-balance sheet (OBS) items when we estimate stochastic cost frontier, which 
have been overlooked by the existing empirical literature on Turkish banking as discussed 
in Chapter 3.  
 
                                                 
47 Fukuyama and Matousek (2011). 
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Second, this study expands the current literature by scrutinising the ownership-cost 
efficiency relationship in the context of these reforms to find out the potentially different 
reactions of different ownership structures to the changes in the regulatory reforms. Hardly 
any study investigates to what extent the changes in the regulatory environment affect the 
performance of various ownerships differently. However, it is argued that different 
ownerships tend to react with different speeds to the change of regulatory environment 
(Zhao et al., 2010). Therefore, the other aim of this chapter is to contribute to the literature 
by empirically examining the impact of the regulatory reforms on the cost efficiency-
ownership relation. Third, the effect of the recent wave of foreign bank penetration on the 
performance of Turkish banks has not been widely explored. To the author’s knowledge, 
no other study has yet to account for the impact of this penetration on the cost efficiency of 
Turkish banks. 
 
In summary, this chapter attempts to address the following research questions: 
1) What is the pattern in the production technology in a changing regulatory environment? 
2) What is the cost efficiency trend for Turkish banks in a changing regulatory 
environment? 
3) Do various ownership structures react with different speed and direction to the shift in 
policy focus? 
4) Does the recent wave of foreign bank entry exert an influence on cost efficiency? 
 
Our results indicate that the banking industry experienced technological regress during the 
whole period, yet this is part of a general convex pattern indicating that technological 
regress is slowing down, namely because there are some improvements in production 
technology over time. This may also mirror that overall the average banks may find it 
easier to operate efficiently. The characteristics of cost efficiency are overall significant 
and show a general non-monotonic trend over time. More specifically, the cost efficiency 
gains realised during the 1988-1993 and 1995-1997 periods in the pre-2001 era. This goes 
hand-in-hand with deregulatory reforms and also with the worsening of the frontier as 
explained before. In the post-2001 period, cost efficiency gains were realised during 2002 
and 2007, which can be partly explained by the change in policy focus. The increase in 
efficiency slows down after 2007, indicating that the banks have yet to adjust to the new 
regulatory environment and to benefit from efficient production technologies. Our results 
also show the existence of an ownership impact on the level and trend of cost efficiency. 
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That is, domestic private and foreign banks outperformed state banks in the pre-2001 
period when the policy focus was on deregulation. In the post-2001 period, when the 
policy focus moves to stability, domestic private banks are still the best performers, 
indicating that they are better equipped to cope with prudential re-regulation. Surprisingly, 
foreign banks start to lose their initial efficiency advantage in a more regulated 
environment. The heavy penetration of foreign banks since 2005 appears to have no 
significant impact on the cost efficiency of the banking sector. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the applied 
methodology and data issues, including the specification of empirical cost frontier model 
and inefficiency model. Section 5.5 presents the empirical estimation of the stochastic cost 
frontier model, hypothesis tests and discussion of the results. Section 5.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5.2 Methodology  
To answer the research questions pointed out above, a stochastic cost frontier following 
Battese and Coelli (1995) (BC95) is modelled and estimated simultaneously with the 
determinants of cost inefficiency by employing a one-step Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation. This not only allows us to examine the evolution of cost efficiency but also 
helps us to shed light on the association between ownership and inefficiency. The technical 
details of the SFA approach and BC95 model have been expounded in Chapter 4. 
 
The first step of estimating a stochastic cost frontier is to specify a functional form. This 
study opts for the translog functional form, since this functional form can accommodate 
multiple output cases without necessarily violating the curvature conditions, which is an 
advantage for this study defining three output variables (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). In 
addition, as discussed in Section 4.5.1 the translog functional form offers advantages such 
as being flexible without leading to a further loss of degrees of freedom and making fewer 
assumptions than alternative forms. 
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5.3 Identifying input and output variables 
Following the specification of the cost frontier based on the translog cost function, one 
needs to identify the input prices and output variables. The identification of the variables is 
made based on the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977).48 The underlying 
theoretical assumption of this approach is that banks are accepted as intermediators of 
financial services; accordingly, they collect deposits, employing labour and capital, then 
transform these deposits into loans and other earning assets. We employ a three-output and 
two-input specification, briefly shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Definition/computation of input and output variables 
Variable Notation 
Definition/Computation of 
Variable 
Total Cost TC 
Interest expenses + non-interest 
operating expenses 
Outputs   
Net loans (LOANS) Y1 Gross loans - NPLs 
Other earning assets (OEA) Y2 Total of securities and other 
liquid assets 
Fees and commissions received (FEES) Y3 Proxy for off-balance sheet 
activities 
Inputs   
Price of loanable funds (PFUND) W1 Interest expenses / (Deposits + 
other borrowed funds) 
Price of non-interest operating expenses 
(POPEX) 
W2 Non-interest operating expenses 
/ total assets 
 
 
The first output is the book value of performing loans (LOANS), obtained by subtracting 
NPLs from total loans. We do this to avoid overestimating the volume and quality of loans 
provided by Turkish banks (Girardone et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2010). This is especially 
crucial for the Turkish banking case, as the banks suffered from high levels of NPLs in 
particular during the domestic twin crises, as discussed in Section 2.4. It should be noted 
that the empirical studies investigating the efficiency of Turkish banks have rarely 
accounted for the NPLs. To our knowledge, only two studies (Akın et al., 2013; Fethi et al., 
                                                 
48  Kenjegalieva et al. (2009) find that although the efficiency levels differ across the intermediation, 
production and profit approaches, change in positions of the banks relative to the mean is miniscule across 
the three approaches. 
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2012) used net loans as one of the outputs. This is a serious limitation of the existing 
literature since Turkish banks - in particular state banks - carried large NPLs and not 
accounting for these losses will overestimate banks’ efficiency (Denizer et al., 2000; 
Özkan-Günay et al., 2013). The second output is other earning assets (OEA), which 
aggregates public sector debt securities, securities representing a share in capital, other 
marketable securities (i.e. total financial assets (securities)), and other liquid assets 
including due from banks and other financial institutions.49 The third output is received 
fees and commissions50 (FEES) that is included as a proxy for the non-traditional OBS. 
This is a crucial inclusion since Turkish banks’ business focus has significantly shifted 
from traditional on-balance sheet activities to non-traditional OBS, especially after 2001 
(see Section 2.6) and this has been overlooked in the Turkish banking efficiency literature. 
This variable reflects the scale of this shift  and  its exclusion would lead to biased cost 
efficiency estimates (Clark & Siems 2002; Isik & Hassan 2003b; Lozano-Vivas & 
Pasiouras 2010).51 
 
Our two inputs are chosen to match the characteristics of the outputs selected. The first 
input is non-interest operating expenses, which aggregates the costs associated with labour, 
                                                 
49 Interbank money market replacement accounts could not be included due to the many missing values, as 
well as measurement and reporting errors. Given its miniscule scale, we trust the omission to be insignificant. 
50 Including non-interest income (as a proxy for the OBS) as one of the outputs is crucial from an empirical 
point of view to avoid biased cost efficiency estimates, given the increasing volume of it. Non-interest 
income is defined as the sum of net fees and commission income/expenses, dividend income, net trading 
profit/loss, and other operating income reported in the income statements of Turkish banks. However, since 
many banks suffered from huge trading losses before 2001 in particular, this definition of non-interest 
income leads to negative total values, preventing us from undertaking logarithmic transformations. In 
addition, due to changing accounting principles after 2002, the trading profit/loss account reports net values 
rather than showing profit and loss separately, with the exception of fees and commissions which are still 
reported as having been received and paid separately. As a consequence of this we cannot include trading 
income in our non-interest income measure and we only take fees and commissions received as a proxy for 
non-interest income and fees and commissions paid as other operating expenses. This practice is adopted 
because some banks’ net fees and commissions are negative during the twin crises; therefore, we could not 
take into account net fees and commissions without separating them into received and paid fees and 
commissions. A similar practice is adopted by Yildirim (2002). Lastly, the fees and commissions account is 
the biggest in scale among the non-interest income variables, which makes it reasonable to use as a proxy for 
a non-interest income account. 
51 Although it is not possible to categorise the fees and commission income variable with respect to its 
source, it is normal practice to expect this income to be generated by off-balance sheet activities alone (Clark 
and Siems, 2002). This prevents us from suffering from a potential double counting issue that would arise if 
part of it came from balance sheet items already captured by other output variables. Our approach of using 
both fees and commission income and other earning assets is also followed by, for example, Lozano-Vivas 
and Pasiouras (2010),  Lieu et al.(2005) and  Zhao et al.( 2010), Casu et al. (2013). 
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physical capital and other operating expenses; its relative price (POPEX) is calculated as the 
ratio of  total operating expenses associated with these inputs to total assets. 52  Total 
loanable funds is the second input and it aggregates deposits and funds borrowed; its 
relative price (PFUNDS) is given by the ratio of total interest expenditure on loanable funds 
to the total loanable funds.53 Finally, the dependent variable total cost (TC) is given by the 
sum of interest and non-interest operating expenses.  
 
5.3.1 Dataset 
The data used in this study is obtained from the Banks Association of Turkey’s data base 
named “Data Query System” and from the annual periodicals (so called “Banks in 
Turkey”) issued by the same institution. This database has a more exhaustive sample and 
spans a longer period compared to commercially available databases such as 
BankScope/Orbis. The unconsolidated balance sheets are used to lessen the probability of 
aggregation bias of accounts (Manlagñit, 2011). We focus on commercial deposit banks 
and exclude four banking groups since their structures and objectives are expected to be 
different. These are Islamic banks, development and investment banks,54 foreign banks 
operating as a single branch55 and banks under the deposit insurance fund.56 
 
                                                 
52 Bank efficiency studies tend to separate the price of labour (the ratio of personnel expenses to number of 
employees) and the price of other operating expenses. We could not adopt this practice because changes in 
the accounting practice (the reporting of personnel expenses and the content of other operating expenses were 
changed) made the distinction impossible. We followed instead the suggestions of the BAT and adopted a 
unified accounting system that aggregates non-interest operating expenses, including costs associated with 
labour, physical capital and other operations. The aggregate measure was subject to negligible changes, 
allowing us to use this variable as a total. 
53
 (a) Deposits, (b) funds borrowed from banks and other financial institutions, (c) interbank funds, (d) 
securities issued have been reported as loanable funds in the balance sheet of Turkish banks. However, (c) 
the interbank funds and (d) the securities issued have many observations recorded as zero as well as having 
many missing values in the sample period. To ensure consistency of the dataset over time and to avoid 
measurement issues we do not include these to the loanable funds account. Moreover, on average 90-95% of 
the reported loanable funds account are composed of the (a) deposits and (b) funds borrowed from banks and 
other financial institutions, indicating that these two accounts can be used as a proxy for the loanable funds 
account. 
54 Development banks obtain funds mostly from either governments or international organisations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank in order to extend loans for medium- or long-run investments. 
55  Foreign banks operating on a single branch basis are excluded since their structures and customer 
portfolios are different and they generally face very low initial start-up costs and asymmetric information. 
56  Banks under the SDIF are excluded as they are being restructured and therefore do not work on a 
conventional banking basis. 
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One of the novelties of this dataset is that, unlike any other studies investigating the 
efficiency of Turkish banks, the period of analysis runs from 1988 to 2016, allowing us to 
investigate the long-term impacts of structural changes and policy shifts on the cost 
characteristics and ownership-efficiency relation in Turkish banking sector. Yet such a long 
time span of course presented us with some serious challenges in the construction of our 
dataset. First, as we specified in footnotes in 44-54, changes in accounting reporting led us 
to make necessary adjustments to obtain an homogenised dataset. Secondly, banks adopted 
inflation accounting57 in 2003 and 2004 due to the hyperinflation of the period and this 
might create distortions (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011). However, there is not a clear 
way mentioned in the literature of showing how one can avoid the possible distortion 
driven by inflation accounting58 and neither does the Bank Association of Turkey disclosed 
pre- and post- adjustment dataset. Therefore, we refer to the Turkish banking efficiency 
papers59 of 2003 and 2004 when the financial data was adjusted for hyperinflation with 
other years. This indicates that a dataset including these years have been used for 
estimation, implying that it is an accepted practice in the Turkish banking efficiency 
literature. Moreover, we undertake a comparison estimation to find out whether our 
empirical analysis might have suffered from the inflation accounting practice. That is, we 
estimate the same model with the same data for the period 1988-2002 and then for 1988-
2004, resulting in two estimations for two different periods. A significant difference in the 
estimated parameters of the two models would in turn signal that the inflation accounting 
practice distorted the consistency of the series, stopping us generating a dataset starting 
from 1988 to 2016, covering the years 2003 and 2004 (see Appendix 5.2). The third 
challenge that came with the dataset is that the number of banks significantly changed 
during the estimation period. This is because some of them were acquired by domestic or 
                                                 
57  Inflation accounting involves recalculating the financial amounts of the non-monetary assets by 
multiplying them with the calculated adjustment rate to show their real values at the time when the financial 
statements are presented (Arsoy and Gucenme, 2009). Inflation adjustment was firstly applied at the end of 
2003 and was ended after 2004 due to favourable economic environment and decreasing inflation rate, 
authorities decided that inflation accounting method would not be implemented in 2005. The financial 
statements of the companies began to give correct, reliable and comparable information (Arsoy and 
Gucenme, 2009). 
58 It is argued that the denomination of variables in US dollars would eliminate the adverse effect of  inflation  
on real magnitudes and this would mean direct adjustment of variables for inflation (Isik and Hassan, 2002a). 
Turkish economy suffered from hyper-inflation between 2002-2004, led firms including banks to adopt 
inflation accounting that could cause difficulties to provide an unbiased comparison of the results. Yet we 
find that the denomination of variables in US dollar or in real Turkish Lira does not change the estimation 
results (see Appendix 5.3). 
59 see Fukuyama and Matousek (2011); Assaf, Matousek and Tsionas (2013); Özkan-Günay, Günay and 
Günay (2013); Yildirim (2014). 
109 
 
foreign banks, some of were forced to merge with other banks or were taken over by the 
SDIF since these banks failed and their operating permission were revoked. This study 
treats the merger and acquisitions in a way that banks’ pre-merger or pre-acquisition 
financial data was treated separately, with the combined post-merger or post-acquisition 
financial data for the merged or acquirer bank. Concerning the banks taken over by the 
SDIF, it includes these banks’ data until the year when the transfer to the SDIF was 
realised. This is because while those banks were commercial banks with the aims of cost 
minimising and profit maximising, once they were undertaken by the SDIF whose aim is to 
restructure the banks that were in deficiency, or to facilitate their sales in full or in part, or 
to liquidate them, instead of operating them as normal commercial banks. Therefore, the 
dataset is an unbalanced panel of 51 banks between 1988 and 2016, totalling 860 
observations. 60 They were either in operation in each year during the sample period or 
operated for at least four consecutive years within this period in the Turkish banking sector. 
All the bank-level data are in millions Turkish Lira and they are adjusted to real values 
using the consumer price index (CPI) with 1998 as the base year. 
 
We now provide descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs. Firstly, Table 5.2 shows the 
total cost (TC), input prices (PFUNDS and POPEX), and ratios showing the composition of the 
total costs. The table shows that TC slightly increased from 1988 to 1996, but it showed a 
sharp rise from 1996 to 2001. This increase was partly due to the significant increase in the 
price of deposits due to the removal of controls over deposit interest rates and adverse 
repercussions of economic instabilities in the late-1990s. It can be seen from the table that 
PFUNDS doubled from 1996 to 2001, while the POPEX presented a slight increase during the 
same period. The trend was reversed in total cost and prices of inputs after 2001, since they 
presented a steep decrease from 2001 to 2005, which can be seen as a positive sign of 
reduction of expenses. Yet this reduction trend did not last long for the TC after 2005, 
although the PFUNDS and the POPEX tended to persist their declining trends after 2001. This 
controversy might be partly caused by the shift in the policy focus from deregulation to 
prudential re-regulation in the aftermath of the twin crises. That is, as discussed in Section 
2.6, Turkish banks have faced with stricter prudential re-regulations after 2001 and have 
been subjected to an increase in compliance costs due to the efforts to adapt to the new 
regulatory environment. Therefore, post-2001, non-interest expenses have started to 
                                                 
60 All yearly observations refer to the end of December of each year, which is the financial reporting date. 
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comprise almost half of the total costs, changing the composition of total cost and thus is 
likely to contribute to the increase in total cost despite a drop in the prices of inputs. 
 
Table 5.2 Average values of total costs, input prices and ratios of cost components 
 
     Ratios  
 TC POPEX PFUNDS 
OPEX/ 
TC 
Interest 
paid on 
deposits/ 
TC 
Interest 
paid on 
other 
funds/  
TC 
1988 97.68 0.06 0.17 0.34 0.55 0.10 
1992 115.20 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.45 0.18 
1996 156.55 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.61 0.07 
1999 351.85 0.05 0.20 0.29 0.56 0.14 
2001 465.41 0.08 0.32 0.27 0.62 0.11 
2005 171.26 0.05 0.07 0.46 0.47 0.07 
2009 207.07 0.04 0.06 0.44 0.49 0.08 
2013 206.12 0.03 0.04 0.49 0.45 0.06 
2016 268.80 0.02 0.05 0.41 0.53 0.06 
Note: Monetary values are adjusted to real values using the CPI index with 1998 as the base year 
(millions, TRY). 
 
Secondly, Table 5.3 presents the mean values of outputs, net loans (LOANS), other earning 
assets (OEA), and fees and commissions received (FEES), respectively. With regards to the 
mean values of outputs, the average net loans (LOANS) were relatively stable between 
1988 and 2001. The mean performing loans presented an increasing trend in the post-2001 
period, stemming partly from recovery in the economy 61  and concomitant increase in 
demand for corporate and consumer loans. Interestingly, the average OEA did not show a 
constant trend like other outputs and instead fluctuated significantly over time. As 
                                                 
61 The Turkish economy showed a fast recovery in the aftermath of the twin crises by growing almost 7% on 
average between 2002 and 2007 and around 5% on average between 2002 and 2016. 
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discussed in Section 2.6, Turkish banks have preferred to invest more in these assets, 
which are relatively more liquid and less risky than loans. More specifically, they increased 
their investments in these assets when the economy was instable during 1996-2001 and 
when prudential re-regulations imposed stricter rules and upward risk-based capital 
requirements in the post-2001 period. Nonetheless, Turkish banks have started to reduce 
their investment in these assets after the global financial crisis. The mean value of fees and 
commissions income (FEES) constantly increased after 1992, mirroring the growing 
tendency of Turkish banks to engage in OBS activities.  
 
Table 5.3 Average of values of outputs 
 
 LOANS OEA FEES 
1988 187.29 143.91 10.27 
1992 204.07 146.77 5.60 
1996 287.71 205.04 6.75 
1999 321.57 708.87 12.00 
2001 208.15 282.00 23.28 
2005 658.20 465.44 29.46 
2009 1,213.25 656.75 38.64 
2013 2,446.43 595.24 47.21 
2016 3,185.95 595.32 53.89 
Note: Monetary values are adjusted to real values using the CPI index with 1998 as the base year 
(millions, TRY). 
 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the TC, input prices, and output variables at the 
industry level and per ownership category to be able to compare the scales of various 
ownerships within the industry. As it can be seen in the table, the state banks always 
account for the maximum values at industry level, whilst the shares of the foreign banks 
have the lowest values at industry level. The values of the domestic private banks tend to 
be close to the industry average, except their FEES value that is above the industry 
average, which in turn indicates that OBS activities are an important business activity for 
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domestic private banks. With regards to input prices, foreign banks have the highest mean 
price of non-interest operating expenses. This is an expected result, as argued in the 
literature, as these banks seek to attract skilled employees by offering them higher salaries 
and rely heavily on state-of-art technology and automation of banking services compared 
to their domestic counterparts, which in turn subject them to higher price of capital 
(Havrylchyk, 2006). However, they have the lowest PFUNDS in the industry, which could be 
due to their diversified funding bases, including access to liquidity from their parent banks 
as well as from the international interbank market (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014). This 
is in fact a crucial advantage for them, as one of the main challenges Turkish banks face is 
the high cost of domestic deposit funding. According to the IMF report (2016), the Turkish 
household saving rate is not only significantly below the average of upper middle-income 
countries, but considerably below the worldwide average. Therefore, banks have to pay up 
to attract more deposits. In addition, households tend to invest in short-term bank deposits, 
which in turn lead banks to offer even higher interest rates to attract and retain more 
household savings. 
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Table 5.4 Data descriptive statistics by ownership 
 
Variable Statistics Mean Stdev Min Max 
TC 
Industry mean 19,329.64 36,083.24 2.71 516,309.50 
State banks 55,849.06 54,627.22 306.72 288,862.70 
Domestic 
private 
14,217.08 18,621.56 85.73 82,383.79 
Foreign banks 10,177.26 41,973.91 2.71 516,309.50 
LOANS 
Industry mean 76,318.16 154,494.50 27.54 1,094,112.00 
State banks 161,933.60 210,757.10 30.43 1,094,112.00 
Domestic 
private 
70,197.96 156,877.50 82.19 950,377.80 
Foreign banks 39,799.08 62,919.15 27.54 280,253.10 
OEA 
Industry mean 35,952.30 83,797.38 34.70 1,530,049.00 
State banks 72,046.00 79,536.30 1,024.76 335,394.80 
Domestic 
private 
31,599.76 60,225.79 98.35 339,640.80 
Foreign banks 25,007.89 122,738.20 34.70 1,530,049.00 
FEES 
Industry mean 2,074.93 3,584.33 0.02 20,744.75 
State banks 2,968.89 2,473.25 6.86 9,699.69 
Domestic 
private 
2,255.56 4,188.17 0.02 20,744.75 
Foreign banks 1,067.10 1,861.85 0.20 8,660.72 
POPEX 
Industry mean 0.050 0.036 0.001 0.512 
State banks 0.046 0.038 0.012 0.238 
Domestic 
private 
0.051 0.030 0.015 0.295 
Foreign banks 0.051 0.046 0.001 0.512 
PFUNDS 
Industry mean 0.140 0.131 0.001 1.957 
State banks 0.217 0.149 0.036 0.815 
Domestic 
private 
0.140 0.110 0.020 1.691 
Foreign banks 0.096 0.146 0.001 1.957 
Note: Monetary values are adjusted to real values using the CPI index with 1998 as the base year 
(millions, TRY). 
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5.4 Model specification 
The estimable stochastic cost frontier is written in Eq. (5.1). TC is total cost, Yj are the 
three outputs and Wm are the two input prices, which we discussed in the previous section. 
We use Y1, Y2, Y3 to represent LOANS, OEA, and FEES respectively; while W1 and W2 
represent POPEX and PFUNDS. Additional control variables are also incorporated in the 
deterministic part of the cost frontier. Various studies suggest including risk factors, since 
the strategic decisions of banks concerning asset quality and capital composition influence 
the risk premium of their output and input prices (Berger and Mester, 1997; Brissimis et 
al., 2010; Casu et al., 2017; Glass et al., 2014; Hughes and Mester, 2013; Mester, 1996). 
This study incorporates two risk factors in our model: the equity capital to assets ratio 
(EAR) and loan loss provisions (LLP) to account for latent heterogeneity of banks. The 
EAR, which is measured as the ratio of shareholder’s equity (capital) to total assets,62 
accounts for the different risk preferences of banks. This might be an important practice for 
our case, since as discussed in Section 2.6, Turkish banks have largely managed to meet 
the minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirements compliant with Basel-I and 
Basel-II provisions, indicating that banking authorities have always paid great attention on 
this issue and one should thus account for the cost related repercussions. We do not have a 
priori expectations on the EAR variable sign. On the one hand, a higher capital ratio and 
lower leverage can signal a bank as a less risky institution, which could diminish its costs 
of borrowing on the international interbank market. On the other hand, a risk-averse bank 
may hold capital that is well above the minimum regulatory requirements, which translates 
into extra costs because capital is more likely to be more expensive than deposits. The 
LLP, measured as the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans, reflect a bank’s credit 
risk. Again, we do not have any a priori expectations. A higher LLP indicates higher risk of 
loan default, and thereby lower loan quality. This should increase the borrowing costs of a 
bank but could also translate into short-run cost savings for a bank, presumably driven by 
lower ex ante resources invested in screening and monitoring activities. That is, as 
suggested in the literature, this study both takes NPLs (loan quality) and LLP into 
consideration, thus allowing us to penalise the bad bank management of problem loans and 
                                                 
62 The risk adjusted capital ratio is obtained by dividing a bank’s shareholder equity (capital) to its assets 
weighted by risk. Since this ratio started to be released from 2005 in the Turkish banking sector, we have had 
to divide a bank’s equity capital to its total assets, compliant with Basel-I standards, to reflect the risk 
preferences of banks. 
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reward prudential perception in terms of loss provision set aside by banks (see Asmild and 
Zhu, 2016). We also include time trends (linear and quadratic) to allow for a non-
monotonic pattern of the changes in production technology; that is, this modelling allows 
the technological change effect to increase or decrease with time (depending on whether 
the quadratic term is positive or negative) (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition, the time trend 
also interacts with the input price and output variables to evaluate non-neutral and scale 
augmenting technological change, since technological biases may occur in the multiple-
input and multiple-output production cases (Altunbaş et al., 1999; Casu et al., 2013; Zhao 
et al., 2010). This can also lead to notable consequences in the context of a changing 
regulatory framework for banks (Asaftei, 2008). 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ⁡𝛼0 +∑𝛽𝑗
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+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
    
(5.1) 
 
As discussed earlier, the whole regulatory reform process in Turkish banking can be 
divided into two stages: in the first stage policies focused on deregulation aimed at 
increasing competition (1988-2001) and in the second stage (post-2002) policies focused 
on strengthening the stability of banks via implementing prudential re-regulations (Bakır 
and Öniş, 2010).  Therefore, to isolate and assess the impact of regulatory change on cost 
technology, this study introduces a bilateral policy shift dummy (PD). This dummy is set 
equal to 1 for the period 2002-2016, while it takes a value of 0 for 1988-2001. The dummy 
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is created to compare the periods before and after 2001, when the main regulatory changes 
took place. It should be noted that we could only capture the impacts of deregulatory 
policies and prudential re-regulations by modelling them as aggregate variables bundling 
all different individual deregulation and prudential re-regulation associated policies. In 
other words, we are not able to investigate the individual effects of specific deregulatory 
policies, which could lead to different and even conflicting results. Therefore, disclosing 
the effects of individual policies would in turn guide the banking authorities to adopt more 
tailor-made policies. Yet this has not been possible for our case because neither the 
Association of Turkish Banks nor the recognised literature building worldwide surveys on 
bank regulations (e.g. Abiad et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2013) have released data enable us to 
disentangle deregulatory or prudential re-regulations into their components. Thus, we stick 
with the aggregation method adopted in the literature (e.g. Zhao et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
following Gollop and Roberts (1983) and  Zhao et al. (2010) this study also allows the 
policy-shift dummy variable to interact with the input price and output variables. This 
practice enables us to evaluate the response of the best practices associated with the input 
mix and output composition stemming from the changes in policy focus rather than with 
the simple passing of time. 
 
Coming to the cost inefficiency model of Eq. 5.6, this is specified as:  
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑢𝑖𝑡 = ϕ0 + ϕ1𝐷𝐵 + ϕ2𝐹𝐵 + ϕ3𝑇 + ϕ4(𝑇 ∗ 𝐷𝐵) + ϕ5(𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝐵) + ϕ6𝑃𝐷
+ ϕ7(𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝐵) + ϕ8(𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐹𝐵) + ϕ9(𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝑇)
+ ϕ10(𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝑇 ∗ 𝐷𝐵) + ϕ11(𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝐵) + ϕ12𝑇
2 + ϕ13𝐶𝑅𝑆94
+ ϕ14𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑁 + ϕ15𝐶𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿 + ϕ16𝐹𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5.2) 
Eq. (5.2) includes 16 explanatory variables to reflect the impact of time, regulatory policy, 
ownership and their interaction on the cost efficiency of Turkish banks. The inclusion of 
the interactive terms eases the investigation of the inter-ownership cost efficiency 
differences and their change over the sample period. The crises dummies (CRS_94, CRS_ 
TWIN, CRS_GLOBAL) are defined as before. Since the Turkish banking sector has 
witnessed a dramatic increase in foreign bank entry since 2005, it in turn provides a unique 
laboratory for analysing the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on bank efficiency. 
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Therefore, in order to capture the possible cost efficiency impact of the heavy penetration 
of foreign banks, we introduce a bilateral dummy (FB_ENTRY). This dummy is set equal 
to 1 for the period 2005-2016, while it takes value of 0 for 1988-2004. We do not have any 
a priori sign expectation. This is because, as expounded in Section 3.4, the entry of foreign 
banks can exert competitive pressure on domestic banks, which in turn is expected to 
increase the efficiency of domestic banks as they need to operate more cost efficiently to 
retain their market shares. In addition, foreign banks are expected to introduce new 
technologies and superior management skills and products which are likely to result in 
performance increases. On the other hand, the penetration of these banks may impose extra 
costs on domestic banks, since foreign banks cherry-pick high quality (low default risk) 
borrowers, thus rendering domestic banks to extend loans to more risky customers, 
increasing their risk and management costs. In addition, domestic banks have to compete 
with reputable banks, which in turn impose extra costs. Furthermore, the entry mode of 
foreign banks also affects their performance. Therefore, since the entry mode of foreign 
banks into the Turkish market has been in the form of acquisition of domestic private 
banks rather than greenfield or de novo entrance, this might in turn influence the efficiency 
differently (Havrylchyk, 2006).  
 
Economic theory requires that the cost function should be homogenous of degree one in 
input prices. This is customarily imposed prior to estimation via the following additional 
parameter restrictions: 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∑𝛿m
2
m
= 1,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∑δmk
2
m
= 0⁡∀⁡k,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∑φmj
2
m
= 0 (5.3) 
 
We implement (5.3) by using the price of funds W2 to normalise total cost (TCit) and the 
price of capital (W1). Symmetry restrictions are also imposed such that  δmk = δkm and 
βjk =⁡βkj. 
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5.5 Empirical results 
The estimation of equations (5.1)-(5.2) is simultaneously performed via a one-step ML 
method63 using the software LIMDEP 10 and the results are presented in Table 5.5 below. 
Table 5.5 Maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic cost frontier and inefficiency model  
Ln(TC/PFUNDS) LnTC Parameter Coeff. 
Std. 
errors 
z-Stat. 
Intercept constant α0  1.174*** 0.25 4.62 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) lnw1
 δ1  0.781*** 0.07 12.01 
Ln(LOANS) lny1 β1  0.695*** 0.06 12.23 
Ln(OEA) lny2 β2  0.299*** 0.04 6.94 
Ln(FEES) lny3 β3  0.060 0.05 1.15 
Ln(LOANS)
2 
(lny1)
2 β11  0.034*** 0.00 21.24 
Ln(OEA)2 (lny2)2 β22  0.080*** 0.00 17.78 
Ln(FEES)
2 
(lny3)
2
 β33 -0.005** 0.00 -2.49 
Ln(LOANS)Ln(OEA) (lny1)(lny2) β12 -0.120*** 0.01 -16.60 
Ln(LOANS)Ln(FEES) (lny1)(lny3) β13  0.045*** 0.00 11.06 
Ln(OEA)Ln(FEES) (lny2)(lny3) β23 -0.037*** 0.01 -5.91 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)
2 
(lnw1)
2 δ11  0.149*** 0.01 18.50 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(LOANS) (lnw1)(lny1) ϕ11  0.001 0.01 0.24 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(OEA) (lnw1)(lny2) ϕ12 -0.001 0.01 -0.13 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(FEES) (lnw1)(lny3) ϕ13 -0.019** 0.01 -2.55 
T T θ1  0.028* 0.02 1.79 
T-square
 
T
2 θ11 -0.0003* 0.00 -1.70 
PD PD ϛ  0.399 0.29 1.40 
T Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) T lnw1 ὴ1 -0.006** 0.00 -2.40 
T Ln(LOANS) T lny1 χ1  0.004* 0.00 1.90 
 
                                                 
63 This chapter has specifically aimed at investigating the impacts of regulatory reforms on cost inefficiency 
over time and on the efficiency performance of different ownerships. Therefore, we needed a model where 
the exogenous environmental factor can be incorporated as a covariate of the inefficiency model and then 
estimate this extended model in a one-step estimation framework. To the author’s knowledge, panel data 
model estimators do not allow one to model the exogenous factors as covariates of inefficiency, preventing us 
from adopting these approaches. Thus, we used the ML estimation method and treated our dataset as pooled 
data, yet we sought to account for possible differences in technology among various ownerships and over 
time by incorporating risk factors, asset quality, and time trends into the deterministic part of the stochastic 
cost frontier model. Moreover, in Chapter 7, in which we empirically examine the effects of the regulatory 
reforms on bank competition, we will employ panel data estimators. 
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T Ln(OEA) T lny2 χ2 -0.002 0.00 -0.90 
T Ln(FEES) T lny3 χ3 -0.004** 0.00 -2.48 
PD Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) PD lnw1 ϑ1  0.108** 0.05 2.36 
PD Ln(LOANS) PD lny1 ρ1 -0.055 0.04 -1.24 
PD Ln(OEA) PD lny2 ρ2 -0.044 0.04 -1.14 
PD Ln(FEES) PD lny3 ρ3  0.086** 0.04 2.44 
LLP LLP τ2  1.531*** 0.10 14.95 
EAR EAR τ1 -0.900*** 0.11 -8.50 
Inefficiency model Parameter Coefficient 
Std. 
errors 
z-stats. 
Intercept constant 𝜙0  0.368 0.31 1.21 
DB DB 𝜙1 -0.762** 0.30 -2.54 
FB FB 𝜙2 -1.204*** 0.46 -2.62 
T T 𝜙3 -0.271*** 0.09 -2.93 
T*DB T*DB 𝜙4  0.019 0.03 0.68 
T*FB T*FB 𝜙5  0.024 0.05 0.44 
PD PD 𝜙6  10.969*** 2.71 4.05 
PD*DB PD*DB 𝜙7  4.683* 2.84 1.65 
PD*FB PD*FB 𝜙8 -0.282 1.56 -0.18 
PD*T PD*T 𝜙9 -0.622*** 0.20 -3.15 
PD*T*DB PD*T*DB 𝜙10 -0.330* 0.18 -1.84 
PD*T*FB PD*T*FB 𝜙11  0.014 0.10 0.14 
T
2 
T
2 𝜙12  0.015** 0.01 2.45 
CRS_94 CRS_94 𝜙13  0.677** 0.27 2.53 
CRS_TWIN CRS_TWIN 𝜙14  1.170** 0.50 2.36 
CRS_GLOBAL CRS_GLOBAL 𝜙15  0.566 0.35 1.60 
FB_ENTRY FB_ENTRY 𝜙16 -0.247 0.35 -0.71  
Variance parameters for compound error Parameter Coefficient 
Std. 
errors 
z-stats. 
Gamma γ  0.969*** 0.007 131.39 
Sigma-squared σ2  0.218*** 0.044 4.90 
Note: Number of observations:860; Log likelihood function= 383.048.⁡𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2, 𝛾 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎2; ***,**,* 
significant at 1%,5%,10% respectively. 
 
Before interpreting the estimated parameters in Table 5.5, we check the robustness of the 
model by undertaking a series of hypothesis tests concerning the nature of the cost frontier 
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model and the consistency of the cost function with its theoretical features using Wald 
tests. Lower levels of significance on the translog are quite common thanks to the presence 
of the quadratic and interactive terms. Therefore, tests undertaken on more than one 
parameter at a time are usually more reliable. These hypothesis tests control (1) the 
adequacy of a more restrictive Cobb-Douglas functional form, (2) the existence of 
technological change, (3) the existence of non-neutral and scale augmenting technology 
change, (4) the significance of a policy shift impact, (5) the significance of a policy shift 
impact on output composition and input mix, (6) if the production technology is 
homothetic, and (7) the overall significance of the inefficiency model. The null hypotheses 
of each of the above are shown as follows: 
 Hypothesis (1): The second-order coefficients in the translog cost function are zero, 
and therefore the Cobb-Douglass functional form is adequate to represent data. 
 Hypothesis (2): All coefficients involving the time trend (T) are equal to zero, 
hence there is no technical change related to time. 
 Hypothesis (3): The interactions between the T and the input prices and output 
quantities are equal to zero and therefore there is no non-neutral and scale 
augmenting technical change and time does not have an impact on output 
composition and input mix. 
 Hypothesis (4): All coefficients involving the policy shift dummy (PD) are zero, 
and thus the shift of policy focus has no effect on the estimated efficient cost 
function. 
 Hypothesis (5): The interaction between the PD and the input prices and output 
quantities are zero, i.e. the shift in the policy has no effect on output mix and input 
composition. 
 Hypothesis (6): The production technology is homothetic and thus the interactive 
terms of input prices and output quantities are equal to zero. 
 Hypothesis (7): All coefficients in the inefficiency model are jointly zero and thus 
the variables are not relevant in explaining cost inefficiency. 
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Table 5.6 Tests of hypotheses for estimated parameters of the translog cost function 
Null hypothesis (H0)  
Critical 
value 𝝌𝟐  
 
Decision (at the 1% 
significant level) 
 
(1) β11 = β22 = β33 = β12 = β13 = β23 = δ11 = ϕ11 = ϕ12 
= ϕ13 = θ11 = ὴ1 = χ1 = χ2 = χ3 = ϑ1 = ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 
= 0 
5152.10 Reject 
(2) θ1 = θ11 = ὴ1 = χ1 = χ2 = χ3 = 0 125.75 Reject 
(3) ὴ1 = χ1 = χ2 = χ3 = 0 25.31 Reject 
(4) ϛ = ϑ1 = ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = 0 34.05 Reject 
(5) ϑ1 = ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = 0 18.98 Reject 
(6) ϕ11 = ϕ12 = ϕ13 = 0 14.06 Reject 
(7) 𝜙⁡1=…= 𝜙⁡12 66.22 Reject 
Notes: Tests of hypotheses involves imposing restrictions on the parameters; that is, parameters of the 
estimated translog cost function are equal to zero. The tests are based on the Wald test. 
 
 
Based on the results of the various hypothesis tests above, we reject the hypothesis that the 
second-order coefficients in the translog cost function are zero and hence we reject the 
Cobb-Douglas and conclude that the translog fits the data more appropriately. We also 
reject the null hypothesis test that there is no technological change associated with time 
and there is no non-neutral and scale augmenting technical change present in the model. 
The policy-shift is also found to be relevant in having impact on costs and on output mix 
and input composition. The production technology is not homothetic. We also reject the 
null hypothesis test that all coefficients in the inefficiency model are jointly zero and thus 
confirm that the inefficiency correlates are relevant in explaining cost inefficiency.  
 
We also undertake the regularity tests whether our estimated translog cost frontier function 
possess the properties of a cost function. Since linear homogeneity and symmetry 
conditions were imposed prior to estimation and non-negativity of costs were already 
checked during data input we only test for monotonicity condition. The results of the test 
monotonicity conditions, requiring that observation-specific cost elasticity of outputs and 
inputs must be positive, are summarised in Table 5.7. However, we note a few violations in 
monotonicity conditions, although these violations represent a small percentage of the total 
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observations. Such minimal violations are common in the literature yet large number of 
violations raise concerns on the soundness of empirical results (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). 
We therefore confirm that the estimated translog cost function satisfies the regulatory 
conditions required by theory.  
 
Table 5.7 Monotonicity conditions of estimated translog cost function 
  Mean Number of violations of 
monotonicity conditions 
(i.e. cost elasticity <0) 
Violations 
represent % of 
total observations 
Cost elasticity 
with respect to 
outputs 
LOANS 0.583 2 0.2% 
OEA 0.325 26 3.0% 
FEES 0.077 75 8.7% 
Input price 
elasticities 
PFUNDS 0.336 61 7.1% 
POPEX 0.664 6 0.7% 
 
 
We will now simultaneously discuss the estimated parameters of the translog cost frontier 
in Table 5.5 and the estimated average cost elasticities of outputs and input prices in Table 
5.7. It can be inferred from the estimated cost frontier that most of the regressors 
associated with the LOANS, OEA and FEES as well as the normalised input price are 
significant at the 5% significance level and have expected signs. The ln (FEES), β3, is the 
only output variable that is not statistically significant, yet other FEES related variables are 
strongly significant. This might be due to the multicollinearity issues related with such a 
large number of explanatory variables. The elasticity of LOANS is almost two times higher 
than the elasticity of OEA and is almost seven and half times larger than the elasticity of 
FEES, emphasising the low cost associated with the investment in securities and 
generation of off-balance sheet services.  
 
Following Baltagi & Griffin (1988) and Altunbas et al. (1999), the impact of technical 
change on the cost function can be measured by the partial derivatives of the estimated cost 
function (5.1) with respect to time trend (T), as follows: 
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𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑇
= 𝜃1 + 𝜃11𝑇 +∑𝜒𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑚
2
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑡 
                                                    
(5.4) 
  
Equation (5.4) can be decomposed into three components, identifying the effect of: (1) 
pure technical change, 𝜃1 + 𝜃11𝑇; (2) scale augmenting technical change, ∑ 𝜒𝑗
3
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑖𝑡; 
and (3) non-neutral technical change, ∑ 𝛿𝑚
2
𝑚=1 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑡 . Pure technical change shows 
reductions in total costs obtainable holding constant the efficient scale of production 
necessary to produce any specific mix of outputs and the shares of each of the inputs in 
total cost. Scale augmenting technical change shows how changes in the efficient scale of 
operations affect total costs. If 𝜒𝑗>0 for all j, the scale of production minimising average 
cost for a given output mix is decreasing over time. Third, non-neutral technical change 
explains how changes in unit input price affect total costs. If 𝛿𝑚 > 0 for all m, the share of 
the cost of input m in total cost is increasing over time. 
 
To answer our second research question, we investigate the estimated cost function 
parameters of T and T2 since they show the economic characteristics of the production 
technology. The coefficient of the first-order time trend, θ1, is 0.028 (significant at 10%), 
whilst the coefficient of quadratic time trend, θ11, is -0.0003 (significant at 10%).
64 This 
result suggests that Turkish banks have still not fully benefited from any cost reductions 
stemming from pure technical progress during the sample period. Although the negative 
estimate of the quadratic time trend indicates that technological regress is slowing down 
over time, technological progress is not realised during the study period.65 This pattern 
partly stems from changes in regulatory policies, the heavy penetration of foreign banks 
realised after 2005, and the improvement of quality of service. As Zhao et al. (2010) point 
out for the case of India, it is possible that banks faced difficulties as they had to adjust to a 
high and rigid cost structure inherited from the financial repression period to the new 
operating environment of the financial deregulation period. In addition, prudential re-
                                                 
64 Lower levels of significance on the translog function models are common due to the presence of the 
quadratic and interactive terms (Zhao et al., 2010). 
65 The efficient cost function is estimated to have a maximum value with respect to pure technical change. 
Yet our result indicates that (0.028/2*0.0003=46.6) there is no parallel shift within the study period.  
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regulations aimed at fostering stability and minimising excessive risk-taking also impose 
higher costs. The finding that Turkish banks experienced technical regress with a likely 
decreasing pace over time might signal that they did not still manage to adjust to the new 
operating environment initiated by the deregulatory policies, which then worsened with the 
implementation of tighter prudential and supervision norms. This phenomenon is in fact 
pointed out by some empirical studies on Turkey. For example, Isik & Hassan (2002a) and 
Kasman (2002) suggest that Turkish banks enjoyed high profits in the 1990s thanks to the 
excess demand of the public sector, which enabled them to overlook technical advances, so 
that many of them did not feel the pressure to minimise costs, arguably culminating in 
technological regress. As Levine (1996) and Claessens & Van Horen (2014) point out, 
foreign banks with greater know-how and superior technologies can lead to improvements 
in a domestic banking sector’s technological development. Yet the negligible presence of 
foreign banks in the Turkish banking sector until the second half of the 2000s (see Section 
2.3) is probably also a relevant reason for experiencing technical regress. In addition, 
although foreign banks expanded their activities when Turkish authorities deregulated the 
banking sector, they nevertheless engaged in trade financing or gave out loans to well-
established or credit worthy firms, rather than expanding or entering into retail banking 
and lending to SMEs. Therefore, they have arguably had very little impact on commercial 
banking with respect to managerial skills and technical infrastructure (Fukuyama and 
Matousek, 2011). Parallel to this argument, a recent study investigating the impacts of 
foreign entry on the cost and profit performance in host country’s banking sector finds that 
the performance of the banking industry significantly improves when foreign banks 
provide domestic banks with assistance in retail banking and internal control respectively 
(Li et al., 2016). In other words, they potentially transfer technology and management 
skills and these spillovers enable the domestic bank to improve their production 
technology. Given the fact that foreign banks in Turkey have largely engaged in trade 
financing or given out loans to well-established or credit worthy firms, they arguably may 
not contribute significantly to the technological infrastructure of the banking sector. The 
result of technical regress of Turkish banks might reflect the improvement of quality of 
service over time. This is because production of high quality financial products and 
services requires extra costs, and cost based models might label such banks as cost 
inefficient unless the quality of output produced is accounted for in efficiency estimations 
(Deyoung and Nolle, 1996). Apparently, there is evidence regarding the effort Turkish 
banks have shown to improve their quality of output and services. For example, the 
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existing traditional banks of the Turkish banking industry have found themselves in a more 
intense competitive environment in the early years of banking deregulation; this in turn 
forced them to increase the quality of their services to strengthen their competitive viability 
(Isik and Hassan, 2003a; Yavas et al., 1997). In addition, there has been a significant 
increase in the adoption of internet banking services and in the number of Turkish banks 
offering internet banking to increase the quality of services (Ozdemir and Trott, 2009; 
Sanli and Hobikoğlu, 2015). Furthermore, the literature also suggests that foreign banks 
tend to produce their financial services with higher quality (Isik and Hassan, 2002b); given 
the heavy penetration of  foreign banks into the Turkish banking sector in particular after 
2005, this in turn might contribute to the continuation of the perceived technical regress 
trend.  
 
With respect to non-neutral technical change, the coefficient ὴ1 is negative and significant, 
this in turn indicates that the estimated efficient cost share of other non-interest operating 
costs reduces relative to borrowed funds over time. This is due largely to the consequence 
of the progressive reduction in excessive branches and employees of banks, in particular 
for state banks, started early on with the implementations of deregulation policies. 
Conversely, the coefficient of the price of borrowed funds is positive and significant,66 
indicating a corresponding increase in the share of interest costs in total costs. Although 
this is partly a direct consequence of the decline in the non-interest operating cost share, it 
does also indicate that Turkish banks have been exposed to the high cost of deposit 
funding, which was the case after the deregulation of deposit rates (see Section 2.3).67 As 
for the possible scale-augmenting technical change, χ1 is positive and insignificant, while 
χ2 and χ3 are negative yet only χ3 is significant. The overall minimum efficient production 
scale increases over time (i.e. χ1+χ2+χ3>0) but this is attributable only to the production of 
fee based income, as their coefficient of time variation, χ3, is negative and significant. This 
reflects the fact that larger banks (state and domestic private banks in the Turkish banking 
                                                 
66  Linear homogeneity of one degree in input prices was imposed prior to estimation by dividing TC (total 
observed cost) and w1 (price of non-interest operating cost) by w2 (price of borrowed funds) before taking 
logs. The coefficient of time trend with borrowed funds (w2) is ??? 
67
 See Section 4.2.2 and the positive interaction of LOANS with T in the frontier (albeit significant) which 
can also back up the increase in the cost of production over time. 
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case) have engaged more in off balance sheet business, leading to a reduction in the cost of 
production of non-core banking activities over time (See Appendix 5.1). 
 
Table 5.8 Output elasticities and scale economies 
 Pre-2001 
period 
(All banks) 
Post-2001  
period 
(All banks) 
Full sample 
(All banks) 
CELOANS 0.650 0.511 0.581 
CEOEA 0.200 0.459 0.330 
CEFEES 0.106 0.047 0.076 
Economies of scale 1.046 0.983 1.013 
Notes: Economies of scale is given by 1/(CELOANS+ CEOEA+ CEFEES) 
 
Cost efficiencies not only are affected by technological progress but also by scale 
economies. Economies of scale measure the relative change in a bank’s total cost for a 
given proportional change in all its outputs. Table 5.8 reports economies of scale in the 
Turkish banking industry with reference to the cost elasticities of outputs evaluated at the 
means. We observe that Turkish banking sector exhibits scale economies in the pre-2001 
period as the sum of the cost elasticity with respect to all outputs is less than one,68 while it 
shows diseconomies of scale in the post-2001 period. This might indicate that large banks 
have not enjoyed a cost advantage over the smaller banks in the post-2001 period.  
 
With regards to the impact of policy shift does not come as a one-off additional regulatory 
cost, when the regulatory policy focus changed from stimulating competition to 
emphasising prudential re-regulation as the insignificant coefficient of the dummy variable 
PD (ϛ = 0.396). Instead, it has affected the change in banks’ input mix and output 
composition. This in turn may mirror that banks did not undertake groundwork for the 
policy change. This might be because the shift to the stability-oriented regulatory reforms 
was not consultative and gradual; instead, they started to be implemented right after the 
twin crises rather than being announced in advance by the authorities (see Section 2.5). 
                                                 
68 Similar finding is also obtained by Kasman  (2002). 
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Therefore, banks could not take a proactive approach to the policy change. The opposite 
phenomenon is observed in the Indian banking sector where the banking authorities 
implemented banking reforms by adopting a gradual and consultative approach, which in 
turn enabled banks to be forward-looking and thus prepared themselves well in advance for 
regulatory changes (Zhao et al., 2010). The estimated cost share of non-interest operating 
cost to loanable funds increases as a result of the shift in policy focus, since ϑ1 is positive 
and significant. As discussed in Section 2.6, the increase in operating expenses might stem 
from increasing incremental compliance costs arising from banks’ efforts to adapt to the 
changes in the regulatory framework. The shift in policy focus seems to influence output 
composition in particular, inducing them to focus on their traditional business model of 
short-term lending and investment in government debt securities and Treasury bonds. This 
is because the loans (ρ1) and the other earning assets (ρ2) are negative yet only the latter is 
significant. This indicates an increase in the other earnings’ optimal scale of production, 
which might be due to the shift to the stability-oriented re-regulations post-2001, leading 
banks to invest in less risky activities such as government securities and lending to well-
established and credit-worthy firms (see Section 2.6). The positive and significant 
coefficient of FEES, ρ3, indicates a reduction in its optimal scale of production because of 
the shift in policy focus. This can be due to the introduction of a tighter prudential re-
regulation and supervision framework, which in turn should have lowered the best 
performers’ risk appetite. 
 
Turning to the control variables, the negative and significant coefficient of the equity asset 
ratio (EAR) suggests that higher equity ratios and thereby lower insolvency risks reduce 
the risk premium the bank has to pay, which in turn reduces the cost of borrowing (Berger 
and Mester, 1997). Given the fact that Turkish banks have always had the CAR above the 
minimum standards set by the authorities, demonstrated them as safe entities by lowering 
the insolvency ratio (see Section 2.6). The loan loss provisions coefficient on the other 
hand (LLP) have a positive and significant sign, indicating that lower expected loans 
quality is associated with higher bank cost, probably due to an increase in the cost of 
borrowing. This result might also be due to the fact that the twin crises led to outstanding 
increases in the NPLs ratio, which in turn forced banks to increase their provisions at high 
costs.  
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5.5.1 Discussing the characteristics of cost efficiency 
Turning to the characteristics of inefficiency, the test on the joint significance of the 
inefficiency effects (Table 5.6) suggests that inefficiency determinants are relevant in 
explaining cost inefficiency. This is also backed up by the statistically significant value of 
inefficiency, 𝛾 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎2=0.969 which is significant at 1% level.69 The characteristics of the 
estimated cost efficiencies, i.e. the average efficiency levels in industry and per ownership 
category, are presented in Figure 5.1. In addition, the partial effects of the coefficients of 
the determinants of inefficiency are presented in Table 5.9.70 The latter practice is adopted 
because the estimation presented in Table 5.5 only provides information on the direction of 
the effect of estimated inefficiency correlates on cost inefficiency. Therefore, to investigate 
the magnitude of the influence of these estimates on cost inefficiency, we also report the 
estimated marginal effects of each of the determinants of cost efficiency.  
 
                                                 
69 In case of a low and not significant inefficiency estimate, 𝛾, it is concluded that inefficiency is not relevant 
in contributing to the distance of the efficient frontier and thus all variations are owing to randomness and so 
OLS can be implied to the estimation. 
70 We use LIMDEP to calculate each marginal effect as 
𝝏(𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕⁡𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚)
𝝏𝑬𝒊𝒕
 based on Eq. (5.1): it is evaluated at 
the mean of each variable and interpreted as % change of cost efficiency due to a per unit change in 
inefficiency correlates. A positive sign suggests the determinants of inefficiency in Eq. (5.1) positively affect 
cost efficiency.  
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Figure 5.1 Average efficiency levels in industry and per ownership category 
 
 
The average estimated cost efficiency of the Turkish banking industry over the study 
period denotes a general non-monotonic pattern over time. Overall, the efficiency gains are 
realised in the period between 1988 and 1997, although this improvement is temporarily 
interrupted by the 1994 financial crisis which marginally led to a 0.59% drop in cost 
efficiency (see Table 5.9). This improvement goes hand-in-hand with the deregulation 
reforms and the technological regress making it easier for average banks to catch-up the 
best performing banks, in turn culminating in an increase in average cost efficiency levels 
of the banking industry during this period. Isik and Hassan (2003a), in investigating the 
impacts of financial deregulation on bank performance in Turkey, also find that 
productivity growth was mainly driven by efficiency increases; namely, inefficient banks 
are able to catch up with the best performers rather than technical progress. Between 1998 
and 2002, Turkish banks experienced a catastrophic drop in their cost efficiency levels, 
which can be explained by various factors. First, the Turkish economy was adversely 
affected by the financial crises that broke out in Russia and Asian countries in the late-
1990s, aggravating domestic economic activities and culminating in problems with loan 
repayments. Moreover, as discussed in 2.4, Turkish banks were prone to maturity risks, 
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which led to serious imbalances on the balance sheets of banks and resulted in the failure 
of five private banks in 1999.  
 
In addition, as expounded earlier, Turkey faced twin crises in 2000 and 2001, leading to 
further bank failures and downsizing in the banking sector. Worsening economic 
conditions also doubled non-performing loans. Finally, the sudden implementation of 
regulatory reforms consisting of restructuring process and prudential re-regulations 
imposed additional regulatory costs. As it can be seen in Table 5.9, the partial effect of the 
policy shift led to a drop of around 9% and 13% in the cost efficiency of state banks and 
domestic private banks respectively. After bottoming out, cost efficiency rebounds as of 
2002 and shows a steep increase up to 2006/07 before experiencing a slump in 2008 due to 
the global financial crisis, leading to a 0.46% drop in cost efficiency (see Table 5.9). This 
recovery probably stemmed from the regulatory development and sustained economic 
performance of Turkey after 2002 which had a positive impact on the banking sector and 
increasing confidence in the financial system in general. The efficiency rebounds as of 
2009 and increases marginally up to 2011, but this increase is not consistent throughout the 
rest of the study period. This is part of a more general convex pattern in cost efficiency as 
denoted by the coefficient of the quadratic time trend (see Table 5.9), indicating that 
improvement in performance slows down over time. Overall, average industry efficiency 
increases from 83.98% in 1988-2001 to 87.03% in 2002-2016. This could be due to both 
the shift in policy focus per se and by the fact that this enabled Turkish banks to benefit 
more from technological advancements under the new regulatory environment. 
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Table 5.9 Marginal effects of the determinants of cost efficiency 
 
Marginal Effects Parameter Partial effects 
Standard 
error 
t-value 
DB 𝜙⁡1 0.0064 0.0028 2.3000 
FB 𝜙⁡2 0.0100 0.0039 2.5800 
T 𝜙⁡3 0.0023 0.0008 2.7300 
T*DB 𝜙⁡4 -0.0002 0.0003 0.6600 
T*FB 𝜙⁡5 -0.0002 0.0005 0.4500 
PD 𝜙⁡6 -0.0935 0.0307 3.0400 
PD*DB 𝜙⁡7 -0.0404 0.0238 1.7000 
PD*FB 𝜙⁡8 0.0024 0.0132 0.1800 
PD*T 𝜙⁡9 0.0052 0.0020 2.5700 
PD*T*DB 𝜙⁡10 0.0028 0.0015 1.9100 
PD*T*FB 𝜙⁡11 -0.0001 0.0009 0.1400 
T2 𝜙⁡12 -0.0001 0.0001 2.2500 
CRS_94 𝜙⁡13 -0.0057 0.0022 2.5900 
CRS_TWIN 𝜙⁡14 -0.0099 0.0039 2.5400 
CRS_GLOBAL 𝜙⁡15 -0.0048 0.0030 1.5800 
FB_ENTRY 𝜙⁡15 0.0021 0.0029 0.7200 
 
It is also interesting to discuss to what extent various ownerships have reacted differently 
to the changes in policy focus. At the beginning of the sample period, both foreign banks 
(𝜙⁡2<0) and domestic private banks (𝜙⁡1<0) have significantly higher cost efficiency than 
public banks, a result in line with the previous findings of Isik & Hassan (2002) and Demir 
et al. (2005). Foreign banks’ performance reflects the expected superior management skills 
and higher quality customer base (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; Isik and Hassan, 
2002b), which enable them to better exploit the increasing functional autonomy and 
operational freedom of deregulation. In addition, domestic private and foreign banks’ 
superior efficiency generally is presumably due to their relatively smaller sizes, which 
might have been optimal, especially at times of macroeconomic and financial instability. 
Although both foreign and domestic banks outperform state banks at the beginning, they 
do not seem to achieve significant progress over time, as indicated by the insignificant 
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coefficients (𝜙⁡4 and 𝜙⁡5). This may suggest that private banks might have failed to adopt 
cost-reducing technology in reaction to the competitive pressures unleased by deregulation. 
Yet the state banks whose operating conditions were initially relatively weak compared to 
private banks, likely due to the cost structure and scale problems inherited from the pre-
deregulation period (𝜙⁡0), seem to improve their position (𝜙⁡3) during the period 1988-
2001. This indicates that they could also benefit from the deregulated regulatory 
environment. Moreover, some studies investigating efficiency in the Turkish banking 
sector draw similar conclusions, stating that state banks manifested superior technical 
efficiency improvements during the 1990s (Yildirim, 2002; Zaim, 1995). 
 
With regards to the change in policy focus, it seems that this shift negatively affects all 
ownership types but to different degrees. Specifically, both state and domestic private 
banks suffer the worse reduction in efficiency; this is because the marginal effects 𝜙⁡6 and 
𝜙⁡7 are negative and significant, indicating that the worsening for domestic private banks is 
larger than that of state banks. This may also state that the shift in policy focus imposed 
higher costs on private banks than state banks. On the other hand, the positive coefficient 
of foreign banks, 𝜙⁡8, might indicate that they have initially adapted to the shift better than 
domestic banks, yet the insignificant result prevents us from drawing this conclusion. The 
disadvantage caused by the shift in policy focus, however, decreases over time during the 
post-2002 period for both state and domestic private banks (𝜙⁡9>0,⁡ 𝜙⁡10>0). It seems that 
the positive and significant coefficient (𝜙⁡10) indicates that domestic private banks achieve 
higher cost efficiency compared to state banks over time. This might be attributed to the 
fact that domestic private banks are strongly recapitalised in the aftermath of the domestic 
twin crises (Altunbaş et al., 2009; Fethi et al., 2012; Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011) and 
this clearly equipped them better - in particular private banks - to sustain tighter prudential 
regulatory changes.  
 
With respect to foreign banks, since their coefficient interacting with the policy shift 
dummy and time trend is not significant, this may suggest that they do not seem to achieve 
significant progress over time. This can be due to the fact that the presence of foreign 
banks was minuscule until 2005 and then accelerated via acquisition of domestic private 
banks by foreign banks. Therefore, these banks are relatively new and hence it may take 
time for these new foreign banks to adapt themselves to domestic policy measures. 
Moreover, as highlighted before, domestic banks had strongly capitalised following the 
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domestic twin crises, which in turn have prevented them from the negative impacts of the 
global financial crisis. Yet foreign banks, whose headquarters are located mostly in 
Europe,71 are more likely to have been adversely affected by the crisis. In addition, the 
coefficient of the FB_ENTRY dummy suggests that the heavy penetration of foreign banks 
since 2005 appears to have no significant impact on cost efficiency, as indicated by the 
positive but not significant value of 𝜙⁡16. This result might be due to fact that the 
penetration of foreign banks have been realised in the form of acquisitions; that is, they 
have taken over domestic banks instead of establishing de novo institutions, which in turn 
might have reduced the impact on cost efficiency. This finding is also consistent with 
empirical evidence suggesting that when domestic banks  are more efficient than foreign 
banks, efficiency gains from foreign banks penetrated through the acquisition of a 
domestic bank are likely to be limited (Clarke et al., 2003). Thus, since in our case we find 
that domestic private banks and in later periods state banks outperformed these foreign 
banks that entered to Turkish banking sector after 2005 via acquisition, this may in turn 
imply that their efficiency impact is likely to be limited. As expounded in Section 3.4, this 
mode of entry is found to be less efficient and employs a lower level of technologies 
compared to greenfield banks, contributing to the insignificant impact (Havrylchyk, 2006). 
 
The general efficiency trend during the study period (see Figure 5.1) indicates that foreign 
banks appear to be more efficient in an environment where functional autonomy and 
operation freedom is increasing. It appears that they have lost their advantages with the 
change in policy focus, which might be attributable to the differences in the quality of the 
institutions and similarity between home and host country institutional quality (Lensink et 
al., 2008). Moreover, domestic banks were strongly recapitalised in the aftermath of the 
domestic twin crises (Altunbaş et al., 2009; Fethi et al., 2012; Fukuyama and Matousek, 
2011), this may in part explain the finding that these banks outperform foreign banks in the 
post-2002 period. Another general efficiency trend indicates that private ownership 
outperforms public ownership in the Turkish banking sector, arguably driven by higher 
performance of foreign banks in the pre-2001 and domestic private banks in the post-2001 
periods. It is noteworthy that state banks are slow to adapt to the changes in regulatory 
shifts, since highlighted above they are the worst performers in the early stages of policy 
                                                 
71 See Chapter 2. 
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shifts, possibly stemming from their larger sizes and principal-agent problems slowing 
down the adjustment process. Yet it appears that once they adapt to the changes, they 
improve their position at a faster rate. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Employing an unbalanced panel dataset covering state, domestic private and foreign 
commercial banks over the period 1988-2016, this chapter has empirically examined the 
effects of the deregulation and prudential re-regulation framework on the characteristics of 
cost structure and on the ownership-cost efficiency relation of Turkish commercial banks. 
The empirical results indicate that pure cost technology worsens during the sample period 
yet at a slowing rate. This is possibly due to the rigid cost structures inherited from the pre-
reform period as well as abundant profit opportunities in the 1990s thanks to the excess 
demand of the public sector, which in turn enabled banks to overlook technical advances 
that could have reduced production costs. Although Turkish banks have yet to benefit from 
technological progress, they have experienced some improvements as they have better 
adjusted to the new regulatory environment and take advantage of the new opportunities. It 
is noteworthy that the banking authorities’ decision to shift to the prudential re-regulations 
was not cautious and gradual. This in turn imposed significant costs on Turkish banks, 
contributing to the catastrophic drop in cost efficiency experienced in the early 2000s. 
Moreover, banks have changed their input mix and output composition to accommodate 
further the changes in the regulatory environments; this signals that the best practices 
among banks have not made all the necessary adjustments to their production process.  
 
The results also suggest that the deregulation and prudential re-regulation framework affect 
the ownership-cost efficiency relationship differently. At the initial stages of deregulation, 
bringing new opportunities and operational freedom,  private banks - in particular foreign 
banks - had higher cost efficiency than public banks, which can be attributable to the fact 
that they were subjected to less political intervention and had ownership advantages. Yet it 
appears that state banks improved their positions over time, presumably due to lessening 
political pressure as a result of deregulatory policies, while others could not carry on 
seizing the benefits of deregulation. The shift in policy focus was costly for all ownerships 
but  for domestic banks in particular. However, we observe that domestic private banks 
appear to adapt better to the new regulatory environment and hence experienced the best 
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efficiency improvements over time. On the other hand, foreign banks do not seem to 
achieve significant progress over time. Furthermore, they adapt worse than public banks to 
new policy measures so that towards the end of the sample period they presented the 
lowest cost efficiency scores. Furthermore, the heavy penetration of foreign banks since 
2005 has not affected cost efficiency significantly. 
 
The results of this study in general compare with those of other studies on the Turkish 
banking sector, yet none of these studies merge the period before and after 2001 with the 
exception of Fukuyama and Mataousek (2011) who use the non-parametric method, in 
contrast to our empirical approach, preventing them from disclosing the real influence of 
the policy shift on general cost efficiency and ownership. Similar to the previous literature, 
our study also confirms that deregulation policies contributed to the efficiency of the sector 
(Ertugrul and Zaim, 1999; Isik and Hassan, 2003a; Zaim, 1995), yet this study finds that 
this improvement could not be sustained over time, as pointed out by different studies 
(Denizer et al., 2007; Isik and Hassan, 2002b; Yildirim, 2002). Furthermore, the sudden 
policy shift that imposed regulatory costs on banks initially rendered adverse impacts on 
efficiency, yet banks appear to adapt quickly to the changes in the regulatory environment 
culminating in efficiency improvements over time (Davutyan and Yildirim, 2015; 
Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; Özkan-Günay et al., 2013). Our results differ from these 
studies by stating that efficiency is part of a more general convex pattern, indicating that 
the improvement in efficiency slows down over time, indicating that banks have yet to 
adjust fully to the new regulatory environment. In terms of ownership-efficiency, this study 
finds that although private banks and in particular foreign banks outperformed public 
banks at the initial stages of deregulation (Isik and Hassan, 2003a), the latter improved 
their position at a slightly faster rate. Some studies’ findings that state banks were more 
technical efficient than private banks during the 1990s might support our finding (Isik and 
Hassan, 2002a; Yildirim, 2002). The studies looking into the ownership-efficiency 
relationship in the post-2001 period mostly find that foreign banks outperformed domestic 
banks (Assaf et al., 2013). Yet we find that foreign banks have lost their advantages over 
time, in particular after the global financial crisis. In addition, their penetration has not 
contributed to the cost efficiency of the banking sector. Fukuyama and Matausek (2011) 
could not confirm that foreign banks are on the average more efficient then domestic 
banks, which may give some support to our findings. Lastly, there are not many papers we 
can compare with our conclusion regarding the trend in production technology. A study 
136 
 
covering the pre- and post-deregulation period finds that Turkish banks utilised their 
resources poorly, i.e. they could have produced more with given inputs (Denizer et al., 
2007), which to some extent supports our finding that deregulation did not stimulate 
improvement in production technology. A similar finding also suggests that the technology 
of domestic banks did not improve over the early post-liberalisation period (Isik and 
Hassan, 2003a). Our finding suggesting that although Turkish banks have not experienced 
technological progress after the policy shift in 2001 but have partly benefited from 
technological improvements over time, at first glance appears to be contrasting. Yet since 
these studies only focus on the post-2001 period when we also find some improvement in 
the production technology, it is not straightforward to state these different conclusions as a 
contradiction. 
 
The policy recommendations are that deregulation reforms can improve efficiency levels, 
particularly once political intervention is lessened on state banks as they seem to improve 
their performance, signalling that they do not need to be privatised for them to be efficient. 
Deregulation reforms did not encourage banks to improve their technology of production 
and banks did not gain sustainable efficiency gains. However, once these reforms are 
accompanied by stability-oriented reforms, average cost efficiency increases and banks 
benefit from production technology. Most importantly, regulatory reforms should be 
consultative and implemented gradually so that banks can equip themselves before the 
implementation of reforms, enabling them to quickly adapt to the changes. This in 
particular could be crucial for foreign banks that are arguably more sensitive to the changes 
in the regulatory environment of the host country.  
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Appendix 5.1 Trend in real mean values of fee based income (Millions TRY) 
 
 
Appendix 5.2 Comparison of ML estimates for 1988-2002 and 1988-2004 period 
Ln(TC/PFUNDS) LnTC Parameter 1988-2002 1988-2004 
Intercept constant α0 0.15023 0.20944 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) lnw1
 δ1 .65942*** .83313*** 
Ln(LOANS) lny1 β1 .87629*** .99309*** 
Ln(OEA) lny2 β2 .37917*** .24450*** 
Ln(FEES) lny3 β3 -0.02937 -0.05506 
Ln(LOANS)2 (lny1)2 β11 .02975*** .02771*** 
Ln(OEA)2 (lny2)2 β22 .08909*** .09464*** 
Ln(FEES)2 (lny3)2 β33 -0.00344 -0.00352 
Ln(LOANS)Ln(OEA) (lny1)(lny2) β12 -.12794*** -.13486*** 
Ln(LOANS)Ln(FEES) (lny1)(lny3) β13 .04641*** .04950*** 
Ln(OEA)Ln(FEES) (lny2)(lny3) β23 -.04243*** -.03881*** 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)
2 (lnw1)2 δ11 .15237*** .16932*** 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(LOANS) (lnw1)(lny1) ϕ11 0.00449 0.01447 
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Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(OEA) (lnw1)(lny2) ϕ12 .02847** 0.00323 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(FEES) (lnw1)(lny3) ϕ13 -.03671*** -.03702*** 
T T θ1 .03575* .08660*** 
T-square T2 θ11 .00441*** .00189*** 
T Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) T lnw1 ὴ1 -.02287*** -.01899*** 
T Ln(LOANS) T lny1 χ1 -0.00069 -0.00231 
T Ln(OEA) T lny2 χ2 -.01430*** -.01110*** 
T Ln(FEES) T lny3 χ3 .00855*** .00493** 
DB DB ψ 1 -.11167*** -.08289*** 
FB FB ψ 2 -.20298*** -.14809*** 
LLP LLP τ2 2.06134*** 2.11203*** 
EAR EAR τ1 -.65355*** -.68118*** 
Gamma Γ 1.76920*** 2.29313*** 
Sigma-squared σ2 .26549*** .29731*** 
 
The Turkish economy suffered from hyper-inflation between 2002-2004, leading firms, 
including banks, to adopt inflation accounting. The results in Appendix 5.2 shows that 
inflation accounting adopted by banks between 2002 and 2004 may not affect the 
consistency of dataset over time; this is partly because only one, ϕ12, out of 27 coefficients 
lost some degree of significance while the sign of it has not changed. Yet it is not 
straightforward to explore the effect of the inflation accounting on the size of the 
coefficients.  
 
Appendix 5.3 shows the estimation results (in terms of size, sign and significance level) of 
the model  denominated in US dollar and in Turkish Lira as seen below. Only one 
coefficient’s significance level changes in this case. 
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Appendix 5.3. Comparison of ML estimates of TRY and US denominated variables 
Ln(TC/PFUNDS) LnTC Parameter 
Estimated 
parameters of 
the  
TRY 
denominated 
data 
(CPI 1998) 
Estimated 
parameters of 
the  
USD 
denominated 
data 
 
Intercept constant α0 1.23186*** 1.16914*** 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) lnw1
 δ1 .74590*** .74981*** 
Ln(LOANS) lny1 β1 .67569*** .67620*** 
Ln(OEA) lny2 β2 .29845*** .29973*** 
Ln(FEES) lny3 β3 0.07479 0.0788 
Ln(LOANS)
2 
(lny1)
2 β11 .03429*** .03345*** 
Ln(OEA)
2 
(lny2)
2
 β22 .07911*** .07936*** 
Ln(FEES)
2 
(lny3)
2
 β33 -.00533** -.00561*** 
Ln(LOANS)Ln(OEA) (lny1)(lny2) β12 -.11643*** -.11643*** 
Ln(LOANS)Ln(FEES) (lny1)(lny3) β13 .04452*** .04672*** 
Ln(OEA)Ln(FEES) (lny2)(lny3) β23 -.03801*** -.03943*** 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)
2 
(lnw1)
2 δ11 .15256*** .15166*** 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(LOAN (lnw1)(lny1) ϕ11 0.00177 -0.00067 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(OEA) (lnw1)(lny2) ϕ12 0.00362 0.00461 
Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS)Ln(FEES) (lnw1)(lny3) ϕ13 -.01941** -.01702** 
T T θ1 .02929* .03359** 
T-square
 
T
2 θ11 -0.00025 -0.00024 
PD PD ϛ 0.38553 0.33862 
T Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) T lnw1 ὴ1 -.00795*** -.00719** 
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T Ln(LOANS) T lny1 χ1 0.00314 0.00325 
T Ln(OEA) T lny2 χ2 -0.00096 -0.00094 
T Ln(FEES) T lny3 χ3 -.00464** -.00487** 
PD Ln(POPEX/PFUNDS) PD lnw1 ϑ1 .13490*** .13813*** 
PD Ln(LOANS) PD lny1 ρ1 -0.02856 -0.02296 
PD Ln(OEA) PD lny2 ρ2 -.06928* -.07040** 
PD Ln(FEES) PD lny3 ρ3 .08840*** .09057*** 
DB DB ψ 1 0.01476 0.01221 
FB FB ψ 2 -.05442* -.05770** 
LLP LLP τ2 1.58525*** 1.58240*** 
EAR EAR τ1 -.93970*** -.94699*** 
Inefficiency model 
Paramete
r 
  
Intercept constant 𝜙0 0.41092 0.42355 
T T 𝜙1 -.25485*** -.26403*** 
T
2 
T
2 𝜙2 .01490*** .01544*** 
DB DB 𝜙3 -.79303*** -.76664*** 
FB FB 𝜙4 -.61614* -0.59401 
T*DB T*DB 𝜙5 0.01933 0.01477 
T*FB T*FB 𝜙6 0.00361 0.00074 
PD PD 𝜙7 10.7768*** 11.0158*** 
PD*DB PD*DB 𝜙8 5.83283* 6.16727* 
PD*FB PD*FB 𝜙9 -1.68798 -1.72752 
PD*T PD*T 𝜙10 -.61988*** -.63587*** 
PD*T*DB PD*T*DB 𝜙11 -.40256** -.42427** 
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PD*T*FB PD*T*FB 𝜙12 0.08994 0.09374 
CRS_94 CRS_94 𝜙13 .63508*** .66044*** 
CRS_TWIN CRS_TWIN 𝜙14 1.05089** 1.07588** 
CRS_GLOBAL 
CRS_GLOB
AL 
𝜙15 0.39824 0.41878 
Variance parameters for  
compound error 
Paramete
r 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Gamma γ .96935*** .97065*** 
Sigma-squared σ2 .19749*** .20220*** 
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Chapter 6  
Measuring Competition in Banking 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated how the regulatory reform process and foreign bank 
penetration have affected the efficiency of Turkish banks. The empirical results showed 
that efficiency had a non-monotonic trend over the sample period. In particular, though 
deregulation led to some improvements in efficiency, this contribution did not last long. 
Stability-oriented reforms, on the other hand, initially imposed high regulatory costs, 
causing efficiency losses. These reforms started a development process in efficiency 
shortly after their implementation, yet the gains appeared to lose pace over time. Therefore, 
it is natural to wonder how these reforms affected the competition in Turkish banking 
sector. We also find that heavy foreign bank penetration that started in 2005 appears to 
have had no discernible impact on the efficiency of the banking sector, which might 
indicate that their entry may not affect the competitive structure of the banking sector. To 
investigate further how regulatory reforms and foreign bank entry affects the competitive 
structure of Turkish banking sector, we next test the impact of regulatory reforms and 
foreign banks entry on the intensity of competition in the Turkish banking sector.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. This chapter aims to provide a concise 
review of the different approaches employed to measure competition in general and the 
banking sector in particular. Therefore, Section 6.3 reviews the traditional Industrial 
Organisation (IO) approaches based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm. Section 6.4 turns to the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) 
approaches used to measure competition. Moreover, Section 6.5 focuses on the NEIO 
approaches based on the static market assumption, while Section 6.6 elaborates on the 
methods - the Boone indicator and the persistence of profits- used to measure dynamic 
competition. All subsections firstly introduce methods, summarise relevant empirical 
studies, and finally highlight their strengths and weaknesses. Section 6.7 concludes.  
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6.2 Measuring competition in banking 
Competition in banking has always been a contentious issue (Vives, 2001). Advocates of 
competition highlight its beneficial effects on banks’ performance, productive efficiency, 
international competitiveness, and innovation (King & Levine 1993a, 1993b; Demirgüç-
Kunt & Maksimovic 1998; Vives 2001; Claessens & Laeven 2004; Levine 2004). 
Moreover, some also posit that increased competition in banking can result in lower prices 
for financial products and greater access to finance for smaller firms in particular, resulting 
in the entry of more firms and higher growth for younger firms (Beck et al., 2004; Cetorelli 
and Strahan, 2006). Overall, these arguments endorse the existence of a healthy degree of 
rivalry to stimulate improvements in banking. Yet the opponents of competition, on the 
other hand, postulate that these perceived benefits have to be weighed against the risks of 
potential instability stemming from increased competition. They argue that higher 
competition is likely to lead banks to take excessive risks, which in turn induce instability 
in the financial sector with negative repercussions on the overall economy (Carlson et al., 
2011; Hakkio and Keeton, 2009). Therefore, they conclude that the notion that competition 
is unambiguously beneficial for banking should be approached with caution. In the light of 
these two opposing views, the evaluation of competition in banking has become crucial for 
policymakers and regulators. 
 
The literature investigating the competitive features of markets, including in banking, is 
divided in two main streams: the structural and the non-structural approach. The former 
largely relies on the SCP paradigm to make inferences on the degree of competition in an 
industry. On the other hand, the non-structural approach seeks to model the dynamic 
interrelation between firms and the contestability of markets to explain pricing behaviour. 
We will now elaborate on these approaches. 
 
6.3 Structural approaches  
Structural approaches posit that competition is a complex phenomenon and hence the 
degree of competition cannot be easily and directly observable. Therefore, these 
approaches rely on the SCP paradigm, associating market structure with the pricing 
conduct of market participants to investigate the intensity of competition in a market. More 
specifically, this paradigm suggests that, assuming a market is characterised by a state of 
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long-run equilibrium, the structural characteristics of the market affect the conduct of 
market participants, and this conduct in turn determines their performance. This 
assumption therefore allows one to draw indirect inferences on the unobserved competitive 
conduct of market participants by interpreting the relationship between observed market 
structure and performance variables. Yet to date there is no consensus as to whether the 
perceived positive relationship between market structure and performance reflects 
collusion or efficiency, leading economists to propose different interpretations. 
 
i. Market power hypotheses 
The traditional SCP paradigm developed by Bain (1951), relying on the traditional IO 
theory of the firm, associates market concentration with the pricing conduct of firms 
operating in manufacturing industries in the 1940s and 1950s. The fundamental features of 
these industries were that they had high fixed costs, a handful of competitors, high barriers 
to entry, and stringent exit conditions due to high sunk costs. In other words, these 
industries had a smaller number of firms (oligopolistic competition) and limited 
contestability. Bain (1951) investigated the relation between market structure and the 
performance of these firms and found a statistically significant relationship between them. 
He accordingly hypothesised that a smaller number of incumbent firms operating under 
limited entry threat make their pricing decisions to realise joint profit maximisation, 
leading them to engage in collusion, price leadership, or other tacit pricing arrangements. 
These anti-competitive behaviours in turn allow them to set prices higher than the 
competitive norms and hence yield abnormal profits. 
 
On the other hand, the relative market power (RMP) hypothesis proposed by Shepherd 
(1982) postulates an alternative interpretation to the SCP paradigm by suggesting a one-
way causality running from exogenous market structure to realised performance. He argues 
that the positive relationship between concentrated markets (with few, large firms) and 
profits might be due to the firms earning larger market shares by offering well-
differentiated products, not necessarily due to collusion as suggested by the SCP. In other 
words, only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated products can exercise 
market power by setting prices at uncompetitive levels and consequently making abnormal 
profits. That is, although this hypothesis agrees on the causality running from structure to 
performance, the interpretation of the relationship is different from the SCP hypothesis. 
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However, both of these hypotheses deem the markets as imperfect with regard to their 
competitive structures as firms can exploit their market power, yielding monopoly profits. 
Therefore, some form of regulation might be needed to limit the exploitation of market 
power. The Chicago School suggests that the intervention of regulators to the market 
induces less competition rather than more. They instead point out that a positive correlation 
between market structure and performance may not be driven from collusive behaviour or 
exploitation of market power. Instead, this positive link may arise from the fact that larger 
firms are likely to operate more efficiently and hence make higher profits. Therefore, these 
views give rise to the development of alternative interpretations of the SCP paradigm. 
 
ii. Efficient structure hypotheses 
The efficient structure hypotheses proposed in its X-efficiency and scale efficiency forms 
offer an alternative explanation to the relationship between market concentration and 
performance. The X-efficiency hypothesis argues that the positive correlation between 
concentration and profits could spring from superior operating efficiency and production 
technology, rather than non-competitive behaviour put forward by the market power (MP) 
hypotheses (Demsetz, 1974; Peltzman, 1977; Smirlock et al., 1984; Rhoades, 1985; 
Evanoff & Fortier, 1988). This is because firms that are more efficient are likely to gain 
larger market shares and have higher profits, as the lower production costs of efficient 
firms enable them to reduce price and compete with less efficient banks for market share. 
Therefore, the market structure (concentration) is not exogenous as assumed by the MP 
hypotheses, but instead it is determined endogenously. This approach accordingly posits a 
positive correlation running from conduct (efficiency) to performance (profits) and then to 
market structure (concentration) which is the reverse of the prediction of the SCP.  
 
The other alternative interpretation of the ES hypotheses is based on scale efficiency. It 
essentially posits that firms may possess equally good management and technological 
skills but some can manage to produce at a more efficient scale, enabling them to reduce 
their unit production costs and hence realise higher profits. Since these scale efficient firms 
are likely to gain larger market shares due to realising abnormal profits and consequently 
making the market more concentrated. Accordingly, the causality is again reversed 
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compared with the MP hypotheses, yet the interpretation is slightly different from the X-
efficiency hypothesis. 
 
iii. Testing the SCP paradigm  
The alternative interpretations of the SCP paradigm have produced a vast body of 
empirical research seeking to resolve this inconclusive causality issue. Many of these 
empirical studies rely on a single-equation model to test the SCP paradigm, where a 
measure of market structure and other relevant variables possibly affecting the 
performance of a firm are regressed on a performance measure. We now elaborate on 
methodological issues, where alternative measures of market structure and performance 
and the alternative model specifications with reference to the SCP hypothesis are reviewed. 
 
To evaluate the competitive features of an industry through a single-equation model based 
on the SCP paradigm, one firstly needs to define measurements of market structure and 
performance. Traditionally, empirical studies tend to characterise the market structure by 
the size distribution of firms, indicating that different sizes of firms may affect competitive 
conditions differently. Given that this research focuses on the banking sector, the size of a 
bank can easily be acquired from a balance sheet (total assets or deposits), then one can 
define the banking market by the size of total banking sector assets or deposits. This 
method of deriving a proxy for market structure is simple to calculate, yet a rather crude 
measure because this proxy gives only one concentration indicator for the banking system. 
However, it is well known fact that many banks engage in different businesses such as 
mortgage loans, consumer loans, off-balance sheet activities, credit cards, and so on. 
Therefore, this feature of banks requires empirical analysts to account for market share 
information on these specific market segments, and its changes over time. However, since 
one cannot easily obtain the share of a bank in a specific market, many empirical studies 
rely on aggregated data such as total assets, loans, and deposits and derive proxies for 
market structure using methods such as n-bank concentration ratio (CRn) and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to reflect the concentration levels of industries.  
 
The CRn index is the sum of market shares of top n-banks in the sector, a relatively easy to 
measure index compared with HHI. But this simplicity comes at a cost. This is because the 
method does not take any account of the remaining banks, whose share distribution can 
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have profoundly different implications. Furthermore, the lack of theoretical foundations 
suggesting a specific number of banks to calculate the index led researchers to make 
arbitrary cut-offs. This in turn is likely to induce inconsistent comparisons of the 
concentration ratios of different samples. For example, even if the CR5 calculated for the 
banking industry of country A is bigger than calculated CR5 for country B, this result may 
be reversed if the CR3 or CR10 ratios are compared. In particular, the higher the difference 
in the number of banks between the samples, the more likely are inconsistencies in the 
comparison of the indexes calculated using different numbers of banks.  
 
To handle these potential shortcomings one can employ the more data-intensive HHI that 
uses the market share information of each bank. The HHI index is defined as the sum of 
the squared market shares of all banks in the industry, which in turn gives greater weight to 
the banks having larger market shares. The index goes from 0 to 1 with higher values 
indicating higher concentration levels. The more the ratio increases, the more unequal are 
the shares of the banks in the market or as the number of banks drops. Therefore, this index 
reflects differences in market share inequality and numbers of competitors and it has been 
widely used in the enforcement of antitrust laws in banking (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). 
Further, it is argued that HHI can overcome the shortcomings of the CRn index as it is less 
sensitive to changes in the number of banks and to the inequality in market shares among 
the different banks. Yet this method has also been subjected to criticisms in the theoretical 
literature. It is argued that although the number and size of banks differ significantly 
between markets, one can get the same HHI values (Davies, 1980). Furthermore, it is 
postulated that the HHI value can significantly decrease once a small firm enters into an 
oligopolistic industry, even though this entrance is not expected to induce a really 
significant drop in the degree of concentration (Hart, 1975). Given that banking markets 
tend to have oligopolistic competition, this handicap may lead to inconsistency in 
empirical results. Consequently, although these shortcomings lead researchers to develop 
different methods to measure concentration levels, these two methods (CRn and HHI) have 
been widely utilised in the empirical studies due to their relative ease of calculation.  
 
Alternative measurements, assumed to overcome the limitations of these two methods, 
have also been offered to proxy market structures in banking. Some researchers employed 
the number of firms in the market, since they argue that entry and exit tend to take much 
longer to realise than do changes in market share (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). On the other 
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hand, others include the number of firms in the calculation of a concentration index, as 
they argue that this number reflects to some extent the conditions of entry into particular 
industry (Hall and Tideman, 1967). 72  In addition to these alternative measures, other 
concentration measures, such as U-index proposed by Davies (1980) and the Hause Indices 
developed by Hause (1977),  have also been offered, highlighting the significance of 
concentration stemming from their ability to reflect the structural features of a market (see 
Bikker & Haaf (2002)). 
 
Once the market structure measure is chosen, one needs to identify a bank performance 
indicator. Most empirical studies employ either price or profit measures as a proxy for 
performance. The studies using the price of particular banking products and services argue 
that they can reflect the extent of a bank’s market power as this translates exactly in the 
setting of prices at  uncompetitive levels (Berger and Hannan, 1989). Moreover, it is 
argued that if Hicks (1935)’s Quiet Life (QL) hypothesis holds, then the positive 
correlation between profit and market structure is partially offset by the cost increases 
stemming from lower cost efficiency, possibly resulting in a weaker relationship between 
profits and market structure (Gilbert, 1984). In these circumstances, prices would be a 
much more accurate predictor of performance. Yet obtaining clear and reliable price 
information for various banking products is often very difficult and one needs to account 
for the associated costs of production as explanatory variable. In addition, the price of a 
single banking product might be deceptive given the multi-product nature of a bank’s 
output and the possibility of cross subsidisation and the use of different pricing strategies 
across markets (Goddard et al. 2001; Evanoff & Fortier 1988). Similarly, an increase in 
prices might result from characteristics other than concentration, like product 
differentiation and research and development. In other words, banks with well-
differentiated and high quality products and services can set higher prices and make 
abnormal profits (Shepherd, 1982b). Therefore, as an alternative to price, other researchers 
use profitability measures as a proxy for performance. Profit measures used as indicators 
of performance vary in the empirical literature. Some use aggregate profit rates, while 
others use the return on assets or the return on equity ratios to capture the profitability of a 
bank. These measures generally enable one to consolidate all product profits and losses 
                                                 
72 It is hypothesised that the higher the number of banks in a banking industry, the easier it gets for new 
banks to penetrate into the market. 
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into one figure and also allow them to overcome the cross subsidisation problem discussed 
above (Molyneux and Forbes, 1995).  
 
Having discussed the market structure and performance measures, we now examine the 
most widely employed SCP model specifications used to test the Market Power and 
Efficient Structure hypotheses. These empirical model specifications are usually static 
cross-section comparisons or are short-run in nature and assume that the market is 
characterised by a state of long-run equilibrium (Berger et al., 2004). Researchers tend to 
use simple ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following type of single-equation 
model specified to account for variation in bank performance with a range of bank and 
market specific variables: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑟 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼3∑𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼4∑𝑀𝑆𝑟 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟 (6.1) 
 
In Equation (1.1)  𝜋𝑖𝑟 is the chosen profit measure for bank i in market r;⁡𝐶𝑅𝑟 is a measure 
of concentration in market r; 𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑟 is the market share of bank i in market r; 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑟 and 
MSir are respectively vectors of bank-specific and market specific variables hypothesised 
to have an impact of bank performance. Finally; 𝑢𝑖𝑟 is the error term.  
 
A positive and statistically significant coefficient on CRr (α1), ceteris paribus, indicates 
that banks operating in a concentrated market are expected to earn higher profits due 
possibly to the collusion confirming the traditional SCP hypothesis. Alternatively, this 
positive and significant finding might reflect the exploitation of market power. In this case, 
banks operating in a concentrated market are able to exercise their market power and hence 
they can charge higher prices while paying lower rates of interest to depositors, resulting in 
higher profits (Berger and Hannan, 1998). This interpretation thus corroborates the RMP 
hypothesis. To this point, we have not considered the market share of the bank. In cases 
where the coefficient on MSRir (α2) is significant and positive and if this leads to the loss 
of the explanatory power of the coefficient on CRr (α1) by making it zero or negative, this 
can be interpreted as evidence that bank profit is positively correlated with firm size 
instead of concentration. This therefore either lends support to the exercise of market 
power because larger banks might exercise greater market power and obtain abnormal 
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profits (Shepherd, 1986), or to the efficient structure hypothesis because high 
concentration endogenously reflects the market share gains of efficient banks (Berger et 
al., 2004).  
 
To shed light on the alternative interpretations of the SCP paradigm issue, Berger (1995) 
attempted to account for bank efficiency measures (x-efficiency and scale efficiency) by 
incorporating these measures into the equation (6.1) and thus allow concentration and 
market share to be functions of these efficiency measures. In other words, properly 
accounting for efficiency via x-efficiency and scale efficiency measures allows market 
share and concentration to reflect solely market power effects. This new specification can 
be shown as the following single-equation regression model: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑟 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼3𝑋𝐸𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼4𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼5∑𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼6∑𝑀𝑆𝑟
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑟 
(6.2) 
 
In equation (6.2) 𝑋𝐸𝑖𝑟 is a bank-specific x-efficiency measure, and 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑟 is a bank-specific 
scale efficiency measure. This fuller model specification, interpreted by looking into the 
sign and significance of the coefficients between 𝛼1 and 𝛼4, allows one to find out which 
of the alternative SCP hypotheses hold. Among the first works using this specification is 
Berger (1995), who investigated the competitive features of US banking and found positive 
and significant coefficients on 𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑟 and 𝑋𝐸𝑖𝑟, supporting the relevance of both market 
power and efficiency on bank profitability. He accordingly interpreted these results that 
larger banks exercise their market power partly because they offer differentiated products 
(𝛼2) and that more efficient banks (irrespective of size) acquire higher profits due to their 
superior management ability and production technology (𝛼3 ). On the other hand, his 
results also imply that concentration,⁡𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑟, and scale efficiency, 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑟, do not seem to have 
an impact on the profitability of banks. Yet the author points out that the results are 
generally weak and varied by market type, in turn lending limited support for two of the 
four hypotheses. 
 
As reviewed above, empirical studies tend to rely on a single-equation model to evaluate 
competitive features in banking. Yet it is also possible to specify and estimate a 
simultaneous-equations model of the SCP paradigm. For example, comparison of single-
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equation and multi-equation estimation techniques suggest that the failure of the single-
equation methods to account for simultaneity bias casts doubts on the single-equation 
studies of the SCP paradigm (Peltzman, 1984). Therefore, one can specify a multi-equation 
SCP model to circumvent the potential simultaneity bias that may arise from a single-
equation SCP model. 
 
iv. Discussion of relevant empirical literature  
We now give a brief synopsis of the findings of the relevant empirical literature testing the 
SCP paradigm, focusing in particular on the banking sector. Early empirical banking 
studies mostly tested the traditional SCP paradigm. A survey of the early U.S. banking 
literature undertaken by Gilbert (1984) lends support on the traditional SCP hypothesis. 
This is because most of the reviewed studies (32 out of 44) tend to find market structure to 
be a positive yet minuscule influence on bank profitability, which is attributed to collusion 
or other forms of non-competitive behaviour among banks. Similarly, Short (1979), 
investigating the relationship between bank concentration and profitability in a sample of 
banks from Canada, Western Europe and Japan, also finds a positive yet relatively small 
coefficient of the concentration variable, indicating that relatively large changes in 
concentration are required to reduce profit rates by one percentage point. Other studies 
focusing on the U.S. banking sector in the 1980s and 1990s find that the banks operating in 
more concentrated markets were able to charge prices higher than the competitive norm 
and were more likely to exhibit greater price rigidity (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark 
and Sharpe, 1992). Unlike previous works, these findings are more in line with RMP 
hypothesis.  
 
Since the early empirical findings were ambiguous and provided a weak correlation 
between market concentration and profitability, the efficient structure hypothesis suggests 
that banks with greater efficiency can result in increased profitability and higher market 
shares. For example, some studies suggest that concentration measures have only very 
weak relationships with the measures of profitability once the market share of banks is 
included (Berger et al., 2004; Berger and Hannan, 1998). They ascribe this finding to the 
higher efficiency of larger banks or to the ability of larger banks to exploit their market 
power to set prices at uncompetitive levels; that is, it is difficult to determine whether 
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efficiency or monopoly power is at work. This fuller model specification brought about 
alternative model specifications to elaborate on the inconsistency in interpretations.  
 
To shed light on this conflict and obtain robust results, some studies suggest including 
direct measures of efficiency (X-efficiency and scale efficiency), and let concentration and 
market shares to be a function of these efficiency indicators (e.g., Berger, 1995; Frame & 
Kamerschen, 1997). The application of this suggestion into the US banking case lends 
support to both the RMP and X-efficiency hypotheses, yet it was acknowledged that the 
results were in general weak and varied by market type, i.e. neither the ES nor the SCP 
hypothesis is of great importance in explaining bank performance. It can be concluded that 
these empirical results are overall rather weak and do not lend much support to the relation 
between concentration and profitability as a valid predictor of the competitive conduct of 
firms.   
 
v. Shortcomings of the SCP paradigm 
The SCP paradigm has been subjected to a lot of criticism, from the assumptions 
underpinning it to the ambiguity of its policy implications. One criticism is that this 
paradigm is static in nature and is only applicable if the market is in long-run equilibrium. 
However, there is no guarantee that a profit variable observed at any point represents an 
equilibrium value, leading one to question the collusion inference drawn from the positive 
relationship between market structure and performance. Moreover, even if the market were 
in long-run equilibrium, other forms of equilibrium suggest a different relationship 
between market concentration and pricing conduct. For example, the contestability theory 
argues that when entry and exit are sufficiently free, incumbent firms can compete 
aggressively with one another in order to deter entry of new firms even if the existing 
market is concentrated (Baumol, 1982; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). The empirical work 
of Shaffer & DiSalvo (1994) tests this theory by looking at the conduct of two banks in 
south central Pennsylvania in the period 1970-1986. Their results indicate that the banks 
were actively competing under the duopoly market condition rather than colluding. 
Similarly, Coccorese (2005) investigates the conduct of single-branch Italian banks 
operating as monopolists in the local market between 1988 and 2005. He finds that despite 
their noteworthy size and significant market share, these banks were not colluding to 
exploit their monopoly power due to the existence of nearby competition. The argument 
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goes that the credible threat of potential entry can exert pressure on incumbents and they 
behave competitively to deter entry. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the structural 
characteristics of the banking market are irrelevant in determining competitive conduct and 
instead the entry and exit conditions determine competitive behaviours. 
 
Another criticism is that not only is the relationship between market structure and conduct 
uncertain, but also the direction of causality is ambiguous as the SCP paradigm suffers 
from endogeneity issues. This is because market structure may not be exogenous as 
assumed by the SCP paradigm; instead, it may be endogenously determined by the 
performance of banks, making the causality link run in both directions. This criticism is 
raised by Demsetz (1973), arguing that the observed positive relationship between market 
structure and the performance of firms by the SCP models may not necessarily stem from 
collusion or exploitation of market power. Instead, this result may be due to efficiency 
differentials among firms as argued by the Efficient-Structure hypothesis. This argument 
posits that the cost advantages of efficient firms enable them to increase their market 
shares and gain higher profits as they have lower production costs, enabling them reduce 
price and compete with less efficient firms for market share. The cost advantage of 
efficient firms become the driving force behind the process of market concentration, and if 
efficient firms dominate the market due to their cost advantages, then one may observe an 
increase in market concentration and profitability simultaneously. 
 
Another criticism of the SCP paradigm is that the industry specific features of the banking 
industry (asymmetric information, switching cost, network externalities, reputation, etc.) 
could lead to an ambiguous association between market structure and competitive 
outcomes (Carletti, 2008; Northcott, 2004). For example, the presence of asymmetric 
information obtained by banks during the lending relationship may have opposite effects 
on the relationship between market structure and performance. On the one hand, banks 
operating in a concentrated market can behave competitively in the presence of 
asymmetric information. This is because the ex-post proprietary information on borrowers 
obtained through lending enables these banks to exploit the information in subsequent 
periods. Therefore, to acquire informational advantages over peers, these banks charge 
lower interest rates to compete for new borrowers (the “learning by lending” concept, see 
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Dell’Ariccia, 2001). 73  On the other hand, the information accumulated through lending 
allow established banks to distinguish more effectively between good and bad borrowers, 
compared to new lenders which are likely to fund the bad projects. Then, as banks compete 
with each other, adverse selection induces an endogenous fixed cost for new lenders and 
limits the number of competitors in a banking market in equilibrium (Dell’Ariccia, 2001). 
Therefore, the overall impact of the presence of information asymmetry on competitive 
conduct is ambiguous. The presence of switching costs can affect market structure and 
contestability. A good but opaque borrower may not be able to show its creditworthiness to 
a new lender and changing lender incurs additional physical costs (known as switching 
costs (Vives, 2001)). These circumstances in turn lock the borrower to a specific bank. 
This locked-in effect creates an endogenous barrier and provides a certain degree of market 
power to the specific bank over new lenders, which in turn force the borrower to pay 
interest rates above the competitive level (Diamond, 1971). Another factor affecting 
market structure and competitive features is network externalities. For example, although 
setting up an extensive branch network is costly, having a large branch network increases 
the likelihood of finding more customers. Therefore, the banks with large networks are 
more likely to gain market power which enables them to demand higher prices compared 
to competitors with smaller networks (Gehrig, 1996). Moreover, some banks tend to share 
e-bank service networks when the threat of new entry is high. The intuition behind the 
sharing agreements is to avoid ferocious post-entry competition and foreclose any potential 
entrants (Carletti, 2008).  
 
Overall, the SCP paradigm fails to circumvent the endogeneity issue and does not consider 
factors such as market contestability. In addition, as discussed above, the existence of 
information asymmetry, network externalities, and switching costs can endogenously 
change market contestability. A growing body of empirical studies also argue that bank 
performance measures are more likely to be influenced by macroeconomic factors, the 
legal institutional framework, and regulatory environment rather than market structure 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004). To circumvent the potential drawbacks of the structural 
approaches, non-structural methods, the so-called NEIO, relying directly on conduct, were 
developed in the 1980s. We now briefly introduce this approach. 
                                                 
73 Banks obtain private information from some of their clients through the lender-borrower relationship and 
this proprietary information can be exploited in later periods. 
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6.4 Non-structural approaches 
The structural approaches relying on the SCP posit that understanding of market structure 
underpins all pricing decisions made by firms from which one can make indirect inferences 
on the nature of competition. Yet some researchers raise doubt about the reliability of this 
paradigm as the general contestability of the market and entry/exit barriers can have direct 
influence on the competitive conduct of firms. The point that competition is a matter of 
behaviour and not of structure is also at the core of the theory of contestable markets 
postulated by Baumol (1982), who notes how the potential threat of entry and competition 
from new firms will be enough to induce competitive conduct on the incumbents. If access 
to technology is equal and there are no significant barriers to entry and exit, incumbents 
are forced to behave competitively to prevent entry. Therefore, the new methods, so-called 
non-structural approaches, seek to collect empirical evidence on the nature of competition 
by observing conduct directly.  
 
The non-structural approaches can be classified based on their underlying assumptions. 
The first generation of non-structural approaches based on the oligopoly theory derive a 
measure of competition from the (static) theory of the firm under equilibrium conditions 
and basically employ some form of price mark-up over a competitive benchmark. These 
models include the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, conjectural variations and the Lerner index. 
On the other hand, the second generation of non-structural approaches rely on empirical 
examination of the dynamics of markets and hence they are more in line with the Austrian 
(dynamic) conception of competition. These models include the persistence of profits and 
the Boone indicator. This is a deviation from the static and cross-sectional methodology 
that is common in much of the literature based on the SCP paradigm, the Panzar-Rosse 
method, and the conjectural variations approach (Goddard et al., 2011).   
 
6.4.1 The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics 
One of the most widely employed methods used to measure the degree of competition in 
early empirical studies is the Panzar-Rosse model (PR) developed by Panzar and Rosse 
(1987). The theory underlying the PR model is that depending on the competitiveness of an 
industry (oligopolistic, competitive, and monopolistically competitive markets), the 
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revenue of a profit maximising firm will change differently in response to changes in input 
prices. In other words, this method is based on the empirical observation of the elasticities 
of total revenue to the changes in input prices. The identification of competitiveness of an 
industry is derived by calculating the sum of elasticities of the revenue with respect to all 
input prices. The sum of elasticity, the so-called H-statistic, lies between -ꝏ and +1. The 
larger the transmission of cost changes into revenue changes, the more intense the 
competition is in a market.  
 
Based on the explicit assumption of profit maximising behaviour of firms and assuming 
that the market is in the long-run equilibrium, under perfect competition the increase in 
input prices is expected to lead to an equiproportionate increase in the revenue of a firm. 
This is because an increase in the cost of production will increase the market price by 
exactly the same proportion, so that each firm continues to make a normal profit in the 
long run. Therefore, in perfect competition, the elasticity of revenue with respect to input 
prices (known as H-statistics) is equal to one. Under monopoly conditions, an increase in 
input prices causes a reduction in a monopolist’s total revenue, as the monopolist operates 
on the price elastic portion of the demand curve. Therefore, in monopoly conditions, the 
elasticity of revenue with respect to input prices is negative or less than one. Under 
monopolistic competition, an increase in input prices will lead to a less than proportionate 
increase in total revenue. Thus, the H-statistic lies between zero and one for monopolistic 
competition. The PR H-statistics and relevant competitive environments are summarised in 
Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Panzar-Rosse H-statistics and competitive environments 
H-statistics Competitive environment 
H < 0 Monopoly or collusive oligopoly 
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic competition 
H = 1 Perfect competition 
 
 
The PR H-statistic is modelled by estimating the reduced form revenue equation that can 
be written as follows: 
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ln 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 𝜆𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6.3) 
 
where ln 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the log of gross revenue of bank i in year t, 𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the price of input factor 
m for bank i in year t, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 corresponds to firm-specific and macro-economic exogenous 
control variables assumed to affect the revenue structure and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a random disturbance 
term. The sum of estimated elasticities of revenue with respect to each input price gives H-
statistics, which is a measure of competitive conduct: 
 
𝐻 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
 (6.4) 
 
where m=1….M is the number of inputs included in the model. 
 
The PR H-statistic has the appeal of simplicity due to the advantages in terms of data 
requirements. This method measures the competitive behaviour of firms through a reduced 
form revenue equation, which can be estimated by a simple single equation linear model 
requiring only input prices and revenues variables. Namely, although it focuses on the 
competitive conduct in the output market, one does not need to obtain any output prices 
and quantity information, which are relatively difficult to acquire in the banking sector. 
Moreover, one does not need to make any assumption on the definition of the market; 
namely, it is robust with respect to any implicit market definition (Shaffer, 2004). Further, 
since it only requires bank-level data and allows for bank-specific differences in 
production function, this facilitates cross-country studies (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
 
Despite these advantages, the PR H-statistic has several shortcomings, leading a significant 
drop in its popularity in empirical studies. First, this measure neglects dynamics in the 
market and non-pricing strategies. Second, the valid interpretation of the results for the 
models of perfect and monopolistic competition require the market in which firms operate 
to be in long-run equilibrium at each point in time when the data are observed (Panzar and 
Rosse, 1987). This can be a critical issue in cross-sectional cases in particular, since a large 
number of heterogeneous firms operating within a single-industry is strong evidence of 
disequilibrium, undermining the validity of PR H-statistic results (Bikker et al., 2012). The 
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use of panel data fixed effects formulation might handle to control the unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms. However, the validity of the H-statistic depends on the static 
equilibrium assumption and this assumption can be violated in the panel data case if 
adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous 74 (Goddard and 
Wilson, 2009). Third, the economic interpretation of the magnitude 75 of the H-statistic 
(apart from the long-run competitive equilibrium value of 1) is ambiguous, making it 
difficult to draw conclusions from cross-sample comparisons. In other words, it cannot be 
interpreted as a continuous function of the intensity of competition; namely that the degree 
of competition does not  reduce (increase) with the reduction (rise) in the magnitude of H-
statistics. Finally, the PR model assumes that firms are price-takers in the input market, yet 
some banks might exercise monopoly power when alternative savings products are not 
available, which in turn negatively affect econometric identification. It has been shown that 
if banks exercise market power on the input price by setting the deposit interest rates lower 
than competitive levels, this intervention is likely to yield higher values of the H-statistic 
and hence disguise market power on the output side (Shaffer, 2004).  
 
The simplicity and less stringent data requirement has made the PR model a popular 
method to investigate competition in banking industries despite the potential shortcomings 
discussed above. Early applications of the PR model mainly focus on developed countries 
(Shaffer, 1982; Nathan and Neave, 1989; Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton, 1994; 
Molyneux, Thornton and Michael Llyod-Williams, 1996; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; 
Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Casu and Girardone, 2006; Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki, 
2006; Goddard and Wilson, 2009, among others). Most of these papers reveal that 
monopolistic competition is the pervasive market structure in the banking sector of 
developed countries. Only a few studies find evidence in favour of monopoly: for example, 
Italy from 1986-99 (Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton, 1994), Japan from 1986-88 
(Molyneux et al., 1996b), for small banks in France and Germany from 1992-96 (due 
partially to their advantages in the local markets) (De Bandt and Davis, 2000), and perfect 
                                                 
74 Employing recent advances in dynamic panel data modelling might overcome the cases when adjustment 
towards market equilibrium in response to factor input price shocks is not instantaneous (Goddard and 
Wilson, 2009). 
75
 Another criticism suggests that neither the sign nor the magnitude of H-statistics can be used to identify 
market power, since the study shows that the sign of H-statistics can be positive, even under conditions of 
substantial market power (Shaffer and Spierdijk 2015). 
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competition, such as Italy from 1998-2004 (Goddard and Wilson, 2009) and Korea during 
1997-2000 (Park, 2009). It is argued that failure to reject the null hypothesis of monopoly 
in certain cases may arise from model misspecification bias, namely that when there is a 
partial, not instantaneous, adjustment towards long-run equilibrium in response to input 
price shocks, one should have a dynamic structure rather than the conventional static 
reduced form revenue equation (Goddard and Wilson, 2009).  Recent studies tend to apply 
the PR model to developing countries and transition economies (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004b; Gelos and Roldós, 2004; Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari, 2006; Yeyati and 
Micco, 2007; Schaek, Cihak and Wolfe, 2009; Williams, 2012; Apergis, 2015, among 
others). The results of these studies show that the market structure of the majority of 
countries can be characterised by monopolistic competition, which is similar to the 
findings in the studies of developed countries. The studies assessing competition in the 
Turkish banking sector by using PR H-statistics also find that Turkish banks show 
monopolistic competition, which is a compatible result with other studies (Günalp and 
Çelik, 2006). 
 
6.4.2 The conjectural variations approach  
While both the SCP and the PR model are reduced-form analyses, the conjectural 
variations (CV) approach is a structural approach encompassing demand and supply 
relationships. The CV approach is based on oligopolistic behaviour that has long 
recognised that major firms operating in concentrated markets can compete with one 
another. Price and output decisions of profit-maximising firms affect market equilibrium 
and hence can affect the behaviour of competitors due to interdependence. What each firm 
believes is its rivals’ response to its own actions will be is known as conjectural variations. 
Thus, it is not market structure to determine competitive behaviour, but the price and 
output decisions made by firms in anticipation of the potential or likely reactions of their 
competitors.  
 
The empirical foundations of the CV approach are attributed to the pioneering work of 
Iwata (1974), Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). The estimation of the structural model 
requires estimating a system of equations including a demand function, a cost (supply) 
function, and a specification of the interdependence of market participants (the degree of 
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collusion). One then can make inferences on the degree of competition in the market by 
assessing the estimated interdependence of market participants.  
 
In the case of N-firms, homogenous-products and quantity-setting oligopoly, P is the 
market price, qi is the i-th firm’s output, Q = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the total industry output, then the 
market demand is given by: 
𝑃 = 𝑃(𝑄, 𝑧; 𝛿) (6.5) 
where z is a set of exogenous variables such as income and substitutions affecting demand, 
and δ is a set of unknown parameters to be estimated, and the cost function can be written 
as: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖; 𝛽) (6.6) 
where C is the i-th firm’s cost, wi is the input prices of the i-th firm; β is a vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated.  
 
The profit maximisation condition of firm i can be written as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥⁡𝛱𝑖 = ⁡𝑃(𝑄, 𝑧; 𝛿)𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖; 𝛽) (6.7) 
When it is assumed that the decision-making variable for firms is the quantity of output, 
solving the profit maximisation condition for firm i can be shown as: 
 
𝑑𝛱𝑖
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= 𝑝 + 𝑓′(𝑄) (
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑞𝑖
) 𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖) = 0 (6.8) 
which can be re-written as follows: 
𝑝 + 𝑓′(𝑄)(1 + 𝜆𝑖)𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖) = 0 (6.9) 
where 𝑓′(𝑄) is the inverse of the slope of the market demand curve, 𝜆𝑖 = 𝑑∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 /𝑑𝑞𝑖 is 
the conjectural variation of firm i with respect to all other firms in the industry, showing 
the change in output of all other firms anticipated by firm i in response to an initial change 
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in its own output 𝑑𝑞𝑖. The marginal cost of firm i is 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖). The value of 𝜆𝑖 ranges between 
-1 and ∑ 𝑞𝑗/𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 , and it is related with different degrees of market collusion. For example, 
under perfect competition, an increase in output by firm i has no impact on market price 
and quantity, so that, 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑞𝑖
⁡=1 + 𝜆𝑖=0; 𝜆𝑖 = −1. In the case of Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a 
firm does not anticipate retaliation from other firms in response to its increase of output, so 
that an increase in output by firm i leads to an increase of the market output by the same 
amount, i.e. 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑞𝑖
 =1 + 𝜆𝑖=1 and hence 𝜆𝑖 = 0. Under perfect collusion, where firms act like 
a cartel or pure monopoly, a firm anticipates a full retaliation from the remaining firms to 
protect their market share, and thereby an increase in output by firm i by one unit induces 
an increase in the market output by 
𝑄
𝑞𝑖
 units, namely 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑞𝑖
 =1 + 𝜆𝑖=⁡
𝑄
𝑞𝑖
; 𝜆𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 /𝑞𝑖. 
 
Equation (6.10) can also be rearranged as: 
𝑝 − 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖)
𝑝
= ⁡
1
𝜂
𝜃𝑖 (6.11) 
where 
𝑝−𝐶𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖)
𝑝
 is the well-known Lerner index, a measure of a firm’s market power, 
proposed by Lerner (1934). This measure reflects to what extent market power enables 
firms to set a price above marginal costs. It relies on the assumption that under perfect 
competition price equals marginal cost and hence a measure of the degree to which price 
exceeds marginal cost gives a beneficial measure of market power.  
 
In equation (6.12), the perceived elasticity of demand composes of two elements: η= -
(p/Q)*(∂Q/∂p), defined as the market price elasticity of demand for output; and θi= 
(1+λi)(qi/Q)  is associated with the degree of collusion in the industry. Since the value of 𝜆𝑖 
ranges between -1 and ∑ 𝑞𝑗/𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 , we can find corresponding values of θi  which takes a 
value between 0 and 1. Under perfect competition, 𝜆𝑖 = −1, and thereby 𝜃𝑖 = 0, where 
price is equal to marginal cost. Under Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 𝜆𝑖 = 0  and hence 
𝜃𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖/𝑄 ; and in the case of perfect collusion, 𝜆𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 /𝑞𝑖  means 𝜃𝑖 = 1 , where 
firms maximise joint profit. The interpretations of the conjectural variation parameters can 
be summarised in the Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 Conjectural Variation parameters with different equilibrium 
Competitive environment CV parameter, 𝜆𝑖 Degree of collusion, 𝜃𝑖 
Perfect competition -1 0 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium 0 𝑞𝑖/𝑄 
Perfectly collusive oligopoly 
or pure monopoly 
∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖
/𝑞𝑖 1 
 
 
A major advantage of the CV approach is that compared to the reduced form analysis of 
the SCP paradigm and the PR H-statistic, this approach is not subjected to equilibrium 
restrictions and it is a structural approach modelling the explicit demand, cost and profit-
maximising conditions faced by firms. The estimation of the degree of competition is 
acquired from the nature of the equilibrium among firms. This approach therefore not only 
gives the measure of competition but also provides information on the sources of the 
estimated competitive conduct. Another advantage is that compared to the SCP paradigm 
and the PR model, the estimated conjectural variation parameters can be treated as a 
continuous function of competition since it measures the actual deviation of marginal cost 
from competitive pricing (Shaffer, 2000). This in turn allows one to explore factors 
associated with the variation of the estimated competitive conduct, such as investigating 
the effect of policy changes on competition. However, this approach is not free from 
criticisms. It is a data intensive approach and requires choosing an appropriate functional 
form for the structural demand and supply equations. Moreover, this approach identifies 
competitive conduct by investigating the strategic response of a rival to the changes of a 
firm’s output, yet it ignores the subsequent response of this firm to the changes of the 
output of its rivals. It is argued that it therefore undermines the feedback mechanism of 
firms, given that the dynamic response can be a significant factor in determining the 
competitive conduct (Church and Ware, 2000).  
 
The CV approach as a measurement of competitive conduct has been widely applied in 
banking studies. Most of the work applying this approach assumes a homogenous-product 
and quantity-setting oligopoly model and estimates the CV parameter on quantities: for 
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example, for the United States, Shaffer and Di Salvo, Shaffer (1989); for Canada, Shaffer 
(1993); for Norway, Berg and Kim (1994); for the Netherlands, Toolsemea (2002); for 
Japan, Uchida and Tsutsui (2005); and for Thailand, Mahathanaseth & Tauer (2012). Fewer 
studies assume a heterogeneous-product price setting oligopoly model: for example, for 
Portugal, Barros and Modesto (1999) and Canhoto (2004); for Hong Kong, Wong et al. 
(2007); for Italy, Coccorese (2005); for Thailand, Mahathanaseth and Tauer (2012); and for 
Turkey, Aydemir (2013, 2014). Overall, the majority of the studies using the CV approach 
tend to show that banks’ conduct is imperfectly competitive but far from collusive. This in 
turn indicates the presence of interdependence among banks and it can be inferred that the 
prevailing market condition is oligopolistic competition. Although strong collusion is 
rejected by many studies, there are a few studies accepting the existence of strong 
collusion (Berg and Kim (1994), Mahathanaseth and Tauer (2012), Canhoto (2004), and 
Aydemir (2013, 2014)). These studies show the existence of significant market power in 
the relevant countries. In the case of the Turkish banking sector in particular, the estimation 
results suggest that Turkish banks exercised collusive pricing in the deposit market 
between 2002 and 2011 and in the loan market in 1988 to 2009, indicating that the banking 
sector is conducive to a lack of competition. 
 
6.5 The persistence of profits approach 
The first generation NEIO approaches assume that competitive forces eliminate any 
observed abnormal profits quickly and thereby there will be no permanent differences 
among firms’ profit levels in the long-run. Therefore, it can be inferred that any conduct 
and performance measures observed at any point in time represent equilibrium. Brozen 
(1971), however, contradicts this assertion and points out that the measures observed at 
any point in time may not represent equilibrium values. This is because incumbents can 
enjoy regulatory protection or boast capability to deter imitation or prevent entry. 
Therefore, this deterioration in competition can result in economic profits at any point in 
time and, moreover, some firms can sustain these abnormal profits, even in the long-run 
(Goddard et al., 2011). 
 
There is a broad literature testing the dynamic view of competition and these methods are 
expected to circumvent potential drawbacks driven by the static market view. One method 
is the persistence of profits (POP) approach, which recognises the possibility that markets 
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can be out of equilibrium at the moment when the data are observed (Goddard et al., 2013). 
The POP hypothesis introduced and operationalised by Mueller (1977, 1986) is based on 
two fundamental conditions. First, free entry and exit in each product area are expected to 
rapidly eliminate any abnormal profits. Second, regardless of their initial values, all firms’ 
profit rates tend to converge towards the average long-run equilibrium profit level of the 
industry. It is argued that the second condition, suggesting a swift elimination of abnormal 
profits, is weaker than the second condition. This is because free entry and exit are likely to 
reduce abnormal profits quickly as incumbents lose their market share and power due to 
the entry. Yet the convergence of profits to the same average long-run equilibrium may be 
realised slowly or in extreme cases not occur at all, creating differences in firm-level long-
run average profit rates. In other words, bank profits can continue to persist in the real 
world of banking (Amidu and Harvey, 2016; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2013). 
This is arguably because, against these two axioms, some incumbent firms might exploit 
other advantages stemming from, for instance, regulatory protection (e.g. patents, tariffs, 
licences), information asymmetry and greater efficiency, which can help hinder imitation 
and block entry. If so, these firms profits can persist from year to year, and differences in 
firm-level long-run mean profit rates can be prolonged over time (Goddard et al., 2013, 
2011; Mueller, 1977). 
 
The theoretical model investigating the degree of persistence of profitability is basically 
based on an autoregressive model (AR) of firm profitability. Most of the previous POP 
studies estimate a first-order autoregressive model, AR(1), for the profit rate. That is, they 
assume that the current year’s profit level is affected by the previous year’s profit level. 
This AR model specification is, in fact, a reduced form of a system of two equations 
justified by Geroski & Jacquemin (1988). The first equation suggests that the difference 
between current and previous years’ profits is being affected by current and past entry; this 
is because while actual entry lowers the market share of incumbents, the potential entry 
threat prompts incumbents to take costly pre-emptive actions (e.g. price cutting, 
advertising, etc.) (Goddard et al., 2013, 2011). The second equation posits that current 
entry is being determined by previous years’ profits, as newcomers are more likely to take 
these into account before deciding whether to enter or not into a market (Goddard and 
Wilson, 1999). That is, these two equations account for the impact of entry (both actual 
and threatened) on the dynamics of profit. However, even if one can obtain observations of 
actual entry, the full effect of entry on profits is understated since the threatened entry 
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variable is unobservable (latent) (De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Goddard and Wilson, 2009). 
Therefore, one needs to apply a method enabling circumvention of the latent variable issue. 
The method offered to handle this issue is to re-parameterise these two equations into a 
reduced form model incorporating observations of profits over time, in which entry is 
effectively a latent variable (Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Goddard et al., 2011; Goddard 
and Wilson, 1999). This transformation is detailed hereafter.  
 
First, the change in the normalised profit rate76 of bank i between years t and t-1, shown as 
𝛥𝜋𝑖,𝑡, is assumed to be a function of the threat stemming from current entry in year t or 
past entry that directly affects bank i's profitability, shown as 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−𝑚 where m=0, 1, ..., ∞; 
and an idiosyncratic error component, shown as 𝜀𝑖,𝑡: 
Δπi,t = θi + ∑ θmNi,t−m
∞
m=0
+ εi,t (6.13) 
In Eq. (6.13), the coefficients 𝜃𝑚, measuring the effect of 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−𝑚 on 𝛥𝜋𝑖,𝑡, are assumed to 
be the same for all banks operating on the market. Moreover, entry is supposed to be a 
function of past realisations of bank i's standardised profit rate and an error component, 
shown as 𝑣𝑖,𝑡:, 
Ni,t = μ + ∑ δmπi,t−m
∞
m=1
+ νit (6.14) 
 
In Eq. (6.14) the coefficients 𝛿𝑚 , measure the effect of the past realisation of bank i's 
standardised profit rate (𝜋𝑖,𝑡−𝑚) on entry (𝑁𝑖,𝑡). This impact is assumed to be the same for 
all the banks. Once Eq. (6.14) is substituted into Eq. (6.13) and re-parameterised, this 
transformation results in an auto-regressive model for bank i’s standardised profit rate: 
πi,t = π̃i + ∑ λmπi,t−m
∞
m=1
+ ui,t (6.15) 
                                                 
76 Fluctuations and/or macroeconomic changes are likely to cause extensive variations in the profit rates of 
banks. Since the banking sector is more susceptible to business cycles and regulatory and economic changes, 
one needs to account for these differences to avoid the negative implications on the econometric analysis 
(Bektas, 2007; Glen et al., 2001). The common method applied in the literature to circumvent this pitfall is to 
express the profit rates of all banks within each country, 𝜋𝑖,𝑡, as a deviation from the cross-sectional mean 
profit rate in year t.  
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where  𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error component. It is common to apply a first-order auto-
regressive (AR(1)) specification. Higher orders tend to induce insignificant lagged 
variables under short time-dimensions and to mitigate any endogeneity issues which would 
possibly stem from inclusion of more lagged dependent variables (Bektas, 2007; 
Chronopoulos et al., 2015; Goddard et al., 2011). Moreover, it is also found that 
incorporating lagged variables beyond one year barely changes the general pattern of the 
estimation results, as the profits above the industry average tend to last no longer than a 
year (Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Maruyama and Odagiri, 2002). The AR (1) 
specification in Eq. (6.15) results in: 
πi,t = π̃i + λ1πi,t−1 + ui,t (6.16) 
In Eq. (6.16) 𝜋𝑖,𝑡  and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1  are normalised profit rates for bank i in period t and t-1 
respectively, and  ?̃?𝑖 demonstrates bank i's long-run normalised profit rate. The adjustment 
of normalised profit rates shown in Eq. (6.16) is interpreted because of the interaction 
between profitability and entry, as suggested in the contestable markets literature (Baumol, 
1982; Breshnan and Reiss, 1991). Eq. (6.16) is employed to estimate the short-run 
persistence of profits. That is, the estimated value of  𝜆1 reflects the profit persistence that 
can be interpreted as an indicator of the intensity of competition or as a measure of the 
speed of adjustment of short-run profits. In other words, this value reflects the intensity of 
competition or speed of adjustment to the mean profit of the market. If 𝜆1 = 0, there is no 
relation between 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 , indicating the presence of perfect competition in the 
industry, since abnormal profit is a temporary short-run phenomenon and it disappears 
rapidly. If 0<𝜆1<1, there is a positive relation between 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡, providing evidence 
of persistence of profits in the short-run. This is because the elimination of abnormal 
profits through competition is not realised rapidly, and banks are able to sustain a notable 
portion of their excess profits. If 𝜆1 is high, or close to one, then short-run profits are 
persistent and competition is thus deemed to be weak. If this is small, or close to zero, then 
it can be inferred that short-run profits are quickly eroded and hence competition is 
deemed to be fierce.  
 
It is also possible to investigate the speed of convergence of abnormal profits towards the 
average long-run profit levels. The contestable market theory suggests that the force of 
competitive threat or contestability is expected to induce a significant and rapid 
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convergence of supra-normal profits towards the mean profit rates. Yet this convergence 
process does not always work as the theory suggests. This is because the convergence 
mechanisms are not always untying the leading firms, which has been confirmed by cross-
country studies (Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller, 1990) as well as single-country 
studies (Goddard and Wilson, 1999; Schohl, 1990; Yurtoglu, 2004). The maximum speed 
of convergence towards industry means profit level is accordingly realised when 𝜆1 = 0 in 
the univariate AR(1) process shown in Eq. (6.16). If this is true, firm i’s long-run projected 
profit, ?̅?𝑖,𝑝, is constant over time and equal to average (equilibrium) profit level  ?̅?𝑖,𝑝 =
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1. Therefore, Eq. (6.16) is used to obtain the long-run profit: 
 
π̅i,p = π̃i + λ1(π̅i,p) + ϑi,t (6.17) 
where  
π̅i,p =
π̃i
(1 − λ1)
 (6.18) 
 
Given the condition of -1<𝜆1<1, πi,t converges towards ?̅?𝑖,𝑝 as t increases and thus ?̅?𝑖,𝑝 
reflects the long-run profit rate of the industry. The (1 − 𝜆1) component in the partial 
adjustment model indicates the speed of adjustment. The higher value of the (1 − 𝜆1) 
component signifies that transfer of the previous year’s profit level to the current year is 
less likely to be realised and the profit from the past does not affect current profit 
significantly. Under this circumstance, the previous year’s profits cannot be sustained over 
the following year due partly to the competitive environment. Therefore, the convergence 
or the speed of adjustment towards the mean profit of the industry is quite fast.  
 
The empirical studies testing the persistence of profits hypothesis for the banking 
industries mainly focus on the following three research questions. First, do competitive 
forces successfully dissipate abnormal profits in the short-run? Second, are all firms profits 
levels converged quickly towards long-run average profit rate? Third, what characteristics 
(bank-specific, industry-specific, macroeconomic, or country specific) account for the 
observed differences in persistent profitability and for the speed of the convergence 
towards the average industry profit level? These questions are of interest for regulators in 
particular, as they not only need to know whether profits persist, but also which policy 
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tools and when these tools are needed to be introduced to ensure a competitive 
environment. 
 
In the first stage of the POP analysis, empirical studies have tested whether excess profits 
persist from year to year. This literature relies mostly on time-series variation of bank-
specific or industry-level profit rate data and draws inferences regarding the intensity of 
competition. Some of the early cross-country studies find evidence of profit persistence 
despite intensifying competition in the European banking over between 1992 and 1998 
(Goddard et al., 2004a, 2004b). Similarly, Goddard et al. (2013) found evidence of the 
persistence of profits from one year to the next in eight EU member countries between 
1992 and 2007. They also found that the persistence tends to become weaker due to the 
expected increase in the banking competition following the integration of EU financial 
markets with the introduction of the Euro in 1999 and the implementation of the Financial 
Services Action Plan. Another comprehensive cross-country study by Goddard et al. (2011) 
covering national banking sectors in 65 countries over the period of 1997-2007 found that 
the persistence of profits seems to be stronger for banks in developed countries than for 
those in developing countries. They argue that a higher rate of growth in GDP per capita 
indicates that business opportunities driven by higher economic growth tend to increase 
competition and thereby weaken the ability of incumbent banks to persistently make 
excess profits. Another cross-country study investigating the persistence of profits in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa finds moderate persistence of profitability, denoting that departures 
from perfectly competitive market structures might not be that large in developing 
countries (Flamini, McDonald and Schumacher, 2009). Yet the study by Amidu and 
Harvey (2016) casts doubt on the finding of the previous study as this study finds a high 
level of profit persistence in the African banking sector, which tend to converge at a very 
slow pace to the norm.  
 
The evidence from single-country studies also confirms the existence of persistence of 
profits, yet the level of persistence changes based on the country. For instance, a study 
investigating the Greek banking sector over the period 1985-2001 shows that profitability 
persists to a moderate extent (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008). Agostino, 
Leonida and Trivieri (2005), investigating the Italian banking sector over the period 1997-
2000, find that profit persistence is attributed to ownership concentration, indicating that 
the bigger shares are held by specific banks. Another study focusing on the Turkish 
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banking sector finds that the persistence of profits became stronger after the global 
financial crisis (Yildirim, 2015). In general, the reviewed literature concludes that bank 
profits continue to persist at different levels in various countries. These studies largely 
attribute the existence of persistence to the impediments to product market competition, 
resulting in market power in output markets, and informational opacity, resulting in market 
power in input markets. It is argued that without market power, abnormal profits would be 
dissipated quickly as new firms penetrate into the market, imitate the products or processes 
of innovative leading firms, bid for profitable customers, or bid up the price of managerial 
talent ( Berger et al., 2000).  
 
In the second stage of the POP analysis, studies question whether abnormal profits 
converge to norm profits eventually and, if so, what is the speed of this convergence. 
Theory suggests that competitive forces eventually eliminate profit differentials among 
different firms in the long-run (Mueller, 1977). This is because if a firm enjoys excess 
profits then competitors penetrate into the market and offer similar products at lower costs 
until the profitability in the industry is equal to the competitive rate. On the other hand, if a 
firm has profits below average, investors move to a new market with higher profits and the 
firm with profit under average is eliminated if corrective measures are not introduced, 
restoring at least normal profits. Yet the empirical findings show that this convergence may 
not occur immediately or possibly even at all. For instance, a recent comprehensive cross-
country study investigating the national banking industries of 65 countries confirms that 
although competitive forces are effective in eroding abnormal profits in the long-run, the 
speed of convergence to the norm is not instantaneous and tends to differ among countries 
(Goddard et al., 2013). The study attributes this finding to the market power of some banks 
stemming from informational opacity and their ability to block entry, allowing these banks 
to sustain a notable portion of their supra-normal profits from year to year. Similarly, the 
studies analysing the profit persistence and the speed of convergence of the banking 
sectors in Africa find a high level of profit persistence and a relatively low-level speed of 
convergence to the long-run average industry profit level (Amidu and Harvey, 2016; 
Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 2018). Some single-country studies also confirm the fact that 
the convergence towards the same long-run average profit rate is realised, but this 
convergence also takes time. For example, deregulatory policies enacted during the 1990s 
appears to have induced profits to converge towards long-run average profitability levels in 
US banking (Chronopoulos et al., 2015). Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry (2006), for example, 
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investigate the profit persistence in a sample of US banks and suggest that profits take 
about five years to converge towards mean industry norms.  
 
On the other hand, there are also studies find that profits do converge immediately, or 
profits do persist even in the long-run, rejecting the hypothesis that there is eventual 
convergence towards the same long-run profit rate for all firms. A study finding evidence 
on the immediate convergence of profits focuses on the Turkish banking sector over the 
period 1989-2003 and concludes that in the long-run the persistency of profits does not 
exist in the Turkish banking sector because the long-run average profit rate is very close to 
zero (Bektas, 2007). The studies finding evidence on the persistence of long-run profits 
tend to focus on non-banking industries. One study focusing on the banking sector of five 
large Western European countries and the United States over the period 1993–2014 finds 
evidence on the persistence of profits in the long-run for all six countries before the 
financial crisis in 2008 (Gugler and Peev, 2018). In a non-bank single-country case 
undertaken for Japan, Maruyama & Odagiri (2002) estimated the long-term profit rates of 
357 Japanese manufacturing firms using the 1964-1997 profit-rate data and found that the 
top one-sixth initially most profitable firms estimated to earn higher-than-average long-run 
profit rates persisted with these profits, even in the long-run. This study also highlights that 
although increasing competitive pressure led to reductions in the profits of the most 
profitable firms over time, the force of competitive threat or contestability was far from 
perfect. A similar finding clearly rejecting the hypothesis that there is eventual 
convergence towards the same long-run profit rate for all firms is found by Goddard & 
Wilson (1999) based on a UK dataset containing profit data for 335 firms. Overall, these 
studies attribute these findings to the sustained efforts to the incumbents to innovate, which 
in turn enable them to impose entry and mobility barriers, resulting in less contestable 
markets.  
 
The studies reviewed above highlight the significance of investigating whether abnormal 
profits converge to the norm. In addition to this point, recent studies also focus on the 
potential factors explaining the persistence of profits. This has been a crucial issue, 
particularly for the banking sector. This is because the industry has been undergoing 
constant regulatory changes (e.g. regulation, deregulation, prudential reregulation, 
restructuring, consolidation) and a complete change in the characteristics of banking 
business (e.g. increasing non-traditional activities, developing technological infrastructure) 
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since the 1980s. These changes in turn might affect the market power of banks differently 
and hence profit rates may slowly converge to the industry norm, or not converge in some 
extreme cases. This conclusion is crucial from an anti-trust, regulatory and supervisory 
point of view, since understanding the determinants of persistence not only give insights 
into whether competitive equilibrium can be achieved without intervention, but which 
intervention is required to achieve a competitive outcome.  
 
The third stage focuses on the studies investigating the determinants of the persistence of 
profits in the banking sector. Some of these studies tend to place their attention on merely 
bank-specific and/or industry-specific factors, while others also take into consideration the 
impact of recent regulatory changes, institutional developments, and macro-economic 
factors on the profit persistence in the banking sector. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
many possible factors likely to influence the persistence of profits of banks have been used 
in the literature. We now briefly review the key determinants of bank profit persistence 
based on four categories: bank-specific, macroeconomic, industry-specific, regulatory, and 
institutional-external governance. 
 
First, the key bank-specific factors assumed to determine the profit persistence are bank 
size, earning management, operating efficiency, bank age and innovation. The effect of 
bank size appears to be non-linear, because while it can have a negative impact, due 
possibly to the bureaucratic bottleneck and managerial inefficiencies suffered by banks as 
they become ‘too large’ (Amidu and Harvey, 2016), it can have a positive impact on the 
persistence due to the economics of scale (Flamini et al., 2009). Earning management is 
assumed to protect insiders’ private control benefits by reducing outsider interference and 
appear to contribute to the persistence of profits while older banks are more likely to 
persist their profits as they accumulate a lot of know-how and experience, which in turn 
enable them to charge higher interest rates (Amidu and Harvey, 2016). Operating 
efficiency appears to have a positive relationship with profit persistence in the banking 
sector of four SSA countries (Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 2018). They attribute this 
finding to the fact that the more efficient banks are able to maintain a lower cost to income 
ratio, which in turn enhances their profitability (Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 2018). 
Another possible factor explaining the profit persistence is innovative activities such as 
ATM’s, mobile banking, internet/online banking, etc. On the one hand, adoption of new 
technologies or the offering of new services can generate market power stemming from 
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impediments to product market competition and informational opacity, which in turn 
enables the innovators to sustain their abnormal profits over time (Berger et al., 2000). 
These activities can also replace labour intensive methods with automated processes, 
reducing operational costs and thereby increasing profitability (Sumra et al., 2011). On the 
other hand, banks incur high infrastructure costs and high advertising expenses to adopt the 
new technologies or promote these new products or services; however, it takes time for 
customers to accustom to the new technological services and they require a certain level of 
education to use, these in turn might affect profitability negatively (Akhisar et al., 2015). 
 
Second, the key macroeconomic factors tested in the literature are GDP growth, inflation, 
and financial crisis. The GDP growth measures, introduced to control general economic 
development, seem to have a negative relationship with the persistence of profits (Goddard 
et al., 2011). This is arguably due to increasing business opportunities driven by economic 
growth, lowering the opportunity cost of entering into the banking sector and hence 
reducing entry barriers. The impact of inflation on profit persistence is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, one study suggests that banks increase their interest rate margins to deal with the 
negative effects of increasing inflation, which in turn lead to the persistence of profits 
(Amidu and Harvey, 2016). On the other hand, another study finds that inflation appears to 
exert little or no influence on profit persistence (Goddard et al., 2011). The financial crisis 
in 2008 appears to induce an increase in profit persistence, which would be the result of a 
number of ad hoc policy implementations (such as taxpayer-funded bailouts of large failing 
banks) that seems to prioritise stability over competition during the crisis period 
(Chronopoulos et al., 2015).  
 
Third, the key industry specific factors considered in the literature are ownership 
concentration, the level of concentration, and the intensity of competition in the banking 
sector. The ownership concentration hypothesis positing whether and to what extent 
ownership concentration and shareholder identity affect profit persistence has been tested 
for a sample of 331 Italian banks for the period 1997–2000 (Agostino et al., 2005). The 
study confirms the hypothesis that the bigger the fraction of shares held by banks or 
foundations, the higher the profit persistence. The industry concentration measure proxied 
by the average Herfindahl–Hirschman Index appears to have a positive relationship with 
the persistence of profits, which is attributed to the collusion hypothesis positing that 
explicit or implicit cooperation among incumbents, resulting in higher rates on loans and 
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lower interest rates on deposits (Goddard et al., 2011, 2001). On the other hand, the 
concentration does not contribute to the bank profit persistence in the banking sector of 
four SSA countries, suggesting that the overall impact of concentration on persistence is 
uncertain (Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 2018). The degree of competition, proxied by the 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistics and the Boone indicator, appears to exert a negative impact on 
the persistence of bank profit, suggesting that more intense competition weakens the ability 
of incumbents to sustain their profits (Amidu and Harvey, 2016; Goddard et al., 2011).   
 
Fourth, the studies focusing on the determinants of profit persistence also consider the 
regulatory developments and the institutional and external governance factors as possible 
determinants. The erection or enforcement of legal barriers to entry associates positively 
with profit persistence, suggesting that successful banks that are protected by entry barriers 
are better able to sustain their profitability over time (Goddard et al., 2011). However, the 
same study also finds that other regulatory factors (activity restrictions, capital regulation, 
and financial freedom) appear to have little or no significant impact on profit persistence. 
Another study focusing on the regulatory factor finds that deregulation eliminating the 
federal restrictions on interstate banking in the US banking sector resulted in reduced profit 
persistence, yet deregulatory policies are found to have resulted in an increase in profit 
persistence when they allowed banks to diversify across business segments (Chronopoulos 
et al., 2015). The institutional development and external governance factors such as 
economic freedom, transparency, law quality, bureaucratic quality, and institutional 
development appears to promote competition and this tends to reduce the persistence of 
profits (Amidu and Harvey, 2016; Goddard et al., 2011; Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 
2018). 
 
Overall, it can be concluded from the reviewed studies that there are considerable 
variations in the factors affecting profit persistence in different countries and their 
influence may change based on the country. The degree of profit persistence provides 
insights into the effectiveness of competition policies and the differences observed in their 
determinants indicate the need for tailor-made responses in different countries.  
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6.6 The Boone indicator 
A more recently developed measure of competition, taking into account dynamics in 
market and non-pricing strategies, is proposed by Boone (2008) and has become known as 
the Boone indicator (BI) in the literature. The BI is based on the idea that competition 
rewards efficiency and punishes inefficiency. It starts from the notion that more efficient 
banks (i.e. banks with lower marginal costs) gain market share or increase profits at the 
expense of less efficient counterparts. The indicator relies on this reallocation effect from 
inefficient banks to efficient ones, as Boone (2008) shows that this effect is monotonically 
increasing in the degree of competition. 77  In other words, the higher the intensity of 
competition, the greater the reallocation of market shares or profits from less efficient to 
more efficient banks, and vice versa. The BI theoretically supports the empirical findings 
of Stiroh and Strahan (2003) who found that increased competitive pressure leads to a 
substantial reallocation of assets towards more efficient banks.  
 
The intensity of competition is estimated from the following profit equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑖 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑐𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 (6.19) 
where 𝜋𝑖 stands for the profit of bank i and 𝑚𝑐𝑖 denotes the marginal cost of bank i, which 
is a proxy for efficiency. The coefficient 𝛽 is the BI and it is the elasticity of profits with 
respect to marginal cost, used as a measure of the degree of competition. In theory, this 
indicator is expected to be negative, as it reflects the fact that lower marginal costs (higher 
efficiency) are associated with higher profits. In other words, higher profits are achieved 
by more efficient banks. In addition, the magnitude of 𝛽 reflects the degree of competition 
so that the more negative 𝛽  indicates a higher level of competition as the effect of 
reallocation is stronger.  
 
Instead of using a log/log specification as in Eq. (6.20), it is also possible to estimate 
profits and marginal costs in levels. This allows one to use negative profit levels and 
                                                 
77 Boone (2008) considers two factors resulting in an increase in competition. One of the factors is a fall in 
entry barriers, enabling new banks to enter the market and hence the more competitive the sector should be. 
The other factor is the more aggressive interaction among incumbents. As long as the reallocation condition 
holds, the BI remains valid. 
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possibly eliminate the selection bias. However, the log specification, though ignoring 
negative profit values, enables one to interpret coefficient 𝛽  as elasticity. Moreover, 
(Boone et al., 2013) show that results are weakly sensitive to the exclusion of the negative 
profit values as this does not generate a bias in the estimates of PE. Therefore, most of the 
empirical studies tend to use a log/log specification. 
 
Some studies introduced modifications to the model in Eq. (6.21). First, it is associated 
with the computation of the marginal cost that cannot be observed directly. This variable 
has been approximated by the ratio of average variable costs to total income (or total 
assets) (Boone et al., 2004; Schaeck and Cihák, 2010). Since this approximation is likely to 
be distorted by the impact of scale economies, the observation-specific estimates of 
marginal costs, which are arguably more precise and in line with theory, has been derived 
by estimating a translog cost function (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). This practice also 
allows one to focus on segments of the banking sector such as the loan market where no 
direct observations of individual cost items are accessible. Second, efficient banks may 
prefer to transfer lower costs either into higher profits or into lower output prices to attain 
market share. Therefore, some studies employ the market share as a dependent variable to 
take the second possibility into account. This is because these studies argue that in a more 
competitive market banks are more likely to transfer efficient gains into lower output 
prices, which in turn increase their market shares (Tabak et al., 2012; van Leuvensteijn et 
al., 2013).  
 
The BI has a number of appealing properties. First, it overcomes the shortcomings of 
traditionally used concentration-based measures of competition (such as CRn, HHI index, 
Lerner index, etc.), as these measures can sometimes incorrectly suggest a fall in 
competition when the interaction among banks becomes more aggressive. That is, when 
competition becomes more intense, profits or market share are reallocated from inefficient 
banks to efficient banks. In this case, some banks may even go bankrupt as a result of the 
increased competition and leave the market. This raises concentration in the market, yet it 
cannot be interpreted as a fall in competition. Therefore, relying on these measures may 
result in misleading inferences as high concentration is deemed to be sign of a lack of 
competition. This is particularly crucial given the fact that recent literature has concluded 
that concentration is a poor proxy for competition in banking (Berger et al., 2004; Casu 
and Girardone, 2006; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Second, the BI can be obtained by 
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estimating a simple single-equation linear econometric specification and it does not require 
imposing any restrictive assumptions, unlike the Panzar and Rosse H-statistics requiring 
that the market must be in the long-run equilibrium. Third, the relationship between profit 
and cost is both continuous and monotonic, and hence higher competition implies that the 
value of β is larger in absolute terms (more negative). That is, while the identification of a 
situation from the PR H-statistics is ambiguous, the BI is monotonically related to 
competition. Fourth, estimating the BI requires data only on profits (or market shares) or 
costs and it can be easily calculated for a limited number of observations, which therefore 
makes it suitable for studies on developing countries where data can be a challenge. 
Moreover, if the costs are proxied by average costs this method does not need information 
on prices. Fifth, instead of considering an entire banking market, this method allows one to 
evaluate competition for different ownerships of banks and for several specific product 
markets such as the loan market. This in turn not only enables one to focus on which bank 
output is prone to more or less competitive pressure, but also it is possible to compare 
which bank type faces more competition  (Tabak et al., 2012). Finally, the BI may be time 
dependent - namely one can measure competition on annual basis - which in turn allows 
tracking down the evolution of competition over time.  
 
The BI, which is a relatively new approach used to measure competition, has been 
subjected to criticisms. First, this approach focuses solely on the relationship between 
profitability and marginal costs affected by competition, hence disregarding other aspects. 
For instance, efficient gains might not be translated into lower prices or higher profits in 
the short-run. This is because a bank may prefer to invest these gains (innovation, extend 
branch-network, etc.) to deal with competition in the future. Moreover, if an incumbent is 
faced with the threat of entry, it may adopt strategies to deal with competition (raise 
service quality, offer well-design products, etc.) instead of reducing prices. In such cases, if 
the incumbent offers the most highly demanded products, the increase in the incumbent’s 
costs because of these strategies are likely to be compensated by profitability increasing 
above the rise in its costs. Theoretically, this case would turn the prediction of Boone’s 
(2008) model upside down. In other words, the β coefficient might be positive when banks 
are competing on quality, making the identification impossible (Tabak et al., 2012).78 
                                                 
78 It is argued that as the market grows as a whole banks may increase their marginal costs to capture 
additional demand by the quality channel (Tabak et al., 2012). 
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Second, another criticism of Boone’s (2008) model is related to firm size. This model 
assumes that the most efficient firm must become the biggest firm with respect to market 
share and thereby, owing to its efficient level, it must make the greatest profit level. Yet it 
is argued that in reality, big firms are not necessarily the most efficient firm and hence it is 
possible to obtain a non-negative β parameter (Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010). 
Lastly, the BI might have the limitation of being an estimate and hence is surrounded by a 
degree of uncertainty (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). 
 
The BI, a new approach used to measure competition in empirical banking studies, has 
been gaining popularity among empirical studies. Researchers tend to adopt two or more 
measures of competition since the empirical results based on different competition 
measures can give different results. On the one hand, some studies measuring competition 
in cross-country and country specific cases using different models found conflicting and 
inconclusive results. For example, Delis (2012) used the BI as well as the Lerner index and 
CR3 to investigate market power in the banking industries of 84 countries across the 
world. This study suggests that competitive conditions are likely to improve more in 
countries which have advanced institutions and a high level of institutional development. 
This study also investigates to what extent this result is sensitive to the methods used to 
measure competition. It concludes that the results of the BI are in line with the results on 
the Lerner index, but the results on the CR3 are qualitatively and quantitatively different. 
Xu, van Rixtel and van Leuvensteijn (2016) used conventional indicators such as the 
Lerner index, PR H-statistics as well as BI to measure competitive conditions in China 
over the period 1966-2008. This study argues that conventional methods might not assess 
bank competition in China’s context correctly, largely due to the existence of interest rate 
regulations. It instead suggests that the BI, whose theoretical foundation is the concept of 
relative profit difference, is likely to result in a correct measurement of competition under 
both binding deposit and loan interest rate regulations. Liu, Molyneux and Wilson (2013) 
investigate to what extent different competition measures yield similar results. This study 
finds that the measures of competition derived using the Lerner index is significantly 
correlated with the ones derived by using the H-statistics and the POP. Yet the competition 
measures obtained from the estimation of the BI do not show any significant correlation 
with other competition measures, indicating that different methods may lead to 
inconsistent evaluation of competition. It can be inferred from these studies that different 
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measures do not provide the same information about competition, and thereby catch 
different aspects of competition (Degryse et al., 2009).  
 
On the other hand, some studies estimating multiple models to test the robustness of the 
results show that different models could yield similar results. For instance, Clerides, Delis 
and Kokas (2015) used the BI, Lerner index and the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index to 
measure competitive conditions for a large number of countries for the period 1997-2010. 
This study finds that these three methods produced similar patterns of competition over 
time, indicating that different methods can also yield similar results. In addition, this study 
also finds that competition differs across regions and income groups, and competition 
tends to be higher in developed countries compared to low-income countries, consistent 
with Delis (2012). Mirzaei and Moore (2014) examine the determinants of competition in a 
cross-country study case, where competition is measured by using the Lerner index and the 
BI. The study finds that the results are robust to alternative measures of competition. 
Therefore, the review of the above results indicates that the models used to measure 
competition can yield contradictory and inconclusive results across countries, within 
countries, and over time. This is arguably because as each method employed to estimate 
the competition has different theoretical underpinnings, assumptions and employs different 
data, thus it is not surprising that they sometimes yield conflicting results. Selection of the 
model largely depends on the purpose of a study, research questions, data availability and 
nature of data, i.e. bank level or industry level. Nevertheless, this does not mean that for 
some cases different indices can point to similar results regarding the level and pattern of 
competition observed or explanatory variables of some other variable. Thus, the literature 
suggests adopting a multiple model approach, which not only can contribute to the 
robustness of the results, but also can provide complementary results given that the models 
allow for different analysis of the dynamics of competition. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The significant role of the banking sector in an economy makes competition among banks 
an important and timely policy issue. Many empirical studies therefore seek to assess the 
determinants and implications of competition in the banking sector. Yet one first needs to 
measure the level and/or evolution of competition. In this chapter, we outlined the variety 
of ways used to measure banking sector competition. The literature on the measurement of 
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competition centres on two principal methods: structural and non-structural approaches. 
The structural approach, based on the SCP paradigm, infers the level of competition from 
the structure of an industry. The likelihood of collusion becomes higher in markets with 
fewer banks and high barriers to entry and exit. The structural approach has been subjected 
to criticism due to concerns over its conceptual framework and interpretation. First, it 
cannot identify the intensity of competition in the industry. Second, the framework fails to 
establish a clear causality between structure and performance. Third, the structure measure 
is unable to reflect market contestability. Lastly, the model fails to account for crucial 
banking characteristics influencing the competitive mechanism. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that this approach provides only limited information concerning market 
competitiveness. Non-structural approaches, which have their roots in the NEIO literature, 
instead attempt to measure the degree of competition directly by observing the pricing 
behaviour of banks in the market. These measures are thereby independent of the structure 
of the market. They can be grouped into two categories. The first-generation measures are 
based on the neoclassical model of oligopoly. This includes the Lerner index, the 
conjectural variation approach, and the Panzar and Rosse H-statistics. The second-
generation measures adopt a dynamic approach of competition associated with the Austrian 
School’s notion of competition. The BI and the POP model can be associated with the 
second-generation of works. It should be noted that each non-structural method is based on 
different assumptions and hence measures different things. The Lerner index investigates 
the average degree of pricing power in the banking market. The CV model assesses rivals’ 
reactions if a bank in the market raises its output by 1%. The PR H-statistics evaluates the 
transmission of changes in input prices to bank revenue. The BI relies on the notion that 
efficient banks are more highly rewarded in a more competitive banking sector. The POP 
model tests whether competition eliminates any abnormal profit quickly and bank profit 
rates converge rapidly towards their long-run equilibrium levels. Therefore, the measures 
of competition cannot be deemed as perfect substitutes. Each of these methods has its 
practical and theoretical advantages as well as its shortcomings. The Lerner index is a 
beneficial indicator of individual market power, yet it is not the best measure of 
competition. This is arguably because the average degree of market power may increase, 
reduce, or stay stable, even if individual Lerner indices decrease owing to the reallocation 
effect from inefficient to efficient banks. The PR H-statistics can be a useful indicator of 
competition in a static perspective. Yet it requires a strong assumption (long-run 
equilibrium, demand elasticity must be higher than one, etc.) that cannot always be realised 
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and tested. The BI accounts for the dynamic aspects of competition yet it may be unable to 
identify the degree of competition in the short-run. The POP model requiring sufficient 
time series banking data has led to the rather limited use of this method in empirical 
banking studies. Therefore, it can be concluded that different measures of competition 
should be used as each accounts for an aspect of competition. This research adopts this 
multiple-model approach for the robustness and completeness of empirical results and 
employ the BI and the POP models for our empirical study of the impact of the regulatory 
reforms on competition in the Turkish banking sector. The detailed justification for the 
choice of these models in favour of the extensively used first-generation non-structural 
methods will be given in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7  
The Impact of Regulatory Reforms on the Competition of Turkish Banks 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to assess the evolution of competition on the lending market during the 
regulatory reform period and to find out whether the degree of competition becomes 
stronger when the policy focus shifts after 2001. This study contributes to the literature on 
competition in the Turkish banking sector in several respects. First, this study focuses on 
the lending market rather than examining competition in the entire banking sector. The 
underlying reasons are that the loans market is the largest and most significant segment of 
the banking sector in Turkey. As of 2016, almost 70% of total earning assets are composed 
of total loans, in line with the primary financial intermediation role of commercial banks. 
Moreover, the deregulatory reforms are aimed at liberalising interest rates on deposits and 
loans, indicating that this segment was the primary target of the reforms. Furthermore, the 
recent wave of foreign bank penetration is expected to improve competitive conditions in 
the lending market, which has not been explicitly accounted for in the Turkish banking 
literature. Finally, the number of studies investigating the competitive dynamics of this 
segment is scarce, calling for more empirical evidence.  
 
Second, as explained in Chapter 6, this study estimates two complementary models, the 
POP and the BI, instead of the Panzar-Rosse model that has been widely used in the 
literature (Günalp and Çelik, 2006; Macit, 2012; Repkova and Stavarek, 2014). To our 
knowledge, only two studies on Turkey use the BI in their empirical research, yet they 
focus on the post-2001 period, which we will expand by including the pre-2001 period to 
capture the pre- and post-reform periods. The POP model to investigate the competitive 
dynamics in the lending market has never been used for the case of Turkey. Among other 
things, this model allows us to include a dummy variable for capturing the recent wave of 
foreign bank penetration. This will be the first attempt at explicitly accounting for the 
influence of foreign bank entry on the competitive dynamic of the lending market.  
 
Third, our rich panel dataset over the period 1988-2016 captures both the pre- and post-
reform periods. This not only enriches the reliability of estimation results and quality of 
empirical analysis, but also gives us a more effective mean of examining the policy effects 
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on competition. This improves the quality of the resulting policy suggestions and tackles 
the limitations of earlier empirical studies based on insufficient data. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the methodology 
adopted for the empirical estimation. Section 7.3 introduces variables and dataset. Section 
7.4 presents the estimation results of the POP and BI models and Section 7.5 concludes. 
 
7.2 Methodology 
As expounded in Chapter 6, we choose to rely on the POP and BI models as they 
circumvent many of the drawbacks of alternative approaches. In short, they are both 
dynamic models and one can measure the degree of competition over time and can also 
analyse the impact of regulatory changes on competition. Furthermore, they both assume 
interdependence between banks that react to competitive pressures stemming from 
regulatory changes and thus enable one to measure banks’ responsiveness to reform 
policies. In addition, these models allow one to evaluate competition for different 
ownerships of banks and for several specific product markets such as the loan market, 
instead of considering an entire banking market. This not only enables one to focus on 
which bank output is prone to more or less competitive pressure but it is also possible to 
compare which bank type faces more competition (Tabak et al., 2012).  
 
Additional motivations for the selection of the POP and BI models are their underlying 
theories, making them appropriate choices for our analysis. More specifically, the 
underlying theory of the POP model suggests that if entry and exit are sufficiently free, 
excess profits enjoyed by incumbent banks attract new entries, which in turn would 
eliminate any abnormal profits and then converge them towards the same long-run 
average. However, if these excess profits tend to persist from year to year, then there might 
be entry barriers or banks might be exploiting monopoly power. Accordingly, this model is 
a suitable choice for our case, since Turkish banking authorities have been implementing 
reforms involving the removal of restrictions on entry and the increase of the range of 
permissible activities, which are expected to eliminate any abnormal profits. Therefore, the 
persistence of profitability becomes less likely with increased competition driven by the 
reforms. With regards to the BI model, its underlying theory indicates that competition 
increases via two channels. First, it increases when bank products become closer 
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substitutes and banks interact more aggressively, and second when entry costs decline to 
facilitate the entry of new banks (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). The theory behind this 
model is that competition enhances the performance of efficient banks and impairs the 
performance of inefficient firms under both regimes of stronger substitution and amid 
lower entry costs, which is mirrored in their respective profits or market shares (Boone, 
2008). Therefore, the reforms undertaken by Turkish banking authorities have removed the 
entry restrictions which in turn are expected to decline entry costs. In addition, they have 
also created a level playing field among different banks, which is likely to stimulate the 
substitutability of products. Moreover, the reforms have aimed to improve the competition 
and efficiency of banks, thus creating an environment suitable to explore the relationship 
between competition and efficiency. The BI model is thus an appropriate choice for our 
study.  
 
7.2.1 Empirical specification and estimation method of the persistence of profits 
model 
The literature employing the POP model usually specifies a first-order autoregressive 
(AR(1)) model of banks’ profitability (e.g. Bektas, 2007; Kaplan and Celik, 2008; Goddard 
et al., 2011; Pervan, Pelivan and Arnerić, 2015). These studies tend to define profitability 
based on the type of competition being measured. For instance, to reflect a broader view of 
competition encapsulating a whole banking sector, profitability is measured as either the 
return on equity or the return on assets. The evidence of persistence of profitability is then 
interpreted as a signal of the intensity of competition (Glen et al., 2003).  
 
Since we focus on the loan market, we follow (Zhao et al., 2010) and utilise a partial 
adjustment AR(1) model where profit is measured as the gap between loan price and 
marginal cost, while controlling for macro and industry level external shocks. In addition 
to the practical advantages expounded in Section 7.1, this approach has empirical 
advantages when compared to widely adopted AR(1) models. This is arguably because this 
analysis directs the unspecified structural model of the POP literature to the profit 
maximising behaviour of banks. More specifically, in the AR(1) process the normalised 
profit rate of bank i between year t-1 and t represent the profitability. Yet the partial 
adjustment AR(1) approach obtains the measures of profitability from the gap between 
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loan price and marginal cost, which in turn gives this model a stronger theoretical basis for 
the empirical representation of competitive dynamics (Zhao et al., 2010).  
 
Assuming that credit intermediation still represents the primary activity of Turkish banks 
and these banks are price-setting profit maximisers, loan profitability is defined as the loan 
overcharge, which is calculated as the ratio of the price of loans to their marginal cost. The 
gap between loan price and marginal cost reflects banks’ perception of changes in the 
competitive environment. In the absence of competition, banks will overcharge by setting 
loan prices above marginal cost. The magnitude of this overcharge depends on the 
perceived elasticity of demand these banks face, which is a decreasing function of the 
degree of competition in the loan market. The higher the elasticity of demand for a profit-
maximising bank, the closer loan price will be to marginal cost and vice versa. This 
implies that persistence of profitability becomes less likely with increased competitive 
pressures. On the other hand, if there is perfect competition in the market, this implies that 
the elasticity of demand is infinite and banks will set loan price equal to marginal cost, 
making the loan overcharge equal to one. This indicates that competition eliminates any 
abnormal loan overcharge quickly and bank profits converge rapidly towards their long-
run equilibrium values.  
 
Considering the marginal cost as the benchmark price under perfect competition, the 
adjustment of the loan overcharge (LOC) to unity implies the dynamic evolution from 
imperfect competition to perfect competition. Therefore, we formulate our partial 
adjustment AR(1) model of loan price overcharge by following Zhao et al. (2010), as 
follows: 
(ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶it − ln𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1)) = λ(ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ − ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1)) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (7.1) 
 
In equation (7.1), 𝐿𝑂𝐶it is the loan overcharge
79 of bank i at time t, defined as the ratio of 
imputed performing loan price80 over their marginal cost,81  𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) is the overcharge at 
                                                 
79 The loan overcharge is estimated on performing loans. This allows us to account for the riskiness of bank 
loan portfolios. Since we employ the imputed price of performing loans, we take into account the aggregate 
mean interest rate and disregard the effect of non-price loan characteristics, e.g. different maturity structures, 
different amounts, etc., on the interest rate charged on loans. However, since we are interested in the change 
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time t-1. 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗  represents the loan overcharge realised under perfect competition. That is, 
it is unity and hence it becomes zero when taking logs. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term, 
assumed to be 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∼  iid (0, σ
2). The parameter 𝜆  in Eq. (7.1) represents the speed of 
adjustment towards the optimum loan overcharge ( 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ ) realised under perfect 
competition. The adjustment parameter 𝜆 is expected to take a value between zero and one. 
Moreover, the larger the value of 𝜆  is the faster the adjustment speed to perfectly 
competitive loan prices, while lower values of 𝜆 reflects a less competitive environment as 
the adjustment towards perfect competition is slow. Yet in a case where 𝜆 = 1 it implies 
that the change in loan pricing mirrors the optimum change and hence a case of perfect 
competition since the loan overcharge is equal to the optimum loan overcharge.  
 
To answer our research questions concerning the impact of regulatory reforms and foreign 
bank penetration on the dynamics of competition, we introduce a bilateral policy shift (PD) 
and foreign bank penetration (FB_Entry) dummy. As defined earlier in Section 5.4, the 
whole regulatory reform process in Turkish banking can be divided into two stages: in the 
first stage policies focused on deregulation aiming at increasing competition (1988-2001), 
and in a second stage (post-2001), policies have focused on strengthening the stability of 
banks via implementing prudential re-regulations. This dummy is therefore set equal to 1 
for the period 2002-2014, while it takes a value of 0 for 1988-2001. The dummy is created 
to compare the periods before and after 2001, when the main regulatory changes took 
place. On the other hand, FB_Entry stands for the bilateral heavy foreign bank penetration 
dummy. As discussed  in Section 5.4, heavy penetration of foreign banks took place after 
2005;  this dummy is set equal to 1 for the period 2005-2016, while it takes a value of 0 for 
1988-2004. Our model specification reads as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
of the ratio of loan price over marginal cost rather than the exact level of loan price, this limitation would 
lead to a serious effect on our findings. A similar approach was adopted by (Zhao et al., 2010). 
80 The imputed price of performing loans is calculated as the ratio of interest income on loans to total 
performing loans. 
81 Marginal costs are not directly observable, thus one needs to obtain them indirectly. Schaeck and Cihak 
(2010) approximate a firm's marginal costs by the ratio of average variable costs to total income. Yet we opt 
to estimate the marginal costs for each bank in the sample from the estimation of Eq. (5.1). The estimation 
procedure of these will be explained in Appendix 7.1.  
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(ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶it − ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1)) ⁡= λ(ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ − ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1)) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡+⁡𝛾𝑃𝐷⁡(ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ − ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡+⁡𝜑𝐹𝐵_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡(ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ − ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1)) + uit 
 
(7.2) 
where 𝛾  is the adjustment parameter representing the speed of adjustment of the 
overcharge to unity and takes a value between 0 and 1. γ measures the change in the speed 
of adjustment between 1998-2001 and 2002-2016, and 0 < λ+⁡𝛾 < 1. An estimated 𝛾 < 0 
will indicate a slower speed of adjustment towards perfectly competitive loan prices in 
2002-2016 (and vice versa). In other words, the change in policy focus has led to weaker 
competition. If 𝛾is not significant, this indicates that there is no significant change in the 
level of competition between the two periods.⁡𝜑 represents the speed of adjustment of the 
overcharge towards unity and is expected to be 0 < 𝜑⁡< 1. The interaction term between 
FB_entry and (ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ − ln𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1)) gives us the speed of adjustment between 1998-
2004 and 2005-2016 and 0 < λ+𝜑 < 1. If the coefficient 𝜑 is negative this indicates a 
slower adjustment speed towards perfectly competitive loan prices in 2005-2016 (and vice 
versa). This also means that the heavy penetration of foreign banks has led to a decline in 
competition. If the 𝜑⁡coefficient is not significant, this indicates that there is no significant 
change in the level of competition between the two periods. 
 
As defined above, the optimum loan overcharge, ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ , reflects the loan overcharge of 
perfect competition where the loan price is equal to marginal cost, thus ln𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗  is unity 
and once the log of this variable is taken we get zero. Therefore, substituting this in Eq. 
(7.1), and rearranging this equation results in: 
ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶it = α ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) + ⁡𝛿𝑃𝐷 ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) + 𝜇𝐹𝐵_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) + uit (7.3) 
 
where  α = 1 − λ , 𝛿 = −𝛾,⁡𝜇 = −𝜑 . In Eq. (7.3) α is the persistence parameter since it 
measures the persistence of ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) into ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶it. A significant and negative 𝛿 means 
a significantly positive 𝛾, which in turn would indicate a reduction in the persistence of the 
loan overcharge in the period 2002-2016 compared to 1988-2001 (and vice versa). This in 
turn could imply an increase in the intensity of competition due to the shift in policy focus. 
Put differently, α reflects the persistence of the overcharge during the pre-reform period, 
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while α + 𝛿  measures the post-reform persistence of loan overcharge. If 𝛿  is not 
significant, then there is no change in the persistence and hence no change in competition 
between the two periods. On the other hand, a significant and negative 𝜇  means a 
significantly positive 𝜑, which in turn would indicate a reduction in the persistence of the 
loan overcharge in the period 2005-2016 compared to 1988-2004 (and vice versa). This in 
turn could imply an increase in the intensity of competition due to the heavy penetration of 
foreign banks. Put differently, α reflects the persistence of the overcharge during the pre-
reform period, while α + 𝜇 measures the post-reform persistence of loan overcharge. If 𝜇 is 
not significant, then there is no change in the persistence and hence no change in 
competition between the two periods. As a priori we expect that the heavy foreign bank 
penetration experienced after 2005 is likely to result in improvements in the competitive 
conditions of the Turkish banking sector, because to protect their market shares against 
these newcomers that are likely to have superior information technologies and 
management skills incumbent banks would respond competitively.  
 
To complete our model, we also take into account macroeconomic and industry level 
external shocks that could potentially influence changes in the loan overcharge in the 
model. Therefore, our complete estimable POP model is specified as follows: 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶it = α ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) + ⁡𝛿𝑃𝐷 ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶i(t−1) + 𝜇𝐹𝐵_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
+ 𝜏𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝜔𝑇𝐷 + uit (7.4) 
 
where RGDP stands for real GDP growth rate. It is expected that high economic growth 
increases business opportunities, hinders business and credit risk, and hence renders a 
lower loan overcharge. On the other hand, slowing economic growth limits business 
opportunities, enhances business and credit risks, and potentially increases default risks, 
resulting in an increase in loan overcharge (Flamini et al., 2009). Therefore, we expect a 
negative association between real GDP growth and the loan overcharge. TD represents 
time dummies incorporated into the model, which takes one in year t and otherwise zero. 
This captures exogenous external industry and macro-level variables, namely growth of 
demand for banks loans, competitive pressures on the banking sector imposed by non-
banking financial institutions, monetary and macroeconomic shocks, opacity of 
informational environment in the loan market, etc. It is argued that these variables could 
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result in asymmetric changes in costs and the profit maximising price and hence need to be 
controlled for (Zhao et al., 2010). Moreover, as it will be explained below, our preferred 
estimation methods, difference and system generalised method of moments (GMM), 
require that the autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard 
errors assume no correlation across banks in the case of idiosyncratic disturbances, an 
assumption which is likely to be hold when one incorporates time dummies into the model 
(Roodman, 2009a). 
 
Having data over time for the same banks in turn allows us to scrutinise dynamic 
relationships, something that cannot be done with a single cross-section and also enables 
us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The estimable model we presented 
in Eq. (7.4) is a dynamic panel data model, specifying that the dependent variable for a 
bank depends in part on its values in previous years. Since we model lagged dependent 
variables as well as their interactions with policy shift and a foreign bank entry dummy as 
explanatory variables, this in turn is expected to result in an endogeneity problem. More 
specifically, one immediate problem in applying OLS in this dynamic model is that the 
lagged dependent variables will be correlated with the unobserved individual effect in the 
error term, which result in “dynamic panel bias” (Nickell, 1981). To circumvent this 
potential endogeneity issue, the literature suggests two ways (Roodman, 2009a). One way 
is to transform the data to remove the unobserved individual effects, other way is to 
instrument the lagged dependent variable and other similarly endogenous variables with 
variables assumed to be uncorrelated with the unobserved individual effects. The former 
approach aims to remove the unobserved individual effects out of the error term by 
incorporating dummies for each individual. Although these transformations draw the 
unobserved individual effects from the model, they cannot fully eliminate the dynamic 
panel bias since the transformed lagged dependent variable and transformed error are still 
correlated after these transformations. The latter approach applies either a mean deviation 
or first difference transformation. The mean deviation transformation approach also cannot 
fully eliminate bias; that is, IV estimation employing lags is not possible because the lags 
of the dependent variable are embedded in the transformed error term, therefore using 
them as an instrument of the lagged dependent variable would not allow this bias to 
disappear (Judson and Owen, 1999). By contrast, although the first-difference estimator is 
also inconsistent, IV estimators of the first-difference model using appropriate lags of the 
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dependent variable as instruments result in consistent parameter estimates (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005).  
 
The IV estimation of the first-difference dynamic panel model is proposed by Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981), where the second-order lag of the dependent variable, assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the transformed error term, is used as an instrument for the first 
difference of the lagged dependent variable. Then they estimate a first differenced two-
stage least squares approach. However, it is argued that even if all the available 
instruments are used, this method is not as efficient as a GMM approach. For example, 
more efficient IV estimators can be acquired by employing additional lags of the 
dependent variable as an instrument, the estimator is then called the Arellano-Bond 
estimator following the seminal paper of Arellano and Bond (1991), who elaborated on the 
implementation of the estimator and suggested tests of the crucial assumption that error 
terms are serially uncorrelated. 
 
The Arellano-Bond estimator has been used to obtain two different IV estimators. First, the 
two-stage least square estimator, also called the one-step estimator. Since the model is 
overidentified, a more efficient estimation is possible by employing an optimal GMM, also 
called the two-step estimator. Many empirical studies have used the one-step estimator as 
simulation studies have reported very little efficiency gains from the two-step estimator. 
Furthermore, this estimator underestimates standard errors, specifically in the presence of a 
large number of instruments. The problem with standard errors in the two-step estimator is 
largely inevitable when the sample is small. However, a correction to standard errors, 
yielding more accurate standard errors, has been suggested by Windmeijer (2005). The 
author found that the two-step estimator with accurate standard errors has performed better 
than the robust one-step estimator in terms of lower bias and standard errors, and thus the 
two-step GMM estimator is considered as a superior approach than the one-step GMM. 
 
The Arellano-Bond estimator utilises an IV estimator relying on the assumption that the 
second-order, third-order, etc. lagged dependent variables are not correlated with the first-
differenced error term, enabling the lags of the dependent variables to be used as 
instruments in the first-differenced dynamic panel models. Yet several studies suggest 
employing additional moment conditions to acquire an estimator with improved precision 
and better finite-sample features (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Specifically, Arellano and 
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Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) use moment conditions from both a first-
difference equation and levels equation as instruments, therefore there are more 
instruments and this is likely to result in more efficiency in estimation. Moreover, the 
system GMM arguably reduces potential biases in finite samples, yet consistency of the 
estimator relies on both the validity of the assumption that the error term is free of second-
order autocorrelation and the validity of instruments (Goddard et al., 2011).  
 
One needs to undertake some specification tests to ensure that the GMM estimators are 
consistent. First, specification tests check whether there is a serial correlation in errors. 
More specifically, it is assumed that error terms are serially uncorrelated, but since a 
lagged dependent variable is included, we expect to have a first-order serial correlation, yet 
there should not be a second-order serial correlation because the moment conditions would 
be invalid in this case (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The Sargan test has been widely used 
to control if there is a serial correlation in errors, which has a null of no serial correlation 
and follow a standard normal distribution. For the first-order serial correlation test, we 
expect to reject the null, while the second-order correlation test should be accepted. 
Second, specification tests control overidentifying restrictions. It is important that 
instruments are exogenous and one should test if the model is overidentified using the 
Sargan test. If the model is just-identified the GMM estimation will pick the parameters, 
making the correlation between the instrument and the error term (the moment condition) 
equal to zero. Finally, one should also consider the issue of having too many instruments. 
This is because there are potentially a large number of instruments when time period 
increases. More specifically, the difference and system GMM estimators can create 
conditions prolifically, where the number of instruments counts quadratic in the time 
dimension of the panel dataset (Roodman, 2009a). Therefore, a large number of 
instruments might actually increase bias since the finite sample may lack adequate 
information to estimate such a large matrix properly. For example, in a simulation study 
based on difference GMM regression shows that dropping the number of instruments from 
28 to 13 reduced the average bias in the two-step estimate of the parameter of interest by 
40% (Windmeijer, 2005). Similarly, another simulation study based on a system GMM 
regression reports that increasing the number of instruments from five to ten resulted in an 
increase in the actual value of the parameter of interest by 7.5% (Roodman, 2009b). 
Therefore, it is suggested to report the number of instruments and to test the robustness of 
results to reducing it.  
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7.2.2 Empirical modelling and estimation technique of the Boone indicator  
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the BI model measures the impact of efficiency on 
performance (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). With regards to model specification, a review 
of the empirical literature on banking competition reveals that marginal cost is used as a 
proxy for efficiency of banks while profit or market share is employed as a proxy for 
performance (Brissimis et al., 2014; Delis, 2012; Schaek and Cihák, 2008; van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2014). Moreover, when the literature focuses on 
analysing competition in the entire banking market, profits are used to measure 
performance; when it focuses on analysing the loan market, market shares are utilised to 
measure performance. 
 
As indicated earlier, since this chapter focuses on analysing the dynamics of competition in 
the Turkish loan market, we follow van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) in formulating our BI 
model, using marginal cost as a proxy for bank efficiency and market share of loans as a 
proxy for bank performance. A crucial advantage of using marginal costs is that it allows 
us to focus on segments of the banking market such as the loan market, where no direct 
observations of individual cost items are available. Since this study aims to investigate 
competition in the loan market of the Turkish banking sector, this approach is expected to 
lead to more precise results. Using market shares instead of profits as a dependent variable 
are more consistent with the theory suggesting that efficiency gains induce lower output 
prices, which in turn increase market share. Furthermore, this effect would be stronger in 
more competitive markets since efficiency would increase market share more than in non-
competitive markets (Boone, 2008). In addition, market share values are always positive 
whereas profit values might be negative at times. Therefore, given the log-log structure of 
the BI model, using market shares would shield us from sample bias (van Leuvensteijn et 
al., 2011). As such, we specify our estimable log-log model, 82  tracking competition 
changes between 1988 and 2016, as follows: 
 
                                                 
82 This specification allows us to handle the heteroscedasticity problem. 
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ln𝑀𝑆it = α +∑𝛽𝑡𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
+∑𝜗𝑡𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1
+ uit 
(7.5) 
  
In Eq. (7.5) 𝑇𝐷𝑡  are time dummies, taking one in year t and otherwise zero, and are 
introduced to account for elements common to all banks in the sector and specific to each 
year; MSit stands for market share of loans of bank i in year t, measured as the share of 
each bank’s performing loans to the total industry loan;⁡⁡MCit is the marginal cost of bank i 
in year t, not directly observable, thus we derived them with similar procedures adopted 
during the POP estimation and will be explained in the Appendix 7.1; uit is error term, 
with uit~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎
2). The vector of parameters 𝛽𝑡 represents the BIs, which are estimated 
for every year. Since it is time dependent it measures annual competition, allowing use to 
track down its evolution over time. The coefficient β is expected to be negative (β < 0), 
since the market shares increase for banks with lower marginal costs. Therefore, an 
increase in competition enhances the market share of a more efficient bank relative to a 
less efficient one. A larger negative value of β hence indicates more intense competitive 
conditions in banking sector (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the literature 
also finds positive values of β, indicating that the higher a bank’s marginal costs, the more 
market share it gains. It is argued that in the case of a positive β, either the banking sector 
has an extreme level of collusion or the banks are competing on quality (Kasman and 
Kasman, 2015).   
 
With regards to the estimation technique of the BI model, we use the Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) approach. This is because higher market shares are likely to reduce 
marginal costs due to scale economies. This indicates that larger market shares are likely to 
go hand in hand with lower marginal costs, implying that marginal costs might be 
endogenous (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). Therefore, to account for this potential 
endogeneity issue we use the GMM approach with an instrumental variable, the one- and 
two-year lagged value of the explanatory variable, marginal cost. Two specification tests 
following the estimation will be implemented to ensure that the GMM estimators are 
robust. First, the Hansen J-test used to test overidentification for all instruments is applied 
(Hayashi, 2000). The joint null hypothesis of this test is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, namely uncorrelated with the error term. Therefore, rejection of this 
hypothesis would challenge the validity of the instruments. Second, the Kleibergen and 
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Paap (2006) likelihood test is undertaken to test the relevance of excluded instrument 
variables. The null hypothesis suggests that the equation is underidentified. Therefore, 
rejection of this hypothesis implies that the model is identified. In addition to these 
specification tests, we also ensure that standard errors are heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust by setting the bandwidth in the estimation at two periods and 
applying the Newey-West kernel suggested by van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011). 
 
7.3 Variables and data 
To carry out our empirical analysis, we estimate two models: the POP and the BI. As 
mentioned before, estimation of these models requires marginal cost variables, which are 
not directly observable. Therefore, instead of using average variable cost as a proxy for 
marginal costs, we used the estimates of the translog cost frontier model presented in Eq. 
(5.1) to derive the marginal costs (see Appendix 7.1). This derivation method is arguably 
more precise and more closely in line with theory (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). Since we 
already defined the variable used in the estimation of the translog cost function in Section 
5.3, we now focus on the other variables of the POP and BI models.  
 
For the POP model, the loan overcharge is measured by the ratio of price of loans to 
marginal costs of loans. Since the price of loans also cannot be directly observable, we 
compute this by dividing the interest income on loans reported in the income statement to 
performing loans. Performing loans are simply calculated by deducting non-performing 
loans from gross loans, this in turn is expected to control for loan quality due to the 
heterogeneity in the quality of loans among banks and high NPLs ratio during the crises. 
With regards to the BI model, the market shares of performing loans are calculated by 
dividing each bank’s performing loan portfolio in a specific year by the industry total loan 
portfolio for the specific year. It is argued that market shares have comparative advantages 
against profits. This is because market shares are always positive, while the range of profits 
might sometimes be negative. Therefore, the log linear specification of the BI would 
exclude the negative values and the estimation results could be distorted by sample bias 
since inefficient, loss-making banks would have to be ignored (van Leuvensteijn et al., 
2011). GDP growth rate is obtained from the World Bank database. Descriptive statistics of 
the key variables are presented in Table 7.1.  
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We obtain our data from the unconsolidated financial statements and annual reports of 
banks, which have been made available by the Bank Association of Turkey (BAT). We use 
a panel dataset consisting of annual bank-level data for commercial banks in the Turkish 
banking industry during the period 1988-2016.83 Due to closures, mergers, acquisitions, 
and new entrants the numbers of banks has changed over time, resulting in an unbalanced 
dataset with 51 banks having operated or currently operating during the sample period. 
Unlike any other studies investigating the efficiency of Turkish banks, the period of 
analysis runs from 1988 to 2016, allowing us to investigate the long-term impacts of 
structural changes (foreign banks entry) and policy shifts on the dynamics of competition 
in the Turkish commercial banking sector. We refer to Section 5.3.1 to avoid repetition 
concerning the challenges in the construction of our dataset. All the bank-level data are in 
millions Turkish Lira and are adjusted to real values using the CPI index with 1998 as the 
base year. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics of the key variables (1988-2016) 
 
Loan overcharge Price of loans Marginal cost of loans 
1988 1.250346 0.37585 0.301131 
1992 1.914412 0.41586 0.387127 
1996 1.331456 0.312339 0.260732 
1999 1.200432 0.438336 0.448055 
2001 0.820166 2.278573 4.801245 
2005 1.01439 0.147952 0.166498 
2009 1.405448 0.157384 0.113527 
2013 1.42523 0.087631 0.063835 
2016 1.540688 0.10533 0.070922 
 
 
                                                 
83Similar to the previous empirical chapter on the banking efficiency, we exclude Islamic banks, development 
and investment banks, foreign banks operating as a single branch, and banks under the deposit insurance fund 
since we assume that these banks have different structures as well as objectives (see Section 5.3.1 for more 
details). 
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Table 7.1 shows that the trend in the price and marginal cost of loans follows a similar 
pattern. It should be noted that there is a significant jump in 2001, largely due to the twin 
crises increasing costs and reduction in loans during the crises. It appears that the price and 
marginal cost of loans are relatively lower in the post-2001 period. With regards to loan 
overcharge, after an increase in the early period, this value shows a decreasing trend from 
1992 to 2001. Yet after this year, the mean values have constantly increased until the end 
of our sample data, which might indicate that banks have been exercising market power, 
allowing them to set loan prices over the norm values.  
 
7.4 Estimation results  
7.4.1 Estimating the persistence of profits 
The first estimation approach we adopt is the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator, 
using the lagged levels of the differenced lagged dependent variable as instruments. For 
robustness, this study also estimates the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator, 
augmenting the former by adding a level equation instrument utilising lagged differences. 
Both estimators are run in their more asymptotically efficient two-step forms, with 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. In addition, we carried out four different 
specifications on the models, with and without time dummies, to examine how sensitive 
our estimation to the number of instruments was. In addition, although we have N that is 
larger than T, a fundamental requirement in dynamic panel models, due to our research 
questions we need to take a relatively long time span (29 years) into consideration. 
Therefore, to avoid instrument proliferation,84 as suggested by Rodman (2009a), we restrict 
the number of lags to one to limit the number of instruments used.  
 
Table 7.2 reports estimates of the persistence of loan overcharge coefficients in Eq. (7.4) 
by four different model specifications. The models produce consistent results: the second-
order correlation tests suggest that the estimations are appropriately specified and we pass 
the overidentifying restrictions test necessary for consistency. The changes in the number 
of instruments do not induce significant changes in coefficients within the models. The 
                                                 
84 The difference and system GMM estimators can create moment conditions prolifically, with the instrument 
count quadratic in the time dimension of the panel T, which in turn is likely to culminate in a bias in finite 
samples (Rodman, 2009). 
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estimated coefficients on the one-period lag of the overcharge is α for 1988-2001 and α + δ 
for 2002-2016. As expected, this study finds that all αs are positive and significant. 
However, all the estimated δs are highly insignificant, implying that the regulatory reforms 
introduced as of 2002 had no discernible impact on the competitiveness of the Turkish 
commercial banking sector.85 In other words, this finding also implies that the elimination 
of abnormal loan overcharge via competition is by no means instantaneous and banks are 
able to retain a significant portion of their abnormal loan overcharges from year to year. A 
possible explanation might be that prudential regulations are multi-faceted, i.e. they 
impose a series of policies on banks such as tighter restrictions on bank activities, greater 
capital regulation stringency, strengthening of official supervisory power, and market-
based monitoring. As expounded in Section 3.5, individual policies might induce different 
impacts on the competitive structure of the banking sector. Since we are unable to account 
for the multi-faceted nature of prudential regulations due to data limitation, each 
regulation’s impact might have cancelled the other out.  
 
There is only one study investigating the impact of restructuring reforms on the 
competition of the whole Turkish banking sector (Yildirim, 2014). Firstly, this study 
investigates the whole banking sector and also adopts a different approach to capture the 
effect of regulatory changes. It divides 2002-2011 into two sub-periods and compares the 
average persistence coefficients between them, and hence the change in coefficients is 
expected to reflect changes in competitive pressure due to regulatory reforms. Similar to 
our finding, this study concludes that there was no significant change in competitive 
conditions following implementation of the post-2002 regulatory reforms. Moreover, this 
study’s persistence coefficient is much lower (0.46), while our estimated persistence 
parameters are quite high, probably since we are looking specifically at the convergence of 
price towards marginal cost and hence we set a higher benchmark on the convergence 
process. Moreover, higher persistence coefficients are obtained by studies focusing on 
developing countries that are more likely to have less competitive banking sectors than 
developed countries (Poshakwale and Qian, 2011). Our finding contradicts the previous 
studies by using time series analysis and adopting unit root tests to assess the persistence of 
                                                 
85 We consider different scenarios where policy shift dummy variables moved from 2001 to 2002 due to the 
possible lagged effect of the impact of the reforms and foreign bank penetration. The result was robust to 
different cut-off points in the policy shift dummy (PD). 
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profits in the Turkish banking sector (Bektas, 2007; Kaplan and Celik, 2008). Any 
controversy is likely to arise from different methodology and estimation approaches.  
 
In line with our other research question, this study also investigates whether the heavy 
penetration of foreign banks into the Turkish banking sector since 2005 has improved 
competitive conditions. The estimated parameters derived from four models, μs, indicate 
that although negative estimators would indicate a drop in the persistence of loan 
overcharge due to the penetration of foreign banks, mirroring an increase in competitive 
conditions, all estimators are not significant, implying that their penetration has actually 
not had a discernible impact on competitiveness in the sector. This study contradicts the 
hypothesis that foreign bank entry is likely to contribute competitive structure by forcing 
domestic banks to lower their costs (Clarke et al., 2003). Yet a similar finding is also found 
by Yildirim (2014). A possible explanation is that these foreign banks have entered the 
Turkish banking sector through acquisition (takeover) of mid-sized domestic private banks 
and not via establishing new greenfield entities. As expounded in Section 3.5, greenfield 
banks are more likely to be more competitive than takeover banks (Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2007). Moreover, greenfield banks are more likely to 
import superior screening technologies, which in turn would force domestic banks to be 
more competitive to protect their market shares against these banks. Another possible 
explanation is that foreign banks tend to follow their customers or prefer to extend loans to 
large, profitable and informational transparent corporates (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 
2004; Peria and Mody, 2004). Yet, the share of SMEs credit has been growing in the 
Turkish banking sector. For example, after a decline during the global financial crisis, 
SMEs’ credits increased more than three times between 2009 and 2014 (Terzi, 2015). 
Therefore, due to the increasing importance of SMEs lending, foreign bank entry may not 
result in improvements in competition in the lending market.  
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Table 7.2 Results of the estimation of the persistence of profits model 
Parameter 
Arellano-Bond 
Difference GMM 
Blundell-Bond 
System GMM 
With time 
dummies 
(1) 
Without time 
dummies 
(2) 
With time 
dummies 
(3) 
Without time 
dummies 
(4) 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶t−1   α 0.549*** 0.589*** 0.767*** 0.811*** 
  (0.128) (0.116) (0.209) (0.092) 
𝑃𝐷∗ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶t−1   δ 0.029 0.032 -0.087 0.015 
  (0.136) (0.125) (0.437) (0.127) 
𝐹𝐵_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦∗ ln 𝐿𝑂𝐶t−1   μ -0.017 -0.071 -0.239 -0.073 
  (0.143) (0.112) (0.302) (0.077) 
RGDP   τ 0.035 0.001 0.035 0.004 
  (0.021) (0.005) (0.039) (0.004) 
 
Number of 
instruments 
 
55 29 84 58 
 
AR test (p-value) 
     
   ord 1  0.006 0.004 0.021 0.002 
   ord 2  0.882 0.523 0.819 0.563 
 
Sargan test (p-value) 
 
 
0.387 
 
0.056 
 
0.999 
 
0.651 
 
Note: Eq. (7.4) is estimated using the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond GMM approaches (SD in 
parenthesis). AR test is the p-value for the test for first- and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. 
Sargan test is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. The 
coefficients of time dummies for the model (1) and (3) are not shown in the table since the number of 
time dummies are quite large (29). Superscripts ***, **, and * imply significance at 1%, 5% or 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
7.4.2 Estimating the Boone indicator  
To double-check the robustness of the POP model results, we present the estimation results 
of the complementary BI model in this section. The BI model of Eq. (7.5) expects a 
negative association between marginal costs and market share through “reallocation 
process”, benefitting efficient banks. In general, although there is no benchmark for the 
level of coefficients, the more negative the coefficients are, the stronger competition must 
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be. As expounded in Section 7.2.2, due to the potential endogeneity of marginal cost with 
market shares, we estimate Eq. (7.5) using the GMM approach with instrumental variables 
(GMM-IV). Two models are estimated using this method. First, the model with 1-year 
lagged values is an exactly identified equation (number of explanatory variables are equal 
to number of instruments), therefore the GMM-IV estimator is merely the standard two-
stage least square (2SLS) estimator. Second, the model with two-year lagged values is an 
overidentified equation, thus GMM-IV estimates will be more efficient than 2SLS 
estimates. Following the estimations of these two models, we undertake hypothesis tests to 
ensure consistency. We used kernel-based Heteroscedastic and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) variance estimators to correct standard errors. The model with two-year lag passes 
the Hansen-J test, indicating that instruments are not correlated with error term, yet it fails 
to pass the Kleibergen-Paap LR test, implying that the model is underidentified. The model 
with one-year lag passes the Kleibergen-Paap LR test, but since it is an exactly identified 
equation, the Hansen J-test is reported as 0.00. This indicates that our preferred model can 
be the one with one-year lag estimated with 2SLS. However, we also undertake a Hausman 
test to control whether the potential endogeneity of marginal cost exists in our preferred 
model. The critical value of this test is 0.110, thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This 
result implies that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as 
exogenous. Therefore, we also estimate the model in Eq. (7.5) using a fixed-effects 
(without IV) estimator with robust standard error for comparison and robustness.  
 
All three estimation results are presented in Table 7.3. It appears from the table that point 
estimates change very little between the models. The table shows that not all estimations 
are significant and towards the end of sample period they also tend to become positive 
values instead of the expected negative values. Firstly, we carry out a Wald test to control 
whether the successive annual estimates over time do not differ significantly from zero. 
The test result chi2(28) = 215.16 (p-value 0.000) indicates that, generally speaking, they 
are significantly different from zero. In addition, non-significant estimations are also 
obtained by other studies (see van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). The positive estimates, which 
might signal either an extreme level of collusion or that banks are competing on quality, 
indicate that banks faced a less competitive environment during these years. Similar to our 
findings, Kasman and Kasman (2015), investigating competition in the Turkish banking 
sector  during 2002-2012 using the BI, also get positive values for their estimates around 
2011. Moreover, Aydemir (2013), who investigates if collusion exists in the Turkish 
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banking sector, finds that the eight largest Turkish banks actually colluded in the loan 
market from 1988 to 2009, which is likely to explain the positive coefficients we obtained.  
 
The pattern of BI estimates of fixed-effects (FE) and 2SLS are depicted in Figure 7.1. It 
appears from the figure that the results from two estimators in general show similar trends. 
Once we investigate the estimated indiators over time, it can be inferred that competition 
shows a non-monotonic trend over time, requiring more in-depth analysis. That is, there 
are significant differences in competition on a yearly basis, indicating that competition 
levels have changed dramatically over time. The figure indicates that competition tends to 
decrease in the early years of the sample despite the implementation of deregulatory 
policies. This finding might partly be attributed to the dominant role of state banks,86 
possibly aggravating competition in the loan market (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). 
However, estimated coefficients of the Boone model indicate that competition shows an 
increasing trend between 1992 and 1996, with the exception of a drop in 1994 due possibly 
to the domestic financial crisis in this year. Yet competition experienced a drop for two 
years after this increasing trend. This drop might partly be attributed to the fact that during 
this period 87  banks tended to invest their resources in government securities due to 
lucrative returns, which in turn reduced loanable funds available for private sector lending. 
The figure reveals that, according to FE results, competition tends to show a significant 
increasing trend from 1998 to 2006, while this trend carries on until 2008, according to the 
2SLS estimation. After these years, 2006 for FE and 2008 for 2SLS, the Turkish banking 
sector witnesses a less competitive environment in the loans market. This finding is due in 
part to the decreasing market shares of domestic private commercial banks after 2005, 
which are found to be generally more competitive than state and foreign banks. In 
particular, after the global financial crisis foreign banks have been less competitive in the 
loan market due to their risk-taking behaviour and global risk exposures (Ansari, 2013). A 
similar finding, i.e. less competitive environment in the loan market after 2008 in Turkish 
banking sector, is also found by (Kasman and Kasman, 2016; Macit, 2012; Yildirim, 
2014). 
 
                                                 
86 See Table 2.2 in Section 2.6. 
87 See Table 2.5 in Section 2.6. 
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When this result is compared with the POP model estimations, both competition 
measurement methods result in similar findings. More specifically, competition in the loan 
market shows a non-monotonic trend over time. This trend might indicate that on average 
deregulatory reforms and concomitant prudential regulations have not led to sustainable 
gains for competition over time. Therefore, this implies that the reform package does not 
appear to have a significant impact on competition, as found by our POP model estimation. 
Moreover, heavy foreign bank penetration via acquisition experienced since 2005 has not 
led to significant improvements in competition, which is also consistent with our POP 
model estimation. It can therefore be inferred that despite the implementation of regulatory 
reforms and foreign penetration, the level of competition did not increase.  
202 
 
Table 7.3  Results of the estimation of the Boone indicator model (1988-2016) 
 FIXED EFFECTS  2SLS GMM-IV 
Year Estimates SD Estimates SD Estimates SD 
1988 -0.224 -0.545 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
1989 -0.243 -0.322 -0.520 -0.641 0 (omitted) 
1990 0.315 -0.279 -0.307 -0.395 -0.110 -0.342 
1991 -0.018 -0.051 0.091 -0.415 -0.177 -0.334 
1992 -0.069 -0.099 -0.249 -0.280 -0.106 -0.289 
1993 -0.694 -0.464 -0.762 -0.508 -0.369 -0.412 
1994 -0.823** -0.259 -0.266 -0.895 0.224 -0.423 
1995 -0.057 -0.214 -0.840 -0.750 -0.148 -0.349 
1996 -0.254 -0.247 -1.198 -0.845 -0.585 -0.640 
1997 -0.116 -0.459 -0.565 -0.381 -0.679* -0.345 
1998 -0.101 -0.216 0.007 -0.602 -0.257 -0.274 
1999 -0.392* -0.165 -0.412 -0.231 -0.422 -0.222 
2000 -0.634*** -0.175 -0.754*** -0.182 -0.652*** -0.180 
2001 -0.955*** -0.100 -0.945*** -0.117 -0.801*** -0.092 
2002 -0.875*** -0.054 -0.967*** -0.085 -0.896*** -0.063 
2003 -1.276*** -0.241 -0.975*** -0.120 -0.836*** -0.098 
2004 -1.247*** -0.183 -1.297*** -0.188 -0.988*** -0.164 
2005 -1.189*** -0.208 -1.608*** -0.264 -1.290*** -0.197 
2006 -1.533*** -0.281 -1.837*** -0.356 -1.556*** -0.294 
2007 -1.366** -0.412 -2.072*** -0.448 -1.536*** -0.365 
2008 -0.459 -0.547 -3.132 -2.575 -0.193 -0.676 
2009 0.094 -0.461 -0.831 -0.682 -0.569 -0.537 
2010 0.183 -0.383 -0.217 -0.499 -0.032 -0.333 
2011 0.363 -0.335 0.624 -0.723 -0.111 -0.358 
2012 0.875 -0.514 0.378 -0.431 0.396 -0.359 
2013 0.276 -0.489 -0.018 -0.493 -0.050 -0.361 
2014 0.355 -0.455 0.138 -0.407 0.142 -0.318 
2015 0.790* -0.378 0.436 -0.459 0.376 -0.385 
2016 0.559 -0.401 0.295 -0.402 0.121 -0.359 
 
Kleibergen-Paap                        
LM statistic    (p-val)                  -                                        (0.006)                                    (0.881)                                           
 
Hansen J-test (p-val)                   -                                        (0.000)                                    (0.236) 
Note: Superscripts ***, **, and * imply significance at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients 
of time dummies have not been shown. 
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Figure 7.1 The annual Boone indicators, 1988-2016 
 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically analyses the influence of regulatory reforms and recent foreign 
bank entry on competition in the Turkish banking sector using panel data spanning from 
1988-2016. The study investigates competition in the loan market, as it is the largest and 
most significant segment of the banking sector. Two dynamic competition measurement 
approaches, the POP and BI models, have been employed, enabling us to investigate the 
effects of reforms as well as foreign bank entry on competition in the credit market.  
 
The POP model results show that, firstly, there is evidence of persistent loan overcharge by 
Turkish banks, which is higher compared with banks in developed countries. Secondly, 
regulatory reforms implemented after 2001 have not led to significant improvements in the 
competitive structure of the Turkish banking sector. Finally, the heavy foreign bank 
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penetration that has been experienced since 2005 has not had a discernible impact on 
competition in the lending market.  
 
The empirical results from the complementary competition model, the estimated annual 
Boone indicators, yield consistent results and shed more light on the evolution of the 
competitive dynamics during the sample period. The annual indicators show that 
competition in the loan market follows a non-monotonic pattern over time, suggesting that 
there is no sustainable improvement in competition over time. More specifically, the 
estimated indicators suggest an improvement in competition between 1998 and 2008, but 
this is not sustained in the post-2008 period since competition in the lending market 
plummets thereafter. Therefore, on average, regulatory reforms do not result in sustainable 
competition gains. Foreign bank entry and its impact also provide a similar picture. That is, 
their penetration partly contributed the improvements in competition, yet this trend does 
not persist over time.  
 
The results of this study appear to be consistent with the findings of other studies on 
Turkish banking and developing countries. Yildirim (2014) finds that the overall level of 
competition in the Turkish banking sector did not increase despite restructuring and 
increased foreign bank entry. Kasman and Kasman (2016) find that Turkish banking 
witnessed a less competitive environment in the lending market after 2008. In the broader 
context of the literature on banking reforms and competition, Poshakwale and Qian (2011) 
find that the POP estimation suggests that reforms had no significant impact on the 
competitiveness in the lending market of the Egyptian credit market. Delis (2012) finds 
that financial reforms improve competition in developed countries with sound regulatory 
institutions, while competition is sluggish in developing countries with low institutional 
development. The author thus suggests that the success of reforms aiming at improving the 
competition of banking sectors depends on a certain level of institutional development.  
 
Before concluding, it should be noted that our two chosen models are not without their 
limitations. The estimated loan overcharge parameters and the annual indicators do not 
have particular benchmarks that would be used to judge the optimum level of competition. 
Nevertheless, this drawback does not influence our results, since this study investigates the 
relative measures over time and hence the impacts of policy measures over time can be 
examined. Another limitation highlighted in the literature is that these approaches do not 
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take into account the discrepancies in bank product quality, loan-processing speed, and 
delivery of service, which all appear to be generic limitations for all competition 
measuring approaches. Therefore, despite their limitations, these approaches appear to 
confirm the results on competition and enable us to answer our research questions. 
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Appendix 7.1. Derivation of marginal cost from the translog cost frontier  
 
The marginal costs for performing loans can be obtained by taking the first derivative of 
the total costs, TC, in Eq. (5.1) with respect to the performing loans (Y1) as follows: 
 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
𝜕 ln𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑌1𝑖𝑡
⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑌1𝑖𝑡
⁡⁡ [𝛽1𝑖𝑡 + 2 × 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑌1𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=1,..,𝐾;𝑘≠1
+ 𝜑11 ln (
𝑊1𝑖𝑡
𝑊2𝑖𝑡
) + 𝜒1𝑇
+ 𝜌1𝑃𝐷]⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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Chapter 8  
Summary and conclusions 
8.1 Research summary and findings 
Turkish banking authorities adopted banking deregulation reforms to improve competition 
with the expectation of increasing efficiency and better allocating financial resources. Yet 
the implementation of deregulatory reforms without establishing proper regulation of the 
banking system contributed to domestic financial fragilities since the early 1980s, leading 
the authorities to start a process of banking restructuring and prudential re-regulations in 
the aftermath of the twin-crises of 2000-2001. The new policy focus was aimed at 
strengthening the foundations of the banking system to ensure the smooth functioning of 
Turkish banks. The aim of this thesis has been to analyse the evolution of regulatory 
reforms over the period 1988-2016 and to evaluate their effectiveness on performance and 
competition in the lending market. The reform process can be divided in two periods, 
preceding and following the twin crises: until 2001 reforms focussed on banking 
deregulation in order to stimulate competition; from 2002 prudential re-regulation was  at 
the centre of the reform process with the objective of fostering stability (Bakır and Öniş, 
2010). The main objective of this thesis has been to gain a thorough understanding of the 
effect of these reforms on the performance, ownership and competition of the Turkish 
banking sector. In addition, the recent wave of heavy penetration of foreign banks has 
enabled us to investigate their impact on the performance of banks and on the competitive 
dynamics of the sector.  
 
This thesis has specifically examined the following three research questions: 
 
1. What is the impact of a deregulation-prudential regulation policy framework on banks’ 
efficiency, cost characteristics, and on the relations between cost efficiency and ownership? 
 
2. What are the effects of this policy framework on the intensity of competition in the loan 
market? 
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3. Does the recent wave of foreign bank penetration improve cost efficiency and 
competition in the lending market? 
 
In our empirical analyses, we use a panel dataset of 51 banks, including state, domestic 
private and foreign commercial banks, for the period 1988-2016. The bank level data is 
compiled from the unconsolidated financial statements of banks. They have either been in 
operation in each year during the sample period or operated in at least four consecutive 
years within this period in the Turkish banking sector. 
 
With regards to the stochastic cost frontier analysis the results indicate pure cost 
technological regress over the sample period, yet this worsening appears to slow down 
over time. This could in part mirror the difficulties faced by banks to adjust to a high and 
rigid cost structure inherited from the pre-deregulation period to the new operating 
environment. Moreover, successive governments found it easier to finance its borrowing 
requirements from domestic banks by means of government securities in the 1990s in 
particular. As a result, high real interest rates, coupled with financial arbitrage 
opportunities, prompted banks to focus on government deficit funding. Therefore, banks 
focused on seizing this opportunity rather than improving their productivity. The prudential 
re-regulations started to be implemented right after the devastating domestic twin-crises 
which arguably contributed to the technological regress. This is partly because it imposed a 
significant regulatory cost on banks. In addition, it further influenced the change in output 
composition and input mix of banks. It can thus be inferred that sudden implementation of 
re-regulations might hinder banks in preparing for these policies.  
 
Turning to characteristics of efficiency, this reflects a non-monotonic pattern over time, 
with efficiency gains in the early stages of deregulation and prudential re-regulation 
processes. This could be explained both by the change in reforms and the technological 
regress, which might enable average banks to catch-up with the best performing banks, 
increasing the average efficiency of banking sector. In addition, the average efficiency 
scores in the post-2002 are much higher than the pre-2002 period, which in turn might 
highlight the importance of combining deregulation reforms with a sound regulatory 
framework.  
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Turning to the determinants of efficiency, this study finds that different ownerships tend to 
react differently to the changes in the regulatory framework. More specifically, at the 
beginning of the sample, private, domestic and foreign banks appear to benefit from 
operational freedom and functional autonomy derived from deregulation compared to state 
banks. Yet they lose their advantage over time compared to state banks, indicating that the 
latter are initially well equipped to adapt. The implementation of tighter policy reforms 
appears to adversely affect all ownerships. Yet state banks, and in particular domestic 
private banks, seem to adapt to the new regulatory environment better than foreign banks 
as their efficiency improves over time, while the latter could not achieve significant 
progress. Finally, this study finds that heavy foreign bank entry after 2005 does not appear 
to have a significant effect on the efficiency of banking sector, which is partly attributed to 
their mode of entry realised in the form of acquisition rather than greenfield.  
 
The results of the POP model suggest that the elimination of abnormal profits via 
competition in the Turkish banking sector is not instantaneous. Turkish banks are able 
sustain a considerable portion of their abnormal profits from year to year due arguably to 
the impediments to competition, such as increasing concentration in the aftermath of the 
restructuring period and offering innovative services. In addition, tighter prudential norms 
on average did not have a discernible impact on competition in the lending market between 
2002 and 2016. This result is consistent with the findings of the stochastic frontier analysis 
suggesting pure cost technological regress and unsustainable efficiency gains during the 
same period. In addition, foreign bank penetration does not lead to a more competitive 
lending market. This result might partly be due to their mode of entry realised via 
acquisition and their lending strategy focusing largely on transparent large corporates. To 
crosscheck these findings, this study also analyses the dynamics of competition by 
employing a BI model. This model allows us to estimate annual competition measures and 
hence allow for the evolution of competition over time. The annual BI coefficients suggest 
a non-monotonic trend in competition over time. More specifically, there are some periods 
when competition in the lending market increased and also decreased for some years. For 
example, it is observed the longest and most consistent increase in competition from 1998 
to 2008, yet this trend changed after 2008 and competition showed a drastic decline 
thereafter. Therefore, this study also suggests that, on average, tighter prudential norms do 
not lead to a significant increase in the competition in the lending market. Moreover, 
foreign banks heavily entered into the banking sector as of 2005 and it appears that their 
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penetration might have had positive impacts on competition in the early stages of entry. 
However, since competition declines after 2008, suggesting that, on average, their 
penetration has not had a discernible impact on competition in the lending market.  
 
8.2 Implications for policies  
To widen policy implications of our empirical findings, this section seeks to compare the 
findings of this thesis with empirical evidence based on countries experienced similar 
banking reforms and structural changes. First, Turkish banking authorities imposed strict 
prudential re-regulation reforms right after the devastating domestic twin-crises; therefore, 
this sudden implementation of the reforms in turn imposed heavy regulatory costs and not 
gave necessary time for banks to prepare well in advance for the regulatory changes, 
arguably contributing to the efficiency losses and hampering technological improvements. 
Indeed, the evidence from Indian banking reforms suggests that authorities should adopt a 
consultative and gradual approach in the implementation of prudential re-regulations (Zhao 
et al., 2010). This enables banks to undertake necessary groundwork for the forthcoming 
policy changes so that these re-regulations may not necessarily come at the technological 
improvements and competitive environment. Second, empirical evidence suggests that the 
success of regulatory reforms aiming to improve competition in banking sector depends on 
a certain level of institutional developments (Delis, 2012). Since our empirical findings 
imply that the regulatory reforms could not have a discernible impact on competition in the 
lending market, the authorities should therefore aim to improve the regulatory and 
supervisory institutions to promote competition. Finally, our empirical finding suggests 
that the heavy penetration of foreign banks has not led to a significant impact on cost 
efficiency and competitive environment in the Turkish banking sector. Similarly, empirical 
evidence from Central and Eastern European banking sectors, also experienced large 
number of foreign bank entries, shows that competition is stronger if entry of foreign banks 
occurs through a greenfield investment rather than by acquisition of an existing domestic 
bank (Claeys and Hainz, 2006). Furthermore, greenfield banks tend to outperform the 
foreign banks entered via acquisition (Thi and Vencappa, 2008). Therefore, we can infer 
from that Turkish banking authorities should encourage new foreign investors to enter to 
the banking sector as greenfield banks to contribute both competition and efficiency. 
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8.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This thesis has sought to provide an investigation of the banking sector reforms in Turkey 
and their impact on efficiency, ownership, and competition. Yet there are some limitations 
that we acknowledge which also could serve as the foundations for future research. First, 
this thesis is a single country study, so its results are less easily generalised to other 
countries. Nevertheless, research could be expanded by an analysis involving a cross-
country comparison consisting of other emerging market economies, providing an 
opportunity to generalise the results on a more international basis. Second, individual 
deregulation and prudential re-regulation policies might lead to different impacts on bank 
performance and competition. Unfortunately, data limitations prevented us from taking this 
into account, making us treat both reforms as general categories. Once survey data on 
banking reforms are available for Turkey, this issue should be taken into account to capture 
the effects of individual deregulation and prudential re-regulation policies. 
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